


*CROMWELLIANA*  
*1973*



*The Cromwell Association*

# THE CROMWELL ASSOCIATION

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THE CROMWELL ASSOCIATION was founded in 1935 by the late Rt. Hon. Isaac Foot and others to help to preserve the memory of Oliver Cromwell the great puritan statesman, and to encourage study of the history of the Commonwealth protectorate and its leaders. It is not a political organisation and its aims are principally historical and antiquarian. The Association has at present over 300 members. It is anxious to extend its membership in order to widen its influence and increase its work.

Since the Association has come into existence it has: —

1. Put up commemorative tablets at Dunbar, Edgehill, Naseby, Preston, Worcester, the Huntingdon Grammar School, and elsewhere, to mark the sites of Cromwell's victories or famous episodes in his career.
2. Helped to constitute a Cromwellian Museum at present housed in the Old Grammar School, Huntingdon. It arranges for lectures to be given, leaflets issued, etc., as required on Cromwellian subjects.
3. Established an Annual Service held on September 3rd each year, by Cromwell's Statue outside the Houses of Parliament, when the address is given by a distinguished Cromwellian.
4. The Association has also formed a small reference library from which books can be borrowed on written application, enclosing postage, from the Hon. Secretary, to whom communications and enquiries can be made.

The minimum annual subscription is 50p. Life Membership £5.25.

## CROMWELL'S DAY 1972

(The Address given by Dr. Blair Worden at the Annual Commemoration Service.)

We have met today to commemorate Oliver Cromwell. To be asked to address you on this occasion is a great honour, for I know that in recent years you have been addressed by speakers both older and more distinguished than I. Dr. Ashley has told me that as we are meeting indoors this year, I might speak for a little longer than is the custom; a rash offer to extend to any speaker. I shall try not to take excessive advantage of it.

The pleasure with which I received the invitation was mixed, I confess, with a certain trepidation. The skills of the historian's trade do not qualify him in the arts of commemoration. Indeed, the idea of commemoration may not come easily to him. His job is to understand the past, not to exalt it. And yet without understanding, perhaps, there can be no true commemoration.

Cromwell is to the historian what Hamlet is to the student of English literature. A personality at once so deep and so complex will attract scholars of widely differing outlooks, who will find in it very different things. The problem, as with Hamlet, is to see Cromwell whole: to convey the rounded personality, rather than merely those parts of it with which one feels an immediate accord. For the baffling question is how so many different things could have been true of the same man.

Cromwell served his political apprenticeship in the 1620s and 1630s, those dark decades of appeasement abroad and of arbitrary government, economic dislocation, and religious persecution at home. He learnt his politics under men like John Hampden and Oliver St. John, men anxious to preserve the rights of property and to return to the mixed or balanced constitution which they believed to have existed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The influence of such men fortified Cromwell's innate conservatism; all his life he looked to the past. Yet in the 1640s, when he reached political maturity, he became the hero of the radicals, both in the army and in the congregations. We remember his defence of the anabaptists among his troops. "I have a lovely company," he wrote to St. John in 1643. "You would respect them, if you did know them. They are honest, sober Christians; and expect to be used as men." Cromwell used them as men, and he never forgot his obligations to them; a loyalty which required all his courage when the sects came under fire from M.P.s and Presbyterian divines. It was not merely a matter of loyalty, of course; it was a matter of conviction. Few country gentlemen were so responsive to radical ideas. Few of them, certainly, had the breadth of vision to combine the attitudes of a Hampden with those of the religious sects. Cromwell did combine them, but at a time when events were showing them to be politically incompatible. Here was the source of his confusion, of his spiritual tension, and eventually of his sense of defeat. We cannot properly call Cromwell either a conservative or a radical; for he was both.

His conservatism has dismayed many historians, who have regarded the inauguration of the Protectorate in 1653 as a victory for the landed classes and as, in effect, the logical outcome of Cromwell's betrayal of the radical cause. There are those, too, who find Cromwell much less interesting a figure after his final break with the Levellers in 1649. I would argue that where Cromwell differed from the Levellers was in his willingness to test his idealism against the realities of politics, and that by doing so he pitted himself against problems of political morality far more searching than those the Levellers permitted themselves to face. However that may be, it is surely a mistake to regard Cromwell's social conservatism as a mere expression of class interest. The social order, and the values to which social tradition gave rise, were God-given; only in an ordered world, Cromwell believed, could men live peaceably together, and so develop tolerance and respect for each other. Whatever else Cromwell was, he was no snob; no one was more quick to defend men with "the matter of God in them" from scornful references to their social origins. But Cromwell also knew that conservatives did not have a monopoly of intolerance. Intolerant radicalism, born of

hatred of the world rather than of understanding of it, dismayed him as much as did intolerant conservatism. Cromwell believed in the saving power of love. He wanted "righteousness and mercy" to "kiss each other."

Righteousness and mercy; there you have the fundamental dilemma of his career. His timeless statements in favour of liberty of conscience are well known; but he was saddened by those who clamoured for religious toleration but who, when the crunch came, proved to want it only for themselves. "Is it ingenious," he queried, "to ask for liberty, and not to give it?" His famous statement of 1652 that "he would rather that Muhammedanism were permitted among us, than that one of God's children should be persecuted" was made as an indignant rebuke to an M.P. who chose "zealously to argue against a Laodicean, or lukewarm indifference in religion." One of the main consequences of the Puritan Revolution, and largely a reaction against it, was the growing distinction between religion and politics, or at least between the private and the public man. In this development Cromwell played a large, if often unwitting and often unwilling, part. Many of the politicians who advised him during the Protectorate period, men like Bulstrode Whitelocke, had reacted against the proselytising element in the Puritan movement. They had developed a preference for a personal, contemplative, uncombative religion. Although they attended services at a wide variety of churches, they seem to have spent more and more of their Sundays at home in devotions with their families. Cromwell would have been dismayed by the divorce of religion from politics; but that was in the future. What he achieved during his rule was a toleration which prevented men from imposing their judgements on others. It was the fulfilment of a lifetime's ambition. "I profess to thee", he had written to Robert Hammond in 1648, "I desire from my heart, I have prayed for it. I have waited for the day to see union and right understanding between the godly people; Scots, English, Jews, Gentiles, Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, all." Three years earlier, after the successful siege of Bristol, he had written to Speaker Lenthall, "Presbyterians, Independents, all had here the same faith and prayer . . . They agree here, know no names of difference. Pity it is should be otherwise anywhere . . . All that believe have the real unity, which is most glorious, because inward and spiritual . . . As for being united in forms, commonly called uniformity, every Christian will for peace sake study and do, as far as conscience will permit; and from brethren, in things of the mind, we look for no compulsion but that of light and reason." In 1650 he asked the Presbyterian Kirk of Scotland, "Is all religion wrapped up in that or any one form? Doth that name, or thing, give the difference between those that are the members of Christ and those that are not? We think not so. We say, faith working through love is the true character of a Christian."

Faith working through love; it was the guiding principle of his life. Yet he was also a politician (a much more skilful politician, I believe, than some historians have allowed), and in politics faith and love may not, by themselves, take one very far. In the 1650s the conservatism and the radicalism of the revolution went separate ways; and Cromwell, seeking to bridge the gap, was eventually left stranded between the two. A lesser man would have given up the struggle, compromised with his beliefs by turning his back on one or the other. His refusal to do so set him on an almost predictable path of political self-destruction. Whenever the spectre of anarchy was raised, whenever the social order seemed in peril, he would expound the virtues of harmony and propriety and set about repairing the damage; but when he had done so, and when inevitably the cause then strayed once more from the paths of righteousness and reform, he would inveigh against the soullessness of his more temperate colleagues and destroy the goodwill he had taken such pains to foster. Endlessly patient in creating political unity, Cromwell was sudden and terrible in its destruction. And nothing more consistently sabotaged his various political initiatives of the 1650s than his own perception that they might succeed.

Cromwell was always torn between his desire for constitutional respectability on the one hand and his hunger for godly reformation on the other. The tension

between these two competing concerns explains the see-saw quality of Interregnum politics. In January 1649, after prolonged hesitation, Cromwell first sanctioned, and then led the moves which brought Charles I to the scaffold. When Charles' death alienated conservative and influential opinion, Cromwell reverted to more sober courses, upsetting army radicals by contemplating the survival of the Rump of the Long Parliament—the sole extant symbol of the constitutionalist, conservative opposition to Charles I—for a matter of years rather than (as the army radicals had wanted) of months. He also upset them by persuading moderates who had opposed the execution of the King to return to fill central posts in the Commonwealth government, and by seeking to prevent the abolition of the House of Lords. Yet Cromwell, having set up the Rump government as a bulwark against radical excess, proceeded to make conflicting demands of it. He wanted it not only to secure for the new republic the approval of moderate and even royalist opinion, but to implement radical reform as well. The two programmes were incompatible, and Cromwell's consequent dilemma drove him into a moody introspection which left him especially vulnerable to the promptings of his radical allies. In April 1653, accordingly, he found temporary release from his anxieties with a gesture which took even his own supporters by surprise, turning the Rump out by force, and subjecting the departing members to a vituperative display of moral indignation whose principal target was the alcoholic and sexual turpitude of the assembled M.P.s.

In place of the Rump came another graphically nick-named assembly, Barbone's Parliament, a gathering of the saints, God's chosen elite, intent, under the leadership of Thomas Harrison, on the implementation of an exhilaratingly radical programme. For a few head-turning weeks the very fabric of society seemed threatened. But Cromwell's renewed fraternity with the saints soon turned to panic. While he hesitated, others acted. The dissolution of Barbone's was contrived from within, and power handed back to a relieved and grateful Oliver. Within days he had accepted the safe, conservative constitution of the Instrument of Government, and taken for himself the title of Lord Protector.

Cromwell marked his return to respectable ways by summoning a respectable parliament—the parliament of 1654-5. When, not surprisingly, that parliament imitated the Long Parliament of the 1640s and challenged the power of the supreme magistrate—formerly Charles I, now Cromwell—the Protector took the first opportunity to dissolve the house. Instead, he set his Major-Generals to reform the manners of his countrymen. Predictably, the Major-Generals offended conservative provincial susceptibilities. Equally predictably, Cromwell revoked their commissions. Meanwhile he had turned once more to a parliament, which in 1657 came forward with a constitutional solution which offered every hope of the political settlement for which Cromwell craved, and which might indeed have been designed to fulfil the hopes entertained by Hampden, Pym and St. John in the 1640s: it offered Cromwell the crown, with constitutional checks intended to recreate the political balance of Elizabeth's time. With "settlement" at last in his grasp, however, Cromwell tormented himself over the perils of worldly temptation, and remembered at the last moment the political and religious convictions of his fellow army officers, all as entitled as he to the heritage of victory. The offer of kingship was rejected, and with it went any chance that peace would long outlive Cromwell. Within two years of his death, Charles II was back on the English throne.

It was Cromwell's misfortune to preside over the disintegration of the Puritan movement. In the 1640s, with battles to fight against an enemy who could effectively be depicted as the agent of Antichrist, the dispensations of Providence had been so much easier to detect than they had subsequently become amidst the harsh complexities of politics. Puritanism, thriving on conflict and drama, was gravely jeopardised by the return to relative political stability after the final defeat of the royalists at Worcester in 1651, and by what Sir Henry Vane called the "great silence in Heaven" thereafter. Meanwhile a new generation was emerging to political prominence, a generation impressed less by tales of civil war

heroism or the ideals which had led to bloodshed and chaos than by the need to stabilise, and hence to secularise, the world of politics. The emergence of this generation represented a far graver threat to the survival of Puritanism than did the scattered remnants of the royalist party of the 1640s. John Owen, Cromwell's chaplain and close friend, recognised the point in his opening sermon to the parliament of 1656: "Take heed", he implored, "that there rise not up a generation which knew not Joseph; that knew us not in the days of our distress, and contending with those who would have destroyed us, who were not engaged with us in praying, fasting, fighting in England, Scotland, and Ireland: but were unconcerned in our affairs; who knew nothing of the cries, tremblings, and fears, wherewith this cause hath been managed. Can we expect that they should be acted by the spirit of it, or have a due sense of what they must be engaged in? What know they of the communion we have had with God in this business all along, what answers He hath given us, what obligations He hath put upon us thereby? The whole business is to them as a story only of that which is past, wherein they are not concerned."

Owen exhorted in vain. The tide was turning against Puritanism, and Cromwell was both unable to check it and unwilling to swim with it. As a result, he died conscious of defeat. Yet it was defeat only because of, and in comparison with, the human standards he set himself, and from which he never flinched. For Cromwell always sought to live above his own limits. Often, it is true, he adopted earthly means in the pursuit of godly ends. He could be a bully; he could be devious; he could be an astute political manipulator; and above all he had the first prerequisite of a great politician, a capacity for self-deception. It is easy, from the shelter of an ivory tower, to condemn him for these things; but they are of the essence of politics; and it is through politics that any reformer, however lofty his aims, has to work. To Cromwell politics were only means; they were never ends in themselves; and the ends were the fulfilment of God's purposes.

Life, to Cromwell, was both a precious gift and an infinite responsibility. It required those who lived it to strive for an unattainable perfection; and humanity was far greater than human beings. As he is reported to have said on his death-bed, "My work is done; yet God will be with His people." In those words there lies, surely, an ideal to which men of all ages, in very different ways, can respond, and which on this occasion can serve as a bond between our age and his. For that, it seems to me, is what commemoration is.

I would like to end by referring to three sources which testify to that ideal. The first is the passage from Romans (Romans 12) which has been read to you during the Service; there is, I think, no more appropriate passage with which to commemorate Cromwell. The second is Peter Lely's portrait. All of Cromwell is there: in the face, there is the man of action; boldness, resolution, fixity of purpose. Yet the eyes tell a different story; they convey gentleness, sadness, and weariness of heart. In it, you can read his troubled lifelong spiritual vigil. And the third is the well-known letter written by Cromwell after Marston Moor to Valentine Walton, whose son had been killed in the battle. One of Cromwell's own sons had died of illness a little earlier. It is, to me, one of the most remarkable documents to survive from the civil war, and I would like to end by reading it:

*"To my loving brother, Colonel Valentine Walton, these.*

*Dear Sir,*

*It's our duty to sympathise in all mercies; and to praise the Lord together in chastisements or trials, that so we may sorrow together.*

*Truly England and the Church of God hath had a great favour from the Lord, in this great victory given unto us, such as the like never was since this war began. It had all the evidences of an absolute victory obtained by the Lord's blessing upon the godly party principally. We never charged but we routed the enemy. The left wing, which I commanded, being our own horse, saving a few Scots in the rear, beat all the Prince's horse. God made them as stubble to our swords. We charged their regiments of foot with our horse, and routed*

*all we charged. The particulars I cannot relate now; but I believe, of twenty-five thousand, the Prince hath not four thousand left.*

*Sir, God hath taken away your eldest son by a cannon-ball. It brake his leg. We were necessitated to have it cut off, whereof he died.*

*Sir, you know my own trials this way: but the Lord supported me with this, that the Lord took him into the happiness we all pant for and live for. There is your precious child full of glory, never to know sin or sorrow any more. He was a gallant young man, exceeding gracious. God give you His comfort. Before his death he was so full of comfort that to Frank Russell and myself he could not express it, it was so great above his pain. This he said to us. Indeed it was admirable. A little after, he said one thing lay upon his spirit. I asked him what that was? He told me it was, that God had not suffered him to be any more the executioner of His enemies. At his fall, his horse being killed with the bullet, and as I am informed three horses more, I am told he bid them open to the right and left, that he might see the rogues run. Truly he was exceedingly beloved in the army, of all that knew him. But few knew him; for he was a precious young man, fit for God. You have cause to bless the Lord. He is a glorious saint in Heaven; wherein you ought exceedingly to rejoice. Let this drink up your sorrow; seeing these are not feigned words to comfort you, but the thing is so real and undoubted a truth. You may do all things by the strength of Christ. Seek that, and you shall easily bear your trial. Let this public mercy to the Church of God make you to forget your private sorrow. The Lord be your strength; so prays*

*Your truly faithful and loving brother,  
Oliver Cromwell.*

Cromwell met the death of his friends with a directness and a simplicity possible only in a man aware of both the preciousness and the transience of life. In the same knowledge, we may suppose, he met his own.

## NOTES and NEWS

### Collection of books on Cromwell and his Times in London Borough of Lewisham Library.

Books in this collection of 200 titles can be borrowed through local public Libraries. A list of the titles is available on application to the Association Chairman, Mr. Trewin Copplestone, Advance House, 101-109 Ladbroke Grove, London, W.11.

### New additions to the Association Library.

Paperback editions of "The King's Peace" and "The King's War" by C. V. Wedgwood.

Revised (1973) edition of "Oliver Cromwell" by C. V. Wedgwood—  
all generously presented by member Mr. F. C. Jones.

### Note of special interest to young members.

Tina Tyree, enthusiastic young member of the Association is keen to start a duplicated magazine entitled "The Young Cromwellian". Members interested to receive and contribute to such a venture should please communicate with Miss Tina Tyree, 76 Exeter House, Hallfield Est., Bayswater, London, W.2.

### Northfield Castle, Near Peterborough.

Members will be interested to learn that this Castle, home of Cromwell's daughter Elizabeth and of his wife in her widowhood, is now undergoing a thorough restoration, and should soon be open to the public. The new owner is Mr. Roy Genders of Scarborough.

### For Sale.

(1) Engraving of Oliver Cromwell from original by Lely, with seal and two autographs 1640 and 1657.

(2) Old engraving of Prince Rupert (7½x6).

(3) Engraving of Duke of Buckingham and autograph (from original) (11x8½).  
Offers to Mrs. P. Scarisbrick, 29 Tyrone Avenue, Bispham, Blackpool, Lancs.

## CROMWELL: THE CURSE OF IRELAND?

by Jonathan S. Smith

(Awarded First Prize in the Cromwell Historical Essay Competition 1972.)

Ireland has for long constituted a peculiar problem to the English race—in whatever form the relation of the two has taken—as it, indeed, still does today. An English civil servant of the sixteenth century, whilst writing gloomily about the state of Ireland, was able to find support for his pessimism in a proverb:

It is a proverb of old date, that the pride of France, the treason of England, and the war of Ireland, shall never have end. Which proverb, touching the war of Ireland, is like always to continue without God set it in men's breasts to find some new remedy that never was found before.<sup>1</sup>

Certainly the Irish have always had a tendency towards dissatisfaction with the conditions that have existed at any given time, and the country has accordingly for long periods been a land of disruption and turmoil. Cromwell's actions in and with regard to Ireland must not be seen in isolation but within the total context of Irish and Anglo-Irish history. To ignore tendencies inherent on either side of the Irish Sea is to erect unacceptable canons of judgement in any consideration of events, whether in general or, arguably in Cromwell's case, in more individual terms. Nor is it acceptable to argue that Cromwell should have left Ireland alone—for in many respects that country can be seen as England's first colony, and by the mid-seventeenth century the two were inextricably and unavoidably associated with each other.

Cromwell's policy towards Ireland was in fact rarely original, but within the Tudor and Stuart tradition, and he perhaps had far less effect upon the ultimate peace of Ireland's soul than is often presumed. That this should be the case ties in with Hugh Trevor-Roper's notions about Cromwell's foreign and domestic policies in general: that he was essentially an Elizabethan, pursuing traditional English directions. However, from the death of Elizabeth to the Civil War, notably under Strafford's domination of Irish affairs, there had occurred a considerable expansion and evolution of English policy towards Ireland—so that in some respects it might more properly and definitely be said that Cromwell was following Stuart and distinct from Elizabethan lines of thought.

As the words of the sixteenth century civil servant imply, Ireland had been a land of instability long before Cromwell had come into contact with it; and it was to be a portent of that nation's history when, even prior to the exertion of any English influence upon it, Giraldus Cambrensis should have specifically noted its instability and backwardness: "separated from the rest of the known world, and in some sort to be distinguished as another world."<sup>2</sup> . . . And it is not insignificant that the first effective instance of English activity in Ireland should have been at the request of the King of Leinster when at war with several of his neighbouring kings. The reward for the victors: the settlement of land upon themselves, both leaders and followers. Whether the intervention of England was an event likely to hinder or promote the growth of internal stability in Ireland is a moot point—and in the world of the 1640s and 1650s such speculation seemed to Englishmen to be largely irrelevant.

And had been irrelevant since that point in time, subsequent to the first English intervention, when Henry II had determined to invade Ireland, and had formulated that idea that later kings and counsellors of England were to consistently advocate—namely that English landed proprietors in Ireland should rule that country, just as William the Conqueror had made the French of Normandy landlords and rulers of England. Stability, it seemed, was to be brought about by the subjection of all but the English influence, and the greater the degree of stability that could be expected to be finally created, it was rarely considered by Englishmen that the ~~disintegration of the Irish~~ might stem from anything other than their innate and ~~average~~ ~~instability~~—or if it was it was

usually ignored. The English desire for land and wealth, and the seeming need of the Irish to be "civilized" through contact too conveniently went together. Though the designs begun by Henry II were to be frequently interrupted they were never finally abandoned, and seemed likely to reach their final fruition under the rule of Oliver Cromwell. But, allowing the moral acceptability of the design in the time of Henry II, can we yet approve or allow its continuation and extension in the seventeenth century, despite the existence of potential excuses such as those of tradition, justification, and special circumstance? Was Cromwell's intervention in Ireland justifiable in any circumstance?—and if we deny his right to do so is this a purely twentieth century reflection? Allowing this right—a right nearly all Englishmen accepted without question—was Cromwell's policy justified in the circumstances? Such questions are a few that the complexity of the Irish issue raise.

Further complication ensues from the relation of Ireland to the Civil War in England, and the co-existence of two issues: the Irish against the English in general, and the conflict of Royalist and Parliamentary within Ireland, with the sometime confluence of the Royalist and Irish causes. If this is not sufficient we could also question the true loyalties of the old Englishmen—those English settlers under the Tudors who, after the passage of the first decades of the seventeenth century seemed to be increasingly clearly assimilated with the native Irish. Men of whom Sir Vincent Gookin recorded in 1634 that,

As soon as any cometh over and setteth himself in this country and hath gotten any estate, he findeth himself environed with the Irish, and hath no safety both for himself and posterity but by some way sticking themselves by marriage and gossiping, or the like.<sup>3</sup>

These men tried to tread the tightrope between the different loyalties and needs pressing upon them.

Cromwell, if he was severe in his general treatment of the old English, at least had some degree of justification that Charles I did not have when he began his policy of subordinating *all* the people in Ireland to the needs of England, for whereas during the Civil War many could be construed as having not only fought against Parliament but also against the whole English nation, from whatever motives, in the 1630s no such reasoning was available. Defeated they could only expect punishment—but were they, in the time of Charles I, as potentially disloyal and "un-English" as he seemed to hold them?

As early as 1611 Sir George Carew had been warning that crown policies, if not tempered, would one day lead to rebellion; but his words were not heeded. The extension of the policy of subjection to the old English, notably under Strafford, served above all else to produce dissatisfaction among an ever increasing number of the inhabitants of Ireland. The following statement, made in 1644 by one of the old English, to Parliament, shows the depth of resentment that was created:

Was it not the usual taunt of the late Lord Strafford and all his fawning sycophants, in their private conversations with those of the Pale (the old English), that they were the most refractory men of the kingdom, and that it was more necessary—that is for their own crooked ends—that they should be planted and supplanted than any others, and that where plantations might not reach Defective Titles should extend?<sup>4</sup>

And the alacrity with which the old English were prepared to present reasons for Strafford's impeachment allows a similar conclusion. As within England not all men supported Strafford's impeachment—though one would in Ireland be more hard put to find his defenders; and nor did they all oppose the crown just because they opposed the crown's policies—rather they saw men like Strafford to be the evil counsellors who were misguiding the king. Thus it was that men like the young Earl of Clanricarde could be amongst Charles' most loyal supporters throughout the 1640s, despite the shabby treatment his father suffered in the 1630s. In the same way the Earl of Ormonde was forced to accept the loss of a quarter of his lands but yet still served the crown loyally in Ireland over four decades.

while the Earl of Cork, a known and diehard Royalist, was treated similarly—and in his case at least it is clear that the king was forced into a line of policy he disliked.

There can, then, in the activities of Strafford and Charles I, be seen a precedent for the subjection of all the inhabitants of Ireland but those who were recently arrived, and hence controlled, English. It was this desire for absolute control—Strafford and Archbishop Laud's policy of "thorough"—as much as the desire to earn some easy revenue, though an increased income was the expected outcome of greater control, that was the true motivation behind the crown's policies. In such we can see the reasoning behind the prosecution of the City of London, and its subsequent fining, sequestration of lands, and forfeiture of Irish charter, for the contravention of the terms of its charter to Coleraine and Londonderry. Along with the more potentially honest and well-intentioned idea of settling and thereby "civilizing" Ireland, these motivations also account for the crown's refusal to allow a sixty years possessory title for the land, as had been passed in England under James I, and its insistence on either confirming lands for a fee or, more usually, granting confirmation of three quarters of the land in exchange for the remaining quarter being put to the use of the crown. Leitrim had been thus planted under James I, and Roscommon, Sligo and Mayo counties followed under Charles—Galway, for its resistance, having half its land confiscated, and it being set aside to be "fully lined and planted with English". Such actions can be seen as the forerunners of the attempts to "settle" Ireland during the Interregnum—attempts that were more justified owing to the intervening presence of the Irish Rebellion. Nor was it an insignificant factor that despite Strafford's policy the Irish and Royalist causes should frequently have appeared to be one—and to Cromwell and the Parliamentarians the mere threat of such an alliance was almost as great as any actuality that might have been created, it being no accident that Strafford should finally have died on the basis of his supposed plans for the Irish army.

But how real was this alliance? The basic cause of the unrest in Ireland was the dissatisfaction of the native Irish with the English yoke they were forced to bear—"chafing under a thousand grievances", Charles' difficulties in both England and Scotland provided the stimulus and the opportunity for the outbreak. An outbreak that was clearly not aimed against non-monarchical forces alone, but against the whole of England, for how else are we to interpret statements such as that made by Sir Con Magennis:

We are for our lives and liberties.

And the destruction of the English Protestant settlers in the early part of the rebellion was a positive indication of the English stain on the land being eliminated—nor was it always to be restricted to Protestants. Sir John Temple recorded that in the first weeks of the rebellion

Many persons of good rank and quality (were) covered with old rags . . . others that had escaped with their lives sorely wounded. Wives came bitterly lamenting the murders of their husbands, mothers of their children, barbarously destroyed before their faces . . . The greatest part of the women and children thus barbarously expelled out of their habitations perished in the city of Dublin . . .<sup>5</sup>

Temple was to later estimate that 300,000 "British and Protestants" were thus murdered or expelled, and though exaggerated such reports, in the troubled times, could not help but be listened to—especially as the general facts were accurate. Add to this the positive exultation of men like the Jesuit Cornelius O'Mahony, and one can easily appreciate that the English Parliament would tend to severity in its retaliation upon the rebels. And it was only rarely doubted that the answer to rebellion was greater rather than lesser or moderated severity.

It is all too easy today to point to the fact that Elizabeth's settlement with Hugh O'Neill in 1603 was generous, and then to ask why that of the 1650s could not have been equally so. It does seem to be true that Elizabeth understood the fears of the Ulstermen, and that the settlement she offered them was

in large part designed as an assurance that they would not lose any basic rights, in the hope of creating peace for the future as well as for the present; but it is also true that in 1602/1603 she was a dying queen who longed to leave her people in tranquility, and who, to do so, was perhaps prepared to grant more than she would have been in earlier days. Equally, in 1603 Elizabeth could afford to be generous because Hugh O'Neill had never called into question the right of England to be in Ireland, merely the extent to which those rights should be stretched—but in the 1650s it could not be forgotten that the Irish had rebelled against all English influence for the preceding ten years. If this English influence were to be now maintained—and which Englishman could doubt that it would be—then it would have to be through rigour and severity. Perhaps even more dangerous from the English point of view was the fact that the Irish had displaced the established church and set up the Catholic church in its stead—and the Papal Nuncio, Rinuccini, had been in their midst, continually urging them to a greater and more irreconcilable extremism.

But this extremist influence was, at least at times, balanced by the moderating influence of the old English and of some of the Irish. It was unfortunate that many of the extreme Irish on the one hand should have failed to see the benefits in restraint, and, on the other, that many of the English should have tarred all the Irish and the old English with the same brush. It is clear that the moderating—and largely old English—element were not in alliance with the extremist Irish in the latter's wholesale destruction of the new English: a planned destruction that even the most kind-hearted of men would find it difficult to forget. But neither could they gain the appreciation of the English Parliament, because their efforts were nearly entirely directed towards the assuaging of the specifically Irish and anti-English aspect of the rebellion to the benefit of the Royalist cause.

Thus when the native Irish, led by the Ulstermen, always anxious for their rights, rebelled in October 1641 they were not initially joined by the old English, though it was soon clear that their own persons and property would be threatened if they did not do so, and that no help was to be forthcoming from England. By the end of the year, however, the majority had joined with the rebels—why? In part it was undoubtedly because of the immediate fear they felt, but they must also have known that the rebellion would ultimately be put down, and their position would be almost equally hopeless—hopeless, that is, unless they could appear to be fighting for a loyal cause. Ireland being more feudal and aristocratic than England, without the same expanding middle and commercial classes, the choice of cause seemed obvious—not even the activities of a Strafford could turn most of them from the basic loyalties they felt for the monarchy. Thus it was that the one condition that the old English made, through Ormonde, of the Irish before they allied with them was that the latter should swear that they were fighting for the crown against the growing antagonism of the English Houses of Lords and Commons.

This condition the Irish readily agreed to, the more especially because they were already claiming the Royalist cause as their own in an attempt to bolster their own hopes. Sir Phelim O'Neill, for example, who was the leading rebel during the first few months, repeatedly claimed to be acting by the King's authority, and displayed a commission bearing the great seal of England—and though Charles denounced it for the forgery it undoubtedly was the English Puritans and Scottish Presbyterians, already suspicious of his dealings with the Irish, were not in a mood to be easily convinced.

From basically different motives, therefore, the Irish and old English causes were flung together. Parliament, if this had been all, could not be excused for failing to see the difference of motivation of the two groups, and to differentiate between the two accordingly—but if the identification was initially to the advantage of the Irish: "The crisis between King and Parliament had begun in a dispute over . . . the Irish revolt. It now seemed that a Civil War would have to be fought in England . . ." then it must not be forgotten that the King in his turn all too soon began to see what he regarded as the advantages of an Irish alliance, so that throughout the 1640s his servants in Ireland concentrated their

efforts upon establishing a firm relationship with the rebels. Such an association was to be detrimental to the King's cause in England, owing to the inherent dislike and fear Englishmen had of the "Irish savages", and to the Irish and old English in the settlement arrived at in the 1650s, because of the added danger that the crown represented.

Already Charles had created much opposition in England by his suggestion in 1639 that a new Irish army of 9,000 men be raised, expressly "to reduce those in Scotland to their true obedience", and Strafford had died on the basis of the potential use of this army in England. But this policy was, even so, continued, and in September 1643 the lieutenant-general of the English army in Ireland, Ormonde, was able to secure a year's cessation of hostilities. It is to Charles' credit that he was not searching for Catholic aid (though the rebels agreed to pay the King £30,000 over an eight months period) but Protestant, and the 2,500 men despatched from Dublin in November 1643 were part of Ormonde's English/Irish Protestant army, released from its need to stay in Ireland. Though Charles was anxious to have these men even he could not trust the Irish sufficiently to transport them from their defensive purpose until hostilities actually ceased. And it is worthwhile noting that even in the years 1643/4 Charles put the defence of his English subjects in Ireland to be his first priority there, as opposed to the need he saw for an Irish alliance—Ormonde's task had been to combine the two. What is most revealing about the nature of the Anglo-Irish relationship is the fact that even at the most desperate times the King never doubted the English *right* to be in Ireland, and Irish independence was the farthest thing from his mind. It is true that Charles was to grant the Earl of Glamorgan special powers to treat with the rebels in an attempt to ease a hopeless situation, but it is equally clear that the peace treaty he signed, granting all the Irish demands, far exceeded anything that had been intended—the King knew all too well that if he were to accept such conditions then his cause in England would be disgraced. However it is not surprising that Parliament, because of Charles' sometimes devious and contradictory ways—which Glamorgan seems to have been caught up in—was suspicious of him, and held it possible that he should uphold the Earl's abortive treaty.

This mere possibility, along with the existence of any sort of Irish army in England, was sufficient to alienate much potential support for the Royalist cause, for Ireland was the backdoor to England, and the simplest mention of Ireland could not help but conjure up for most Englishmen the spectre of Catholicism. Was it not feasible that, as under Elizabeth, when 4,000 soldiers were landed to aid the Ulstermen, the Spanish might try to invade England through Ireland, religiously a natural ally? Cromwell was only expressing the accepted view when he said that the Papists had been "accounted, ever since I was born, Spaniolized". The Armada and the Gunpowder Plot were still all too vivid memories in the minds of Englishmen, and more recently it had seemed that the House of Habsburg had been undoing the Reformation, and this with the connivance of the English king and bishops. Moreover, it had been clear from the earliest days of the Civil War that the Papists were to be solidly Royalist. The triangle of king, Catholicism and Ireland seemed too complete to be ignored—and the potential danger of this triple alliance appeared to have been confirmed following Charles I's execution, when the Prince of Wales waited at Jersey for a favourable moment to enter Ireland, where he in fact at one point despatched his baggage, and when Prince Rupert occupied Kinsale (even if blockaded by the Parliamentarian, Admiral Blake).

That Ireland could, and with considerable validity, be seen as the possible source of an invasion of England by the Royalists is alone sufficient to explain why the Commonwealth might think it necessary to secure Ireland very firmly—and the way to this seemed to be through a complete reorganization of the land system, affecting both the Irish and old English, since they were equally dangerous to the Parliamentarian cause, if not to the English.

If Ireland had only rebelled against the degree of English interference and authority within it, as had been the case under Elizabeth, then the severity of

the Cromwellian settlement would be hard to accept as entirely necessary. Even the potential Royalist threat could not, despite a degree of justification it finally gives, be used as an excuse for the planned wholesale removal of the majority of the inhabitants of Ireland. But the rebellion of 1641/53 was on a new and frightening scale. In many respects Elizabeth had seemed to offer Ireland the permanent existence of at least a semblance of self-government and power to control English aspirations. However, as we have seen, Strafford repudiated such a relationship as regards *all* those who lived in Ireland, for even the newest of the English settlers was expected to be totally subservient to central policy—thus in 1663 writing to Lord Coke, Strafford, then Thomas Wentworth, said:

Nothing is more prejudicial to the good success of these affairs than their being understood aforehand by them here. So prejudicial I hold it indeed that on my faith there is not a minister who knows anything I either write or intend...<sup>9</sup>

But whereas the new English could accept their position as a condition of their presence, this the Irish, who believed they had secured a better one, and the old English, who had always assumed they held a special position above the Irish, could not accept. Certainly the Irish, rightly feeling they would only lose more and more land and privileges, considered that England had broken her side of a bargain—and what reason was there to presume that she would not do so again? If there was to be a rebellion it seemed that it would have to be a make-or-break one—defeat meant to the Irish the end of their hopes of independence, and it seemed logical that since the rebels had established the grounds upon which they were fighting then upon such grounds and by such standards should they be judged.

This belief of the Irish that they were fighting a last desperate struggle for freedom—a desperation beyond the moderation that the old English represented—helps explain in large part the unalterable extremism that dominated the Irish cause, and assured that defeat would be very bitter and severe. This extremism was found embodied in that aspect of Ireland that most Englishmen least liked, namely its Catholicism, and it was the Catholic clergy who most consistently worked against *any* peace that would not satisfy *all* the original Irish demands. In practice the Catholic clergy throughout Ireland encouraged resistance to the English, and before the rebellion had begun we read that there had been "a great underhand labouring among the priests, friars and Jesuits", culminating in a meeting at Multifarnham in Westmeath in the month of the outbreak of the rebellion and at which their basic and uncompromising demands were set out.

Only Catholicism was to be allowed; Ireland was to be entirely separated from England; the civil authority of the country was to be placed into the hands of the ancient chiefs and nobility—thus a constant request of the Catholics in their negotiations with Ormonde was that:

the Parliament of Ireland be independent of the Parliament of England, without which independency this realm could be no kingdom, nor any Parliaments here necessary, nor any subject of this kingdom sure of his estate, life, or liberty, other than at the will and pleasure of a Parliament, wherein neither knights, Lords, nor burgesses of this kingdom hath place or vote, and which vowed the destruction of all or most of this nation, and unwarrantably assumed the power to dispose of their estates.<sup>10</sup>

Rebellion risked total subjection, but that seemed destined without the rebellion itself. There can in this be seen two possible lines, one saying that the severity of the Cromwellian settlement was justified in the light of the extremist Irish attitudes and the other stating that those very attitudes were created by unwarranted and unacceptable assumptions embodied in English policy. In other words were Englishmen right to presume that they held privileges and a superiority over the Irish such that the latter had little say in their own destiny?

The question has a useful parallel in the attitudes of the American settlers to the North American Indians: the savages of another land ripe for colonization. There were men in the seventeenth century who warned their contemporaries

that perhaps their assumptions as regards less developed races were false—thus in New England John Eliot and Roger Williams both quarrelled with the authorities when they pressed for the rights of natives. Roger Williams, for example, stated that no king of England could grant land in America for it did not belong to him but, through possession, to the Indians. Such men embody the high standards by which we ought to compare their fellow men—but, equally, it must never be forgotten that later man has the advantage of hindsight and that the “rights” and “wrongs” of the past were not nearly so obvious as we now see them as being. It was very difficult for men like John Winthrop, John Cotton and Thomas Dudley, convinced as they were that they were among the elect few who had God’s saving grace and who followed the true path, to accept that uneducated and heathen Indians could have rights that, if stubbornly exercised, could prevent the fulfilment of God’s work. To a lesser degree this same attitude prevailed in Ireland and the English views of it, and it is perhaps no coincidence that in the 1650s some of the Massachusetts Puritans should have been encouraged to settle there. It would be hard, then, to condemn the many because of the unique insight of a few—a few who in reality lived before their time.

However, though the comparison of the Indians and the Irish is valid there are differences—not the least of which was that the Irish were Christians, if Catholics. It is perhaps true to say that such was the English Protestant fear of Catholicism that they would almost rather that the Irish had been heathens—certainly their treatment could have been little worse. And what is more significant, the Irish were not as “uncivilized” as North America’s Indians—so that it is harder to condone attitudes that were remarkably similar in some respects.

The very fact that Ireland was so close to England, both geographically and economically, in fact helps to explain English actions—it was not only that the Irish were less civilized, it was also that they represented a threat to the established order of things, and this never more so than when it seemed to the forces of Parliament that it might serve as the base for the Royalist cause. Once involved in Ireland it also appeared too late for England to extricate herself, for without control that land would always be a danger and an area of disturbance to the home country. It was not because the Catholic clergy were savages, but because they encouraged, almost without fail, resistance to England—they symbolized that potential disruption that Ireland as a whole represented—that goes farthest to explaining why it became accepted policy to kill any priests caught after a battle or a siege.

Cromwell has been frequently criticized for his inability to extend the toleration he was prepared to grant all the Protestant sects to include Catholicism:

I meddle not with any man’s conscience. But if by liberty of conscience you mean a liberty to exercise the mass, I judge it best to use plain dealing, and to let you know, where the Parliament of England have power, that will not be allowed of.<sup>11</sup>

To a certain extent this attitude was only to be expected, for it was that of the majority of Englishmen, and throughout the Irish rebellion the Catholic influence had tended not towards peace but towards war. The presence and influence of Rinuccini seemed an additional threat that must be prevented from occurring again, and this by the total subjection of the Catholic religion in Ireland.

But just how justifiable were these aims? For example, though the Nuncio was present and worked against peace, yet his instructions were not as extreme as might have been expected:

the restoration and re-establishment of the public exercise of the Catholic religion in the island of Ireland, and further to lead her people, if not as tributaries to the Holy Sea, such as they were five centuries ago, to subject themselves to the mild yoke of the Pontiff, at least in all spiritual affairs—thus to gain over innumerable souls to the glories of Paradise.<sup>12</sup>

We cannot help but admire Cromwell’s attitude towards toleration, which was in its general aspects far in advance of his time:

As for being united in forms, commonly called uniformity, every Christian will for peace-sake study and do as far as conscience will permit; and from brethren in the things of the mind we look for no compulsion but that of light and reason.<sup>13</sup>

And yet, given that the Papal orders showed an appreciation of the difficulties of the English position, and desired only spiritual freedom, might it not have been expected that Cromwell should have begun, at least, to find room for the toleration of Catholics? Should he not have seen also that much of the unrest in Ireland had stemmed from religious restriction, and that if this were relaxed to some extent then a new harmony might be forged? The latter point does seem valid; and that Cromwell, in company with most Englishmen, showed a failure to understand the true nature of the Irish problem appears clear. But the former point is more open to doubt, for the actual designs of the Papacy were never really clear, largely through the intrigues of Rinuccini. Could spiritual freedom only come about through military victory, and was this the Pope’s true desire?—the answer to this might not have been clear, but what was known was that the Nuncio never faltered from combining the two. Was the Papacy working for a complete reversal of the power structure?—this too was never said, and yet could it be doubted that Rinuccini was the valid representative of Papal designs when he insisted that the laws of Ireland should be for the guaranteed protection of Catholics and the disadvantage of Protestants? Laws that were all too clearly not restricted even to religious matters. Moreover, Rinuccini had encouraged the ideas of men like the Jesuit O’Hartegan who suggested that all property in Ireland belonging to Dutch, Scottish, English and Irish “heretics” be confiscated and used for the support of a 100,000 strong Catholic army. If it had been clear that the designs of the Papacy and the Catholic clergy had been purely spiritual then the rigour of the Irish settlement that was decided in the 1650s would be hard to justify to the same extent, and even if we accepted such an attitude in the majority of Englishmen could we do the same for Cromwell’s refusal to extend his toleration to Catholics? In fact when Rinuccini left Ireland he did so in the face of extreme Papal displeasure—a displeasure not primarily that Rinuccini had failed to guide the Irish to victory, but rather that his uncompromising attitudes had worked to the detriment of the Catholic cause. The Pope’s main concern was only that some measure of spiritual freedom be secured—but the actions of the Pope’s representatives prevented that from being obvious. Nor was it really to be expected that, in the circumstances, Englishmen should accept the honour of the actual intentions, for the Pope *could* have helped by making a perfectly explicit statement at an early date. The most that we should expect would be a very slight degree of moderation, especially after thirteen years of bloody rebellion in the name of the Catholic cause.

And it would, finally, have been very hard for the Pope to deny that if Irish independence had seemed a virtual certainty then he would not have aided in its achievement—and from that point who would doubt that England was the next target? Perhaps more people should have doubted such, for it can be seen as a groundless fear—and yet, like the McCarthyistic fear of Communism in the United States it had its origins in reality. The truth is that Englishmen in the seventeenth century had also a natural desire towards expansion and control, and Ireland was a very useful “colony”. Such a pose we might condemn now, but it then seemed logical to most men; our criticism of men of advanced ideas like Cromwell and John Milton must be that they failed to extend their theories to their logical conclusions, and allow for the Irish and old English at least a modicum of the respect that they allowed to Englishmen in general.

But it must not be forgotten that the Irish had not show themselves so deserving of trust. It might have appeared to many in England that the old English

under Ormonde had specifically rejected the Parliamentary alternative, and had chosen Ireland before England. In reality, however, Ormonde was not disloyal to England so much as loyal to his king—a position that could not be doubted after 1646. In that year Ormonde was faced between the choice of handing his untenable position over to the English Parliament or to the Irish—and he and his Council of State were united in choosing Parliament. There were a number of reasons for this, such as that the English suppositions as regards Ireland required that the King's cause be not too tightly bound up with Ireland if he were to hope to retain his crown. But primarily significant was the cause of Ormonde's untenable position, this being the domination of the extremist Irish elements who were at that time full of "Hopes of Succour or Relief for themselves". Should Ormonde surrender:

into the hands of the English, who could not deny them protection and justice, or of the Irish, who had not only despoil'd them of their fortunes, and prosecuted them with animosities and cruelties, but declar'd by their Carriage, that they were not capable of security under them.

In this situation we can see both the violence of the Irish position, in that they showed a reluctance to protect their allies, and the general hatred of the Irish by even the old English. And such dislike stemmed from that very lack of trust and honour that the Irish were then displaying. Is it surprising then that Parliament, more definitely their enemy, should have taken a tough line, when even the most ardent of Royalists chose the King's opponents before Ireland?

In part this would seem to lead us back to a prior position, namely that the Irish can be seen as being justified in their treatment of the old English because they only had a choice between English Parliamentary domination, English Royalist domination and the possibility of freedom. But were these necessarily the choices, and was Ireland in an impossible position? For was it not, given the occurrences of the time, possible to hope that an alliance with the crown would provide a far greater chance of at least partial freedom than all-out war against England would?

Given this extremist obstinacy it is understandable that Englishmen as a whole should have looked upon the Irish with hatred and disgust, for whatever the causes of the rebellion one could reasonably expect the development of at least a little moderation—or so Englishmen would think. On the Irish side it is possible that many of them honestly believed they were near to winning their freedom, and that it would be sheer stupidity to settle for a compromise; it is in this possibility that we can see the basic differences of opinion on the two sides of the Irish Sea—the English never questioned the fact that they had a *right* to be in Ireland, and it was this very attitude that the Irish opposed. Thus their opposition in 1646 to Ormonde and the old English, who represented the English attitude, and of which they were the outgrowth.

From this point we can see why the crown basically regarded Ireland in the same light as Parliament—the Irish had raised an issue over which there could be no middle courses. The Earl of Clarendon, for example, showed that he possessed just the same attitude as his English opponents—thus on 29th May 1654 he wrote:

We are at a dead calm for all manner of intelligence. Cromwell, no doubt, is very busy. Nathaniel Fiennes is made Chancellor of Ireland; and they doubt not to plant that kingdom without opposition. And truly, if we can get it again, *we shall find difficulties removed* . . .

The attitude would be all the more the same but that Clarendon whitewashes Strafford, and paints the picture of a marvellously happy and harmonious country prior to the 1640s—when peace was destroyed by the rebellious Irish and the disruptions of the English Parliament.

This viewpoint is amplified further by another statement of Clarendon's which clearly shows that the Irish aim was independence, and that this thought was

alien to Englishmen of all leanings, and though one must always be wary of Clarendon's statements there does seem little reason to doubt the basic truth of what he says here, especially given his friendship with Ormonde, who was usually quite fair and reliable:

That which, among other things of importance, made a deep impression on the Marquess, was the knowledge that there had been from the beginning of those Treaties, a design in the principal contrivers of them, entirely to alienate the Kingdom of Ireland from the Crown of England, to extirpate not only the Protestants, but all the Catholics who were derived from the English, and who, in truth, are no less obedient to the old Irish than to the other, and to put themselves into the protection of some foreign Prince, if they should find it impossible to erect one of the old families . . . the exorbitant power assumed by the Nuncio, was earnest how little more they meant to have to do with (even) the King . . .

This possibility that Ireland might appeal for and get foreign protection was one of the basic reasons for England's concern with the Irish situation, and helps explain the growing desire for effective total control of Irish affairs. Ireland was all too well placed to be a bulwark for the invasion of England, a point that the Jesuit David Wolf stressed in 1574 in his *Description of Ireland* when he urged Philip II of Spain to:

accede to the request of the Irish to have don John for their King, which might be a great terror to the English heretics, "for there is a prophecy among them that the ruin of England must begin in Ireland".

Nor were such English fears idle or imaginary for both under Elizabeth and Charles the Irish had rebelled in the confident expectation of being able to obtain foreign support, both material and spiritual. Throughout the 1640s a great deal of time and money had been spent in attempting to win over the Dutch, French, Spaniards, Venetians and others, and the Pope was constantly requested to give more active support than he was prepared to. When Henrietta Maria in 1647 wrote in tones of disgust: "I wonder that the Irish do not give themselves to some foreign King" (-18-) she was expressing a possibility that was far nearer than she realised.

At the beginning of 1646, for example, the Duke of Lorraine had been preparing to send an army of 10,000 men to the aid of Charles, and though this had come to nothing Lorraine was yet not averse to the request made for his help by the Irish clergy assembled at Clonmacnoise in December 1649. Though Ormonde and the Earl of Clanricarde, his more acceptable deputy because a Catholic, were extremely doubtful of the value of the approaches, they eventually acquiesced in the suggestion under extreme pressure, insisting that the two commissioners selected to attend the Duke should do nothing without the approval of at least one of the King's councillors. These commissioners, however, pursued not Clanricarde's instructions (Ormonde having again been forced to relinquish his role) but those of the Catholic Council and the assembly of the clergy, which told them to yield *any* conditions necessary to secure the protection of the Duke, "even by delivering all they had of the kingdom into his hands." Thus was provided adequate proof of Clarendon's contention that:

The greater part of the clergy, and all the Irish of Ulster, had no mind to have any relation to the English nation, and as little to return to their obedience to the Crown.<sup>19</sup>

The scheme failed precisely because Lorraine was too loyal to Charles to accept the Irish proposals, but it must not be forgotten that throughout the critical years of 1650/2 there did seem to be a real possibility of his intervention—and it was at just this period in time that Parliament got down to seriously considering the settlement of Ireland. It is only to be expected that their fears, valid because not totally illusory, should have provoked a severe reaction. An actual illustration of the potential danger existed in the remnant of the Irish who had refuge in Innisbofin and who held out in the name of Lorraine until late in 1652.

It must also have crossed English minds that the fact that the Supreme Council of Ireland, formed in 1642, had survived the troubled times in virtually its original state illustrated not only the permanency that the Irish rebellion was seeking, but also the basic solidarity that the Irish cause invoked. If England were to retain her regained possession and control of Ireland then the settlement could not be lax. And something must be done about the Catholic clergy, for they it was, meeting in Kilkenny in May 1642, who had sketched out the design for the Catholic Confederation, and who, in joint deliberation with a number of Catholic Lords and gentlemen, had then created the Supreme Council. And more than any other segment of Irish society it was they who had created a unity of purpose and belief that, apart from the rivalries and jealousies of several of the army commanders, was to survive barely diluted throughout the period. Only at the time that Rinuccini opted to depart from Ireland did this uniformity really seem to be waning, and many Irishmen were to later bitterly regret that lapse.

In a sense of course the circumstances suited the influence that the clergy exerted—the times were unsettled and they represented potential stability, or at least solidarity. But there was more than this, and it was perhaps this that Englishmen most hated. Certainly Sir Vincent Gookin thought so in his bitter invectives against the whole Irish nation: his attitude, and that of a huge majority of Englishmen, was that the Irish were savages, and what seemed clear to him in 1634 was to be generally accepted after the old English joined the Irish in 1641—namely that far from being civilized by contact with a superior race the Irish in fact caused the degeneration of that race. It was this inherent savagery in the Irish that became directed against their conquerors that the clergy used and melded to their own ends, but which they did not create. Once victory had been won it is doubtful if even the clergy could maintain any valid sense of unity—the potential weakness of their position that was manifested in the inability of the Irish armies to work together, and in the regional fears that occasionally appeared. If the English feared the unity of Ireland it was because it existed and was exploited by the clergy in just one form: hatred of England.

Cromwell has often been criticized for the conduct of his Irish campaign—but such critics ignore or minimise the fact that here different standards of warfare ruled, and which were based on Ireland's savagery and hate. The campaign began on a rare note of humanity which was only possible because of Cromwell's approach to the problem. He had early decided that the campaign must be quick, and therefore ruthless, both because England could not afford a long one, either financially or in terms of the need for stability, and Cromwell knew that there were some at home who were all too eager that he should lose his political authority through a drawn-out fight or defeat. The fact that Essex had failed to subdue the Irish under Elizabeth was not to be forgotten. Because of his concerns Cromwell took long to accept and then prepare for the campaign, and only when supplies were organized and the men paid—he waited from mid-July to mid-August 1649 for the arrival of a promised £100,000—did he embark. And it was *only* because his men were paid that Cromwell was able, upon his arrival in Dublin, to declare:

I am informed that, upon the marching out of the Armies heretofore, or of parties from Garrisons, a liberty hath been taken by the Soldiery to abuse, rob and pillage, and too often to execute cruelties upon the Country People: Being resolved by the grace of God, diligently and strictly to restrain such wickedness for the future . . .<sup>20</sup>

Cromwell did not, it is apparent, set out to be anything but fair, and he appreciated that ordinary folk should not suffer undeservedly for the ravages of the time—something few other commanders seemed to care about. To back up his words two men were hanged for contravention of the declaration, while a newspaper letter of the time informed:

There hath been a huge purge of the Army which we found here: it was an Army made up of dissolute and debauched men.<sup>12</sup>

Contrast this attitude with that of the Irish—for example, as noted in the first weeks of the rebellion by Sir John Temple.

The years before Cromwell's arrival in 1649 were full of their own horrors, of which the following are just a few illustrations. In September 1647 Lord Inchiquin had sacked Cashel because of its refusal to yield—a refusal prompted by the fact that Inchiquin had refused to guarantee the citizens their lives: a condition Cromwell never failed to grant. About 1,000 people, many of them women, were slaughtered; no respect was shown to the church, and Inchiquin is said to have donned the archiepiscopal mitre and boasted that he was now archbishop of Cashel as well as governor of Munster. Ludlow, exaggerating a little, recorded that he:

put 3,000 to the sword, taking the priests even from the altar: of such place is ambition when it seizes upon the minds of men.<sup>22</sup>

And in 1642 major General Robert Monro, after allowing quarter, put over sixty of the townsmen of Newry to death, and 150 women were saved only by the intervention of Monro's second-in-command.

Nor should it be forgotten that the only previous forces of Parliament to be sent to Ireland, under Lord Forbes, had done little but indiscriminately kill unarmed citizens along a part of the coast. And any Irishman encountered by the Parliamentary forces in England was immediately put to death, as were the Irish followers of Montrose in Scotland. Cromwell thus entered a sphere of affairs dominated by savage instincts, and whatever one makes of his conduct at Drogheda and Wexford, the most criticized part of his campaign, one must bear in mind in his defence the nature of the Irish war.

Supposing that Cromwell had determined to make the capture of these towns examples to the rest of Ireland then we can without much difficulty find reasons for his conduct. Would it not have been true to say that if the enemy were not frightened of Cromwell then his campaign might have become interminable?

The capture of Wexford and the massacre of its inhabitants, coming hard on the tragedy of Drogheda, spread the terror of Cromwell's name through Ireland and inclined many waverers and time-servers to his side.<sup>23</sup>

Drogheda and Wexford can thus be seen as necessary warnings that in fact speeded the end of war in Ireland and in the long run prevented a greater loss of life, and this contention the facts of the matter do seem to bear out. Certainly Ormonde immediately abandoned Dundalk and Trim, cutting the number of Cromwell's first series of intended sieges by half, while Ormonde recorded the effect and manner of the defeats upon his supporters.

It is not to be imagined how great the terror is that these successes and the power of the rebels has struck into this people. They are so stupefied, that it is with great difficulty that I can persuade them to act anything like men towards their own preservation.<sup>24</sup>

In opposition to this point of view it has to be admitted that the very fear Cromwell created probably served to lengthen the siege and the loss of men at, for example, Clonmel—fear can drive men to greater as well as lesser actions. But it would be hard to deny that Clonmel was the exception rather than the rule, and that the vitally necessary convincing start to the Parliamentary campaign had been secured, to the discouragement of the opposition. Thus Sir Phelim O'Neill commented that if Cromwell could take Drogheda, with Ormonde's best troops in it, then "he could enter the gates of hell itself."

Again, however, it might be said that Cromwell left three years of military struggle behind him in Ireland, so that the campaign can hardly have been called quick; but the fact remains that these were three years of mopping-up operations. Cromwell's desire was to take the heart out of the Irish cause, and this he certainly succeeded in doing. Moreover, it would have been a waste of proven talent to keep him in Ireland (he had actually received his orders of recall—because of the Scottish situation—four months before he obeyed them, waiting to quell the last serious resistance before departing).

And yet Drogheda and Wexford must remain a blot in posterity's opinion of Cromwell. At Drogheda, on September 10th, he had written to Sir Arthur Aston

the governor:

Having brought the army belonging to the Parliament of England before this place, to reduce it to obedience, to the end the effusion of blood may be prevented, I thought fit to summon you to deliver the same into my hands. If this be refused you will have no cause to blame me.<sup>25</sup>

But even this warning does not excuse what followed—namely the sacking of the town and the massacring of the populace fully two days after the town had been taken. Such is the length of time that Cromwell can hardly be regarded as having opposed it. Nor, surely, is Cromwell's attempt to justify the events sufficient to excuse them—

I am persuaded that this is a righteous judgment of God upon these barbarous wretches, who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood . . . it was the Spirit of God . . . therefore it is good that God alone have all the glory.<sup>26</sup>

If we condemn the cruelty of the Irish then so we should condemn the cruelty of the English—posterity cannot accept mere belief in the righteousness of a cause to excuse the events that follow. Moreover, Cromwell, as commander of the Parliamentary army, must accept the responsibility for that army's actions—thus the question as to whether or not he truly desired to punish the Irish, whether or not he could have controlled his men in the days following the capture of the town, becomes finally immaterial. The events, stark as they stand, must be put by Cromwell's name.

If Wexford seems to have been less of a design on Cromwell's part, because the massacre that occurred was not so prolonged as at Drogheda, yet it must be accounted to Cromwell's name just as the latter was. Cromwell's comment on the siege mentions the same points as were earlier used to defend Drogheda: God willed the massacre, and He did so because the Irish had to be punished for their crimes. And negatively, of course, one can defend Cromwell—the Irish had been cruel, and the massacre did have an effect in speeding up the campaign. Maurice Ashley in *The Greatness of Oliver Cromwell* attempts to lessen the potential severity of our judgement by pointing out that massacres were a part of not only Ireland but Europe, and the world, both then and now:

War is relentless, and similar acts of calculated terror are to be found throughout modern history: the siege of Munster in the Thirty Years War, the sack of Leicester by the Royalists, the devastation of the Palatinate by Turenne and of Bavaria by Marlborough, the 'obliteration' bombing of British and German towns in the last war, and finally the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Both before and after 1643 men were to accept Cromwell's actions as valid and fair:

The practice of refusing quarter to a garrison which stands an assault is not a useless effusion of blood.<sup>27</sup>

But in the positive sense that perhaps separates great men from more ordinary mortals it must be doubted whether the massacres were necessary, at least on the scale that they occurred—was it not sufficient that Ormonde's best men were defeated? Was revenge to be paramount when Ireland had so great a need of humanity?

And yet we must not raise up these two sieges above all the other aspects of Cromwell's campaign, and so condemn his career there without due consideration. For, as we have seen, the campaign began by Cromwell imposing a new morality upon Irish warfare, which provided that there should be no unnecessary suffering, and this new standard of conduct he invariably adhered to—it might present a fairer picture of Cromwell if we consider a siege like that at Clonmel, rather than at Drogheda. It was here in May 1650 that Cromwell had perhaps his most costly victory, losing over 2,000 of his best men, and the town surrendering only for him to discover that the garrison, led by Hugh O'Neill, had slipped out a few hours earlier. Few generals would have kept rigorously, as Cromwell did.

to terms that were only half-valid—especially after such heavy losses. Herein, surely, lies the essence of Cromwell's greatness: a determination to be fair and to always keep to terms to which he had agreed. If a few citizens were killed in some of the sieges then that was not entirely Cromwell's fault, while at both Drogheda and Wexford it was largely the armed forces—forces that had refused to surrender—that were killed. And even in these circumstances it is clear that Cromwell regretted the severity his men showed—hence the fact that he felt he even had to make excuses: a man like Monck, after the massacre that followed the capture of Dundee, did not believe he had anything at all to be sorry about.

There is, then, a duality of position in Cromwell's approach to the Irish campaign, taking the form of a hatred of the Irish and a determination that, despite this, he would be fair. As regards the Irish, in war he can be said to have been so—but does this fairness extend to the old English? As we have seen, Ormonde was an Englishman before an Irishman, and in 1646 he had surrendered to the Parliament of England rather than to the Irish natives. Bearing this in mind might one not have expected that Cromwell would have been less severe towards them during his campaign, if not in the ensuing settlement. However:

To Cromwell, as to the majority of Englishmen of his time, every Irishman, and still more every English defender of the Irish cause, had made himself an accomplice in the misdeeds of certain Irishmen<sup>28</sup>

The old English, in other words, were regarded as supporting the native Irish—but if one cannot blame "the majority of Englishmen" for having that impression, one can Cromwell, who because of his position should have realized that not only did the old English not support the native Irish, but that they had throughout the rebellion been in the centre of two forces, neither of which they could properly hope to control. Yet at Drogheda it was Ormonde's largely old English forces who were massacred. Maybe Cromwell's greatest condemnation was his inability to comprehend the Irish situation.

This inability was never expressed more clearly than in his response to the decrees "framed by the Irish Popish prelates and clergy" at Clonmacnoise in December 1649.<sup>29</sup> The Irish had in these decrees stated that their only chance against the forces of the English Parliament was to work in total harmony with one another. But Cromwell took them as needing a refutation of the Irish cause, which he proceeded to give:

Remember ye hypocrites. Ireland was once united to England . . . That was the original union, Englishmen had good inheritances which many of them purchased with their money; they and their ancestors from you and your ancestors . . . You had generally equal protection with them; and equal justice from the laws . . . You, unprovoked, put the English to the most unheard-of and most barbarous Massacre (without respect of sex or age) that ever the Sun beheld. And at a time when Ireland was in perfect peace. And when, through the example of English industry, through commerce and traffic, that which was in the Natives' hands was better to them than if all Ireland had been in their possession, and not an Englishman in it . . .

Only at the end, almost as an afterthought, does he approach the real problem—the mere presence of Englishmen in Ireland. This to the Irish was the issue, this was why their rebellion was not unprovoked. And though it is true that under Strafford the commerce of Ireland increased considerably Cromwell is wrong to imply that this was of any real benefit to the Irish—Strafford's policy was geared to the advantage of the crown, not the Irish.

W. C. Abbott in *The Writing and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* states that the Irish expedition was a colonizing venture and that "the vision of a rich and fertile country, a Promised Land, should be the prize of victory and whose estates should be enjoyed by its conquerors". And so in large part was the case: the House of Commons had declared in 1641 that the new settlement of Ireland would "perfect the work of Queen Elizabeth and James I", and Bulstrode

Whitelock, had noted that if Parliament's plans were carried out then an end would be put for ever to "that long and bloody conflict foretold with so much truth by Giraldus Cambrensis". But it was not finally intended that all would suffer because of the rebellion—Parliament was to be the avenger of the innocent new English who had been killed or dispossessed, and its aim was to punish those who had perpetrated these crimes. Into this category had to fall the old English. It was true that in 1646 Ormonde had submitted to Parliament rather than to the Irish, but at other times he clearly showed that the crown was his only real cause, and that required the alliance of the Irish and the defeat of Parliament—and in 1646 Ormonde only surrendered to Parliament because the Irish alliance had broken down. Nor was it to be easily forgotten that it was an army of old English that had been sent over to England in 1643 to aid Charles; or that in the same year Lord Justice Parsons had been removed from office and later arrested with three other councillors on the charge of having Parliamentary sympathies. What was perhaps even more damning, the Ulster Scots had survived throughout the rebellion, and seemed to provide an actual refutation of the defence of the old English that their alternative to an Irish alliance was destruction. Ormonde, of course, returned to fight the Parliamentary forces in Ireland as soon as the Royalist cause recovered there—and his actions throughout the 1640s show that he expected defeat to bring loss of life and estate in its wake. Royalists were to suffer on both sides of the Irish Sea.

To control Ireland to the benefit of England was the aim of the English government, whether monarchical or parliamentary—and this could most effectively be achieved through ownership of the land, and such was the concern of the "Cromwellian Settlement". It is not necessary within the context of this essay to go into the technicalities of his settlement, for what is important is that it was the culmination of the English attitude towards Ireland. The preamble to the Act of Settlement of August 1650 sets the tone:

Whereas the Parliament of England, after the expense of much blood and treasure for the suppression of the horrid rebellion in Ireland, have by the good hand of God upon their undertakings, brought that affair to such an issue, as that total reduction and settlement of the nation may, with God's blessing be speedily effected . . . <sup>31</sup>

But who was to take what land was available? The answer was twofold, and appeared so from an early date: namely London "Adventurers" hoping to make a profit, and the English soldiers, who could very conveniently be payed in Irish land.<sup>32</sup>

Thus the "act for the speedy reducing the rebels of Ireland" set aside two and a half million acres, originally just as security for the money that adventurers were prepared to lend, but soon also as security for the payment of the soldiers. Ten years later it was to be necessary in the Act of Satisfaction to extend the figure to three and a half million acres, Connaught being set aside for the Irish—for the Act of Settlement if it certified that "it is not the intention of the Parliament to extirpate the whole nation", yet also confirmed the English policy of transplantation:

It shall be in the power of the Parliament . . . to transplant such persons . . . as shall be judged most consistent with public safety . . .

We can see in the various acts that comprise the Cromwellian Settlement the basic outlines of English policy in general: a policy that did not consider that the Irish had a valid role to play in their country's affairs. In some respects this was carried too far, and there can be little doubt that the Irish were treated very badly by the proposed settlement—for example, all common soldiers, if they laid down their arms within a specified time, were still to lose two-thirds of their estates, whereas officers were to lose all and to suffer banishment "during the Pleasure of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England". But on the other hand the Irish had not shown themselves to be anything other than savages, and leniency had failed in the settlements of 1569, 1583 and 1603, so that a severe settlement seemed to be a possible answer to the Irish problem.

The issues that led up to this settlement can be seen as being very complex ones, and largely unanswerable in black or white terms—but if we for a moment

accept that the Irish were treated abominably, then it is well to bear in mind that excuses can be made personally for Cromwell. The "Cromwellian Settlement" should, for example, be more properly called the "mid-seventeenth century English Settlement"—the Act of Settlement was passed whilst he was in Scotland, and the Act of Satisfaction by the Barebones' Assembly, of which Cromwell was not a member. This does not mean, of course, that Cromwell opposed the measures, in fact the reverse was true at the time of their passage, but it does illustrate the fact that it was a general not a specific belief that produced the Irish settlement.

In conclusion it is worth noting the ways in which the Irish and the English in Ireland were better treated under Cromwellian government:

- 1) to Cromwell Englishmen in Ireland had just the same rights as Englishmen in England—this Strafford had denied and the Restoration was to refute.
- 2) Catholicism could be practised in private, and there was no compulsory church attendance. W. K. Jordan in *The History of Toleration in England* states that the Irish Catholics were far better off under Cromwell.
- 3) Transplantation in fact took place on a far lesser scale than was originally planned and Cromwell in fact told Fleetwood when the latter was Lord Deputy of Ireland that he could dispense with "the orders and instructions . . . for the transplantation of the Irish".
- 4) Cromwell encouraged the development of a rigorous impartiality of justice.
- 5) Ireland was specially favoured by the economic measures of the 1650s—but this policy the Restoration reversed.

#### NOTES

1. J. C. Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland*
2. quoted in Prendergast.
3. quoted in Bagwell, Vol. I.
4. "Queries concerning the peace now treated of in Ireland", quoted in Prendergast.
5. quoted in Beckett.
6. quoted in Bagwell.
7. C. V. Wedgwood, *The King's War, 1641/7*.
8. quoted from C. Hill, "Oliver Cromwell 1658/1758"
9. quoted in Bagwell, Vol. I.
10. quoted in Coonan.
11. Abbott, Vol. 2.
12. quoted in Bagwell, Vol. 2.
13. quoted in M. Ashley, "Cromwell".
14. from Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion in Ireland*
15. quoted in Prendergast.
16. for Strafford's side of the coin consult Hugh Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland*.
17. quoted in Coonan.
18. quoted in Bagwell, Vol. 2.
19. *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, Vol. 5.
20. Carlyle, p. 46/48.
21. quoted by Carlyle.
22. quoted in Bagwell.
23. W. C. Abbott.
24. quoted in C. Hill, *God's Englishmen*.
25. Abbott, p. 118. Vol. 2.
26. Abbott, Vol. 2, p. 125/8.
27. quoted in R. S. Paul.
28. Mrs. Lomas, quoted in Abbott.
29. Carlyle, Vol. 2, p. 115/32.
31. Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*.
32. Feb. 1641/2, Petition of divers well affected to the House of Commons, offering to raise and maintain forces on their own charge against the rebels of Ireland, and afterwards to receive their recompense out of the rebels' estates.

## OLIVER CROMWELL AND GEORGE MONCK

*The Address given by Dr. Maurice Ashley, President of the Association at the Annual General Meeting, April 26th 1973.*

I think that three things can certainly be said about the relationship between Oliver Cromwell and George Monck. The first is that Oliver admired Monck as a professional officer, as a general-at-sea, which was what they called Admirals in those days, and as a military administrator. Secondly, it is clear that Monck was loyal to Cromwell from the time of the establishment of the Protectorate until after Oliver's death. Lastly, Monck gave valuable advice and support to Oliver's successor as Protector, his son, Richard. The remark attributed to Monck: "Richard Cromwell forsook himself, else I had never failed my promise to his father, or my regard to his memory," rings true.

But what I want to discuss is a particular episode, the three-month armistice concluded by Monck with the leader of the Ulster Roman Catholics, Owen Roe MacArt O'Neill. The story is, in my view, of importance because first, it exemplifies the saying that "history does not repeat itself, but historians repeat one another." The second reason is that it shows how any story told to the discredit of Oliver Cromwell—particularly stories related by Restoration hacks—is too readily accepted even in our enlightened twentieth century.

Monck had been appointed major-general of the English Parliamentary forces in the counties of Down and Antrim where he arrived in the autumn of 1647. The intention was that Monck should hold his ground there against the royalists until a large expeditionary force could be sent over from England to restore order in Ireland—always a difficult proposition. The execution of King Charles I had united most of the Irish in the royalist cause under the direction of the Marquis of Ormonde. In the Dublin area a royalist army was commanded by another Irish Protestant, Lord Inchiquin, who had, like Monck, changed sides. In the north Sir George Monro commanded a force of Scots-Irish-Presbyterians who were willing to serve a Covenanted King. On the other side the English Parliament was represented in Dublin by Colonel Michael Jones, yet another Irish Protestant, in western Ulster by Sir Charles Coote, and in eastern Ulster by Monck. But there was also in Ulster a strong force of native Roman Catholics under the leadership of Owen O'Neill, who was a kind of adventurer and brigand and had learnt that art of guerrilla warfare in Spain. O'Neill was committed neither to the royalists nor to the parliamentarians: he believed in Ireland for the Irish or at any rate Ulster for Ulstermen. He was regarded by the English Puritans as a blood-thirsty scoundrel.

In the Spring of 1649 the parliamentary position in Ireland was precarious. The royalist and Irish forces outnumbered those which served Parliament, Ormonde was planning to besiege Dublin; Inchiquin was marching north to attack Drogheda and then to assault Monck's headquarters at Dundalk, which protected the route to Belfast; Sir Charles Coote was hard pressed in Londonderry by the Scots-Irish. Under these circumstances George Monck decided to try to do a deal with Owen O'Neill. He offered to supply him with ammunition and stores on the understanding that he did not come to terms with Ormonde or Inchiquin or any who were enemies to the Parliament of England. This armistice was agreed to and was to last for three months. Monck had been assured by Colonel Michael Jones that he might take any measures he thought necessary to safeguard his tactical position pending the arrival of the expeditionary army from England. He therefore did not hesitate to sign the armistice with O'Neill because it gave him sufficient time to consult his superiors in England.

The armistice was signed on 8th May 1649, but it was not until 25th May that Monck wrote to Oliver Cromwell explaining that there had been "great necessity" for him to make this agreement and he hoped it would "beget no ill construction" since the advantage gained for the parliamentary cause by preventing O'Neill from joining up with Ormonde was obvious. It is also obvious that Monck hoped that O'Neill would assist him when, as he was expecting, Inchiquin attacked Dundalk.

Monck's armistice did him no good at all; his own soldiers did not care for the deal with the bloodthirsty Ulstermen; and on 24th July Monck was forced to surrender to Inchiquin at Dundalk while O'Neill's men were too drunk to help. Monck and his soldiers were allowed to go free: most of the garrison went over to Inchiquin and Monck himself returned to England.

Why did Monck write to Cromwell and not to the Council of State? The reason was that in March Oliver had been appointed, with the approval of Parliament, to lead the expeditionary force against the Irish rebels and had been named Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Cromwell placed Monck's long letter, the terms of the armistice and proposals for a more permanent agreement, made by O'Neill, before the Council of State. The Council of State, it must be remembered, not only included Oliver as a member but also Lord Fairfax, who was the commander-in-chief and Captain-General of all the parliamentary forces everywhere. The Council, when it considered the question at the beginning of June decided that although it thoroughly disapproved of the treaty because it was the Ulster Irish who had started the rebellion against England and massacred Englishmen in Ireland in 1641—nevertheless it would let sleeping dogs lie.

Oliver Cromwell was now at Milford Haven preparing to sail for Ireland. Monck saw Cromwell there in the first week of August and Cromwell after hearing his explanation of what had happened instructed him to go on to London and to meet the Council of State. On 6th August the Council of State reported its conclusions to Parliament; Parliament then summoned Monck to appear at the bar of the House. After hearing what Monck had to say, Parliament resolved unanimously that it disapproved utterly of the treaty which Monck had concluded with O'Neill but added a rider that it was content, as to Monck, to lay aside any further considerations of the matter and not at any time thereafter to call his conduct into question. Indignantly Monck retired to his home in Devon until Cromwell in 1650 formed a regiment for him and appointed him Master of the Ordnance during the campaigns in Scotland.

Now all that seems to me straightforward enough. But in his biography of Monck, published in 1889, Sir Julian Corbett asserted that it was Cromwell who had inspired the armistice with O'Neill; that Cromwell had been sending O'Neill regular pay; and that when Cromwell saw Monck at Milford Haven he had told Monck he must take all the blame for the treaty on himself. In short, Monck was made a scapegoat to save Cromwell's face.

The only piece of evidence for this is the summary of a letter dated 4th August 1649 and printed by a gentleman named Clement Walker in a book entitled *The Complete History of Independency*. This book was published in 1660 when both Walker himself and Oliver Cromwell were dead and Monck was at the very height of his fame. Clement Walker had been a member of the Long Parliament who was expelled in Prides Purge of 1648, was imprisoned for a month and was accused of high treason: he hated Cromwell and the whole Independent Party. This alleged letter said that Cromwell asked the Council of State to negotiate with Monck to take the whole responsibility for the agreement with O'Neill upon himself and thus clear the Council and Cromwell himself of any complicity in it whatsoever and—the letter added—he had found Monck inclined to do so.

Now, what sort of evidence is this? I would say that it could not and should not be accepted by any impartial historian. Yet not only are we asked by Corbett to believe that Cromwell told Monck to lie on his behalf, but the same story is repeated by Oliver Warner in his life of Monck—the latest to be published in 1936. Cromwell, writes Warner, (an old acquaintance of mine, whose books on naval history I admire,) told Monck to lie . . . he must take the whole responsibility on himself . . . in return he was given money and promised a good post after the matter had blown over. Finally, the late Professor Abbott, about whose editing of Cromwell's letters I have my reservations, printed the fake letter in Walker as if it were genuine. He also

observed that *probably* upon Cromwell's advice the Council of State decided to make Monck the scapegoat; but later Abbott backpedalled by adding rather lamely "*whether or not Walker's charge is true* that Monck had lied on the advice of Cromwell, a difficult and dangerous situation had been surmounted."

May I repeat that there is not the slightest reliable evidence that Cromwell acted dishonourably. It is true that Dr. Thomas Gumble, who was years later to be appointed chaplain to Monck's army in Scotland, related in his life of Monck that Monck had taken the blame on himself for an agreement which had been made 'by Cromwell's special order and command.' But Gumble's book was published during the reign of King Charles II after Monck was dead. And I should think it is much more likely that Gumble lifted the accusation out of Clement Walker's book than that he had the story from the notoriously reticent Monck himself. In any case, Monck was an accomplished liar, as he proved in 1660, whereas though Cromwell sometimes deceived himself, I have found no occasion when he engaged in deliberate lying.

## BOOK NEWS

For those who are anxious to follow the English Civil War from a military as well as a constitutional point of view, "The English Civil War—(A Military Handbook)" is an essential; particularly for those who have little or no knowledge of the organisation and functions of the various arms forming both the Parliamentary and Royalist Armies.

This little book covers this ground in an admirable fashion. It is profusely illustrated, and contains clearly drawn maps showing the movements of the two Forces. A short precis of all the important Commanders on either side is also included.

The full-page illustrations are excellent; my only criticism being that they are printed over the printed matter, which often makes the latter very difficult to read.

There is an excellent chapter on Military Costumes, followed by one on Armour, admirably illustrated. The Author has also included an interesting chapter on Drill, followed by one on the various arms used by each Army.

On page 53 the Author sets forth clearly the organisation of the New Model Army, which enabled Parliament to win the struggle.

Quite a large section is devoted to the subject of Artillery and Gun Drill; followed by a chapter on Siege Warfare.

Finally the book contains a chapter on the Navy which played such a considerable part in the victory of the Parliament.

I do congratulate the joint authors, John Tucker and Lewis S. Winstock on having produced a most useful little handbook for those interested in the Military History of the Civil War. In view of the information it contains, the cost, £1.70., is not excessive.

H. A. JOLY DE LOTBINIERE, Brigadier.

It has been suggested that *Cromwelliana* should carry extracts from some less well-known and not easily available works on Cromwell. *Historie and Policie reviewed, in The Heroick Transactions of his Most Serene Highness, Oliver, Late Lord Protector, from his Cradle to his Tomb*, by H. Dawbeny, and published in 1659, is the subject of this issue.

Dawbeny saw Cromwell as "our second Moses," and describes his book, which is dedicated to Protector Richard Cromwell, as "Declaring his (Oliver Cromwell's) steps to princely perfection, as they are drawn in lively parallels to the ascents of the great patriarch Moses, in thirty degrees, to the height of honour." The following is the essence, after decoction as it were (but still in Dawbeny's own words), of those thirty "lively parallels" between Cromwell and Moses, which, in the full work, extend to 306 pages.

Moses was nobly born, extracted from an extra-ordinary race, the most sacred tribe, and the principal family in Israel, the house of Levi. And yet I cannot say his late Highness was extracted from so priestly a family, but altogether as princely, being lineally descended from the loins of our most ancient British princes, and tied in near alliance to the blood of our later kings, as by the thrice noble family of the Barringtons, and divers others.

Moses was from his cradle blest with a very beautiful body for which he was most remarkable in his infancy, so the sacred text tells us, that he was a fair and goodly child. His late most serene Highness, our second Moses and Lord Protector, who, as the former, was from his cradle known to be a most goodly child, and during those, his first sweet and tender years, kept still a very gallant stature, tall and straight as a palm tree, and radiant as a star (so that) every man might read a prince in his countenance.

Moses was a high favourite of heaven from his very infancy, being then miraculously delivered from the danger of the water upon which he was exposed (as scripture teacheth us) in an ark of bulrushes. They that have seen his late Highness in the like former imminent perils, and the great actions he as since most gloriously arrived at, can best make a parallel of the providence . . . . And, though I cannot say he was exposed upon, yet, as I have heard, he has been in equal dangers, by the water as his first master Moses was, and a great deal more. . . . Insomuch that it is said the imminency of those his infant dangers has struck the very hearts, and chilled the blood in the veins of the beholders. Thus then we see a very parallel providence over these two great persons' their very cradles kissing, and, as it were, conspiring to rock each other.

Moses was very liberally bred, and had all the advantages of a noble and princely education, being brought up, as the text tells us, in all the learning of the Egyptians. His Highness's most illustrious parents, desirous to live in the honour of their incomparable child, and to give him a breeding equal to his nobility, beauty, and ingenuity, and to those miraculous preservations by which he was pointed out by providence to be a future instrument of divine wonders, as the former Moses was, would give him an education equal to his.

Moses was most miraculously called by God from his retirement to undertake the deliverance, care, and conduct of his people, the Lord appearing to him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush. I dare not yet boldly affirm that our second Moses in his retirement met with any flaming bush, and the Lord speaking to him out of it, or that he had any such personal discourse with the Almighty. . . . But this I have most certainly been informed that his Highness had many revelations and divine dreams to the same purpose, admonishing him what he should do, and foretelling him what he should arrive at.

Moses, being in his own judgement, and in all outward appearances, unfit for so great a charge, was very unwillingly persuaded by God to undertake it. Now after that our second Moses had upon . . . divine considerations, been drawn to put himself forth upon public services, we all know how unwilling he has been to receive the dues of his own honours. . . . And when the pressing necessities of State required that one single person should sit at the helm, and that he was pointed out both by God and man for that purpose, how unwilling was he to accept the charge.

Moses found the Lord faithful in the performance of all his promised assistance to him, by which means he wrought stupendous miracles in Egypt. We cannot say literally that his Highness was enforced to bring so many miraculous plagues upon our Egyptians, but we all . . . lay under the perfect moral of all those plagues before he . . . did rise up in our Israel and undertake our so great and wonderful victory.

Moses was most miserably disturbed and injuriously persecuted with frequent misprisions, malicious repinings, and ungrateful murmurings of the common people. Has our glorious second Moses been less injured by venomous tongues? Less persecuted with the misprisions, repinings, and malicious murmurings of these mutinous nations than our first Moses has been with his stiff-necked Israelites?

Moses was most malignantly looked upon likewise by some of the elders themselves, and a dangerous head of rebellion was made against him by some of the princes of the people. That we may make good our parallel . . . reflect a little upon the barbarous ingratitude that his late Highness has met withall from persons of other obligations, and princes too of our Assembly.

Moses was a person of very high courage himself and every way accomplished with parts requisite to a good soldier. And he was no less curious in the choice of those who he was to receive to serve him as soldiers. Nor less doubt can there be, sure of the personal valour, of our second Moses who, though he slew no man that I ever heard of in private quarrel, yet was known to be always ready to draw his sword upon the good occasion. . . . His sacred Highness . . . chose for his companions in arms . . . such as the Lord should approve of, and were free from all manner of uncleanness, as that great master of war, and his incomparable precedent, both prescribed and practiced.

Moses was well entered into years, but retained a strong sense still and understanding, before he was called out upon public employment. We do find that God indulged double the life to men before the flood to that he has done since the very next age after . . . so that . . . our second Moses, his forty years and upwards, may appear parallel to the former's four score at, or about, which times they were both pressed first into public employment.

It highly concerns him . . . who is commander in chief to let his prime and principal care be placed in the election of his inferior officers, as our first and second Moses have so exemplarily done.

Moses was by the extraordinary indulgence and favour of heaven, attended with glorious felicity in all his undertakings. All his actions were crowned with success and his battles with victory. Now the greatest favourite of fortune, or, properly speaking, the dearest darling of divine providence, that ever the Christian world produced, was this most excellent person his late most serene Highness. His successes were so constant that we may say he had struck a nail in fortune's wheel that she should never be able to turn it again.

Moses was a most absolute great statesman, a perfect master of the politic science. Our most renounced Lord Protector, our second Moses . . . governed the war itself like a complete statesman, and managed the peace like a prudent captain. He knew as well as Caesar did that a good general will conquer more by counsel than sword.

Moses was most faithful and careful in providing able and honest officers for the civil government as well ministers of state as justice. Has not, I say, our second Moses made out his parallel in this to perfection . . . by employing none in public charge but men of piety, as well as parts, known integrity, as well as ability, knowing nothing to be so perillous to princely greatness as good ministers, and that good officers must make great statesmen.

Moses was not only curious in the choice of his officers, but continued still his own constant care over his people, and above all things rendered himself most remarkable by the clemency and mildness of his government. Did ever any prince in the world go more obliging ways in his governments than his late most serene Highness has done? Has he not ever showed greater affection to sway the scepter over us than to brandish the sword, and to govern us more by laws than arms?

Moses was not only an accomplished prince in all kinds of pity and piety, towards the persons of his people, but he did extend it likewise towards their very purses. His Mosaical Highness . . . was contented to follow his old master, Moses . . . and frequently has been heard to honour the judgement of that most excellent person and pious politician, Boetius, that a good prince ought to fear nothing so much as to be too much feared . . . His Mosaical Highness has [also] been ever so tender of entrenching upon the particular purses of his people to supply those public occasions of state, that he has been almost guilty of transgressing in the other extreme by permitting the general good to be neglected, at least to suffer some prejudice for want of it.

Moses was a most exemplary person in all manner of piety towards God. A duty most becoming a great prince to be highly zealous for the true honour and divine worship of his almighty maker, the Lord of heaven and earth. Now has our glorious second Moses showed less religious zeal or true princely piety towards God, or less extraordinary care and pious curiosity in providing for the honour, splendour, worship and service of his holy name?

Moses was endowed by God with a most singular gift and spirit of prayer, by which he was extraordinary powerful with the Lord that he was called the friend of God. Our second Moses has not only reached after the former . . . but he has summed up all example to perfect himself in the practise of this divine duty [and] had so familiar a recourse to the almighty that, as the one was, so the other, for ought I know, may be entitled the friend of God.

Moses was a most exemplary person in all the practical parts of true piety. Our most gracious late Protector and second Moses . . . practised accordingly, in imitation of his great master, the first Moses, or princely patriarch.

Moses . . . was advanced by God to the highest dignity and perfection of a prophet. Our most pious, gracious, and glorious, late Lord Protector, and second Moses, was a great prophet too, according to his proportion. Statesmen . . . must foresee futurities too or they can never order their affairs aright. For, if they look not into casualties of inconvenience how shall they be ever able to prevent them? This holds altogether as true in him that holds the helm of a kingdom, or commonwealth, as in any pilot of a ship whatsoever.

Moses was not only endowed by God with a most rich and plentiful spirit of prophesy himself, but he always endeavoured to procure it for, and always permitted the exercise of it in, others. His Mosaic Highness . . . would not . . . appear at all severe upon brethren of the same faith, though differing it may be in some doctrines. He provided more doctors than executioners for them, knowing that the apprehensions of God and true religion are to be instilled in the hearts of men by the true spirit of prophesy and help of tongues, and not by the dint of swords.

Thus we are at length arrived within the highest port of personal perfection that any prince can possibly cast an anchor in . . . the practice of this celestial virtue of humility. And I doubt not, but upon a strict examine, we shall find our late princely Protector, and second Moses, his parallel in this also, as well as in all his other most heroical perfections.

Moses, being premonished by God of his approaching end, made his most humble suit unto the Lord for to nominate his successor, that the people might not suffer by the vacancy of so great a charge. Has not the great goodness of heaven been graciously pleased to indulge the very same privilege and prerogative to his late most serene Highness, of glorious memory, our second Moses?

Moses was permitted, and commanded by God, to nominate one for his successor that had a very near relation to him, his own household servant, his minister, or menial attendant to his family. It may be worth our while to sit and consider the transcendency of divine favour and privilege that our great Protector, and second Moses, had in this particular above his prototype the first. Whilst he has been . . . permitted, and directed, by God, to nominate his own son, nay, his eldest son, to succeed him in the sovereign charge, the other being commanded to choose but his menial servant, and minister, and that was a divine favour too.

Moses, drawing nearer towards his death, had the honour and favour to be commanded by the Almighty to lay his holy hands upon his successor, Joshua, and to bless him and put some of his honour upon him that all the children of Israel might be obedient. I presume, some will dispute, and as little can any man, I doubt, but that our second Moses too was indulged by God a parallel prerogative, and did the very like to his most gracious son and successor.

Moses was, by the great favour of the Almighty, permitted to see the promised land. So much of privilege and favour did our second Moses find from the goodness of his heavenly father, and receive beyond the former, for . . . Moses was permitted only to see the land of promise . . . yet suffered not to enter

But our sacred second Moses has not only entered, but enjoyed for divers years his land of promise?

Moses . . . after he had satisfied himself with the fair prospect of the promised land, willingly steps into his so much longed for tabernacle of repose. Just thus, and no otherwise, did our great Protector, and gracious second Moses, depart from us.

Moses built himself a monument in the hearts of all his people, and left a blessed memorial behind him. Has not our most serene second Moses received this precious transcendental favour likewise, from the hands of his gracious God? Has he not filled the minds and mouths of all the good people of the nation that have nothing almost left to think and speak on but the memory of their late, great, Protector?

Edited by R. E. Sherwood

**CHERITON 1644** (£4.25) by Dr. John Adair. Published Roundwood Press, Kington, in their series on the English Civil Wars, should be of interest to members. This battle, looked upon as the "finest hour" of Sir William Waller, the Roundhead Commander, has been vividly described by those who actually took part and these eye-witness accounts of all ranks have been brought together by the author, for 7 years Senior Lecturer in Military History at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

**CROMWELL, OUR CHIEF OF MEN**, by Lady Antonia Fraser. Published Weidenfeld & Nicholson—£4.95.

In the Author's Note, Lady Antonia defines her aim in writing this book as "to rescue the personality of Oliver Cromwell from the obscurity into which it seemed to me that it had fallen, just because there has been such an invaluable concentration on the political and social trends of the age in which he lived". Through the wealth of detail relating every facet of her hero's life and achievements, Lady Antonia seems to have solved the problem posed by Dr. Blair Worden in his address at the Annual Service last year, for she allows the reader to see Cromwell "whole", conveying the "rounded personality" of which Dr. Worden spoke. This is a book every member of the Association will feel compelled to read from beginning to end of its 700 odd pages, and in turn will feel it splendidly appropriate that the author is giving the Address at the Annual Service in St. Margaret's Church, Westminster, on September 3rd this year.

## **RESTORATION OF MARSTON MOOR MEMORIAL**

June 30th 1973.

Address by Professor G. E. Aylmer (University of York.)

Ladies and Gentlemen—

Welcome to this short ceremony this afternoon. I want to talk first about the Memorial, secondly about the campaign and the battle itself, and thirdly—very briefly—about its wider significance.

As someone who is interested in the past history of this country and in particular the history of the part of the country in which I live, I should like to express my appreciation, for the restoration of the tablets on the Memorial, to at least three groups of people, but please forgive me if there are many other individuals I don't know about, whom I should also name. First of all the Cromwell Association whose President Mr. Maurice Ashley and Chairman Mr. Trewin Coplestone we are very glad to have with us today; secondly, the Harrogate Branch of the Yorkshire Archaeological Society who also helped to make this possible; and third, and certainly not least since they after all are the people right here on the spot, the Parish Council of Long Marston. These are the people who have really made it possible that the Memorial should be restored after having been vandalised some years ago.

Now I want to talk just for a minute about the Battle of Marston Moor. Anybody who is interested in history at all, I think, is bound to find this an exciting story, because it shows in a very dramatic form the extraordinary reversals of fortune in human affairs in time of war. It shows the importance of superior resources, but also the importance of individual leadership and the part played by chance and the elements of the unforeseen.

The Civil War had been in progress for nearly two years since the late summer-early autumn of 1642, and had not reached any decisive stage. The Royalists had on the whole had the best of it in Yorkshire, until because of the entry into England of the Scottish allies of the Parliamentary forces, the King's forces in the North were besieged in York in June 1644. The King then detached his nephew Prince Rupert, certainly his most brilliant though not in all respects his finest commander, from the South to relieve York, and—although Charles I wrote a characteristically ambiguous letter which Rupert is said to have carried on him to his dying day—perhaps also to give battle to the besiegers. Now strategically there could be no question (whatever one's personal sympathies towards the combatants in the Civil War) but that Rupert carried out this manoeuvre with brilliant success. He marched up into Lancashire from the Midlands, and he struck across the Pennines North of here with such rapidity that the Parliamentary forces besieging York were taken completely by surprise, and the Scots and the Parliamentarians drew off, away from York. So really Rupert had succeeded in his objective. And of course it is one of the great might-have-beens, supposing he had decided to rest on his laurels and had not attempted to give battle to a numerically superior enemy, what would have happened. The whole course of the English Civil War and so that of modern British history might possibly have been different. But as the Parliamentarians withdrew, mainly to the West and the South-west of York, Rupert came after them, and he sent an urgent message to the besieged forces, that is to the Royalists who had been inside York, to join him out here. So the scene was set on that evening, because although some of the soldiers were here from the early morning, indeed from the night of the 1st July, it was not until the afternoon of the 2nd July that the two armies were fully formed up. The Royalist forces being extended on what is now this side of the road (north of the Marston-Tockwith road), with General Goring out on their left down towards Long Marston, and Rupert's own cavalry down to the right towards Tockwith, with the solid ranks of infantry, largely the men who had been inside York, commanded by the Earl of Newcastle, drawn up in the centre. Now on the slightly higher ground (south of the present-day road) and thus with a marginal advantage were the allied forces of the Parliamentarians and the Scots. Taking them from our extreme right here: Cromwell and the Regiments of the Eastern Association and some of the Scottish regiments led by David Leslie were on the extreme left of their forces (that is on our right), then various forces of their infantry both Scottish and English under Generals Crawford and Manchester and Lord Fairfax (for we must not forget there were two Fairfaxes involved). And then over there on the right of the Parliamentarians (on our left hand), Sir Thomas Fairfax and that brilliant younger Yorkshire soldier from up near Malham Tarn, Colonel John Lambert who was Fairfax's second in command, though he didn't in fact play as great a part in this battle as he did in some later ones. That is the disposition of the forces. Again of course there is the celebrated story about how Rupert didn't really believe that the other side would begin battle so late in the evening and had retired to his tent and was having supper cooked for him, while his men did as best they could dispersed about the fields. The fields on this side of the Moor were still open and had not been enclosed, and therefore although some of the woodlands are the same, the terrain that side (north of the road) is very different from what it is now. It was much more open then. The authorities disagree about where the ditch was. Most of the books tell us that there was a ditch which the Royalist front line were guarding, or manning, just this side (North) of the road. Mr. Abbey who lives here, and knows this ground better than anyone, believes in fact that the ditch may have been just the other side of the road

(to the south). Be that as it may, there was certainly this ditch; which was a minor obstacle for the attacking Parliamentarians.


The battle developed in the most extraordinarily dramatic way, because over on one side, to the West, initially Cromwell's regiments at first had the best of it; they were then checked. Cromwell himself appears to have been slightly wounded and to have withdrawn from the Battle, if only for a matter of minutes; and it looked as if Rupert's forces might once again carry the day as they had in earlier battles of the Civil War. Meanwhile on the other wing to the East, although Sir Thomas Fairfax, leading the Yorkshire cavalry, had initially broken through, he too was checked and in fact very soon larger forces of Royalist cavalry had the best of it over on that side. So that the battle was slewed about, as the renewed attack, led by Cromwell together with David Leslie, the Scottish commander, soon had the Royalist forces on that side routed. Meanwhile the Royalists over on the other side to the East, had very much the best of it. Some of them then began to attack the Parliamentarian infantry in the centre, but others led by General Goring himself, I think one can fairly say a somewhat unstable character, instead of concentrating on attacking the enemy's infantry in the centre, made for the baggage in the hope of plunder. The Parliamentarian generals had rather unwisely established a kind of command post up on that ridge to the south, and very soon found themselves immediately threatened by General Goring's cavalry. So that one must imagine the most extraordinary pandemonium breaking loose, with the Parliamentarians victorious on one side and the Royalists on the other, while the fortune of battle swayed in the centre as it was beginning to get dark. This would be somewhere between 8 and half past in the evening. It is at that stage, as by common consent is recognised by all those who have studied this battle, that the superior discipline of the Parliamentarian cavalry regiments and their Scottish allies proved decisive. Whereas some of the best of General Goring's undefeated Cavalier horsemen simply galloped away after booty and prisoners and so forth, the Parliamentarian cavalry reined in after their victory on that side of the battle and came right round the enemy's rear, the celebrated ride having been made by Sir Thomas Fairfax (the Parliamentarian commander on the other side) who was cut off from his own troops. Fairfax had ridden right round the back, but whether it was he who urged Cromwell and Leslie to come right across the Battlefield, we don't know and we never shall. As in many great historical situations, which if I may say helps to make history that is real life more interesting than fiction, there is an element of mystery, and uncertainty. How long was Cromwell out of action? Did Sir Thomas Fairfax really take this message? What we do know, for it is clear enough, is that towards the end of the Battle Cromwell brought the cavalry of the Parliamentarians and some of the Scots who had been on their extreme left right round in an arc, so that General Goring found himself attacked from the rear, from where he himself had started from over on the opposite side. It is at that stage that the Royalist horse were finally routed and driven from the field.

The last, and in some ways the most heroic stage of the battle, is of course, when the Royalist infantry, the Earl of Newcastle's Whitecoats (named after their undyed white tunics) really died fighting almost to a man in the wooded enclosure out on that side, to the north, in what would have been the rear of the centre of the original Royalist position.

This battle did not of course end the Civil War. It didn't even end the military career of Rupert, because he escaped with many of his cavalry. But it did mark a decisive shift in the fortunes of the combatants in the Civil War. It meant that most of Yorkshire and therefore most of the North of England was securely within the Parliaments' power and that the King's cause was hopeless, unless he won some great compensating victory in the south. It was only now a matter of time before he was finally defeated. There are a number of other historians who know more about the details of the Battle of Marston Moor than I do. If you want a very detailed account you can look at the book by Brigadier Peter Young; and I am quite sure also that Dr. Maurice Ashley,

although he would be too modest to say so, knows a great deal more about this battle than I do. But I don't think that there can be very much doubt about what happened in the long run, although the exact parts played by Cromwell and Fairfax will always be argued about. Nor indeed can there be much dispute about its importance.

I should like just to reflect for a moment now on the significance of this. It does seem to me that, in a country which has mercifully been spared violent revolution and civil war for over three hundred years, it is a moment of some solemnity to reflect on when one is actually standing on the ground where many hundreds, indeed thousands of our fellow countrymen fought and died just over three hundred years ago. What did they fight and die for? Some of them fought and died for their beliefs. Some fought and died for their interests, as they understood these. Some, I think we must be honest, fought and died simply in obedience to military discipline and the orders of their superiors, and for no other particular reason. But it does perhaps have a lesson of a more long lasting and general kind for us. Civil War will always result in suffering and destruction on a scale which is beyond the comprehension of those who begin it. I think that it would not be out of tune with the right kind of spirit or sympathy with the two very great men who are commemorated on the Memorial, because whatever divisions of opinion there are about the characters of Oliver Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax I don't think anyone would ever say that they were mean-spirited men, if I ask you just to stand in silence for a few moments in memory of the dead on both sides who were killed on the 2nd July on this field in 1644.



Battle-plan of Marston Moor

Taken from *Battlefields of the Civil War* by Austin Woolrych  
by courtesy of the publishers A. & T. Batsford

