

Cromwelliana



The Cromwell Association
1987-88

The Cromwell Association

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THE CROMWELL ASSOCIATION was founded in 1935 by the late Rt. Hon. Isaac Foot and others to commemorate Oliver Cromwell, the great Puritan statesman, and to encourage the study of the history of his times, his achievements and influence. It is neither political nor sectarian, its aims being essentially historical. The Association seeks to advance its aims in a variety of ways which have included:

- (a) the erection of commemorative tablets (e.g. at Naseby, Dunbar, Worcester, Preston, etc.). (From time to time appeals are made for funds to pay for projects of this sort);
- (b) helping to establish the Cromwell Museum in the Old Grammar School at Huntingdon;
- (c) holding two annual meetings, one the now traditional Memorial Service by the Statue outside the Houses of Parliament; the other a business meeting at which the Council presents a report on its year's work for discussion by members. At both meetings an Address is given by a distinguished Cromwellian;
- (d) producing an annual publication, *Cromwelliana*, which is free to members;
- (e) awarding an annual prize for an essay on a Cromwellian theme;
- (f) maintaining a small reference library for the use of members;
- (g) supporting the formation of local groups of paid-up members of the Association meeting for study or social purposes;
- (h) acting as a "lobby" at both national and local levels whenever aspects or items of our Cromwellian heritage appear to be endangered.


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CROMWELLIANA

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edited by Peter Gaunt



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CROMWELL'S DAY 1987

Professor Ivan Roots, President of the Cromwell Association

[Professor Roots confessed that on the way to the Palace of Westminster he had lost the notes for his Address. Consequently, what he had intended in any case to be a largely extempore exposition of some notions about Oliver Cromwell's appeal and significance turned out to be one in which, like Cromwell himself—though mercifully more briefly—he offered random thoughts in some sort of stream of consciousness. The version of the Address offered here draws upon a faulty memory and a jumble of observations which may well in fact have been deployed elsewhere on different occasions. It is to be hoped that no shorthand reporter or taperecorder was standing by on this one.]

Today is one of many anniversaries. 3 September 1939 saw (for Britain) the outbreak of the Second World War, a day now largely ignored though no doubt due for a surge of interest in 1989. For members of the Cromwell Association 3 September has other associations, among them the death of His Excellency the Lord General and His Highness the Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell. It is the significance, public and private, of that event which has brought us here today, as it does every 3 September, to take part in a service, to hear an address and to lay a wreath at the base of that impressive statue in whose shadow we are assembled.

Oliver Cromwell would surely find his way onto anyone's shortlist of Great Englishmen. For some, his greatness lies in aspects of character and achievement which can be considered admirable, even exemplary. For others, in contrast, he was a bad, even evil man, whose greatness lies in the disastrous impact he had upon his times—a man, indeed, who (even deliberately) brought destruction. For some, the wickedness was somewhat mitigated by his courage and bearing. He was, as Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, put it, "a brave bad man". But whichever way you look at Oliver—honest, hypocritical, machiavellian, messianic, dissembling—the greatness is difficult to gloss over. "Our chief of men": Milton (echoed by Lady Antonia Fraser) called him that in approval, but the same phrase could be applied less generously. Hitler, after all, was the chief of men of the Third Reich.

I must confess to a life-long interest in and admiration for Oliver Cromwell, but the latter stops short of idolatry. I do not see him as immaculate, "a very parfit gentle knight". He was in fact not a type

but a very human being. Not God's Englishman but one of God's many (we hope) Englishmen. I am inclined to accept that his claim to a personal relationship with God, or as he more commonly put it Providence, was a genuine one, all the more so because he saw it as not unique to himself. The fact that he could assert both his trust in God and keep his powder dry was a sign not of hypocrisy but of a conviction that Christianity is not a supine faith; it is one which demands a consistent co-operation, even a covenant, between a man and his maker.

But, of course, it is no part of the historian's task to pass blatantly moral judgments—though it is difficult to avoid some hint of them. Let us try to take Oliver Cromwell as he was in the context of his turbulent times and seek to understand what he was about, what he did and with what consequences. This sets us on a search for the man inside the Lord General's armour, the Protector's purple velvet suit. Fortunately for us, there is a plethora of material to be subjected to the historian's skills, not least his or her imagination. We have the views of many contemporaries upon whom during the 1640s and 1650s Cromwell made a kaleidoscopic impression. We have portraits, a death mask, even what may be his much-abused mummified head. A great deal may be read into and pulled out of them. But most of all, we have the man's own words, thousands of them. No one can ever be sure of what men and women actually thought, but their words, spoken or written, can be given some critical credence if there is evidence—as there is for Cromwell—to suggest that they were largely spontaneous. The survival of so many of Cromwell's letters to his family, his friends, the Speaker of the Commons and others, and of somewhat authentic versions (taken down by shorthand) of his speeches, both major (to parliaments) and less public (to ambassadors and city councillors, as well as conversations and arguments in private), together allow us to glimpse something of his inner feelings, so encouraging us to continue the pursuit of the whole man. No doubt we shall never arrive. But the readiness to travel is all.

Meanwhile we stand here thinking about him, a diverse lot united only in our concern to remember a man who may have been born great but certainly achieved greatness, and who in some sense had greatness thrust upon him.

OLIVER CROMWELL & GREAT BRITAIN

by Peter Gaunt

“To my Lord’s in the morning, where I met with Captain Cuttance. But my Lord not being up, I went to Charing Cross to see Major-Generall Harrison hanged, drawn and quartered—which was done there—he looking as cheerfully as any man could do in that condition...there was great shouts of joy. Thus it was my chance to see the King beheaded at Whitehall and to see the first blood shed in revenge for the King at Charing Cross”. [1] Pepys missed the grander spectacle three months later, when the exhumed bodies of John Bradshaw, Henry Ireton and Oliver Cromwell were butchered at Tyburn. His wife, however, was amongst the thousands of Londoners who crowded westwards to witness the event. At parliament’s directions, the Protector’s vault in Westminster Abbey had been opened on 26 January 1661, whereupon the Serjeant of the House quickly pocketed the gold coloured inscribed plaque which rested on the body—it turned out to be made of brass or copper—and the workmen made a rather more reliable profit of their own by charging 6d a head from those who had gathered in the abbey for another glimpse of the former Protector. The bodies were conveyed first to the Red Lion Inn in Holborn, and then on to Tyburn on 30 January, the twelfth anniversary of Charles I’s execution, where they were hanged and decapitated. The heads were set up in Westminster Hall, where Pepys and others later viewed them. Cromwell’s semi-mummified head subsequently became a rather undignified collector’s item and passed from hand to hand until, in 1960, that believed to be his was bequeathed to Sidney Sussex and buried or immured near the college chapel. His body probably lies somewhere under the teeming traffic and urban sprawl of the Marble Arch area, which has long engulfed the site of the old Tyburn tree.

Within a few years of his death and exhumation, however, doubts began to circulate about the identity of the body mutilated at Tyburn and the true grave of Oliver Cromwell. Occasional rumours were reported by Pepys and other near contemporaries, but not until the eighteenth century did the uncertainties and alternative stories begin to find their way into print and so to a wider audience; speculation reached new heights during the nineteenth century. A variety of stories have been advanced, resting upon old and suitably vague traditions, accounts passed down generation to generation from gnarled servants and friends of the Cromwells, contemporary documents which suddenly

appeared decades later, and plain wishful thinking. Accordingly, the Protector’s bones have somehow been widely scattered over—or under—his former domain, from London to Yorkshire, taking in Cambridgeshire and Northamptonshire en route. And where no claim can be made on the physical remains, there’s always Oliver the ghost to stand in. His spectre has allegedly appeared stalking Red Lion Square and the Tyburn area in London and around the tithe barn at Old Basing, ensconced in Hampton Court and in the Old Hall at Long Marston, wandering again the fields of his triumphs at Naseby and Worcester, and visiting room 13 of the Golden Lion at St Ives with a mistress in tow. At least these sites have genuine Cromwellian connections and were visited by Oliver in life or by his exhumed remains in 1661. But what of Apsley House, the London home of the Duke of Wellington, built nearly a century and a half after the Protector’s death, in which he supposedly appeared at the height of the Reform Bill crisis?; or Brampton Bryan park, near a civil war castle but one never visited by Cromwell, through which the Devil dances with Oliver’s spectre every 3 September? In short, Cromwell has become almost an ever present figure, a many headed, many bodied monster linked in death and after with more parts of the country than any ruler since King Arthur. The comparison is worth pondering.

Improbable or absurd as they are, there is a more serious side to all these rather questionable tales, for the stories of Cromwell’s travels in and beyond the grave are but posthumous reflections of Cromwell in life. Once more, Cromwell seems to have been everywhere, to have stayed in more mansions than Queen Elizabeth I at her most expansive and to have destroyed more castles than Henry VII, gunpowder and death duties put together, to have desecrated more churches than one would believe humanly possible and to have left more clothes, trinkets and armour around the country than the most absent minded or open handed benefactor. As one eighteenth century traveller and writer put it, “whenever I enquire about ruins, I always get the same answer, that it was some Popish place destroyed by Oliver Cromwell”. [2] Some of these stories are patently absurd or are well known to be false—strongholds supposedly wrecked by Cromwell which had in truth fallen ruinous during the sixteenth century, the original tower of Ely Cathedral brought down, not by the local boy made bad, but by medieval storms and subsidence, innumerable churches stripped of ornament under the influence of a Cromwell, but of Thomas and his followers, not Oliver.

It soon becomes apparent that the only way to chart a course through this morass of half truth, legend and lies is to reconstruct afresh the known movements of Oliver Cromwell throughout the wars and beyond.

The sources from which a Cromwellian itinerary can be constructed are readily to hand and available in print. By far the best and most reliable are Cromwell's own letters, which survive in gratifyingly large numbers over the period when he was most likely to be on the move. Despite the lyricism and interesting prejudices which enliven Thomas Carlyle's tomes, W.C. Abbott's *Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* provides a far sounder and much more comprehensive collection; barely a handful of important letters have come to light since the publication of Abbott's final volume in 1947. [3] Cromwell invariably dated his correspondence and he almost always either added a separate note of provenance or mentioned his whereabouts within the text. But as well as fixing his location at time of writing, the letters frequently relate his actions and movements over the preceding period or list his future plans, though the latter should be used with care—Cromwell frequently changed his mind or was forced to alter his plans in the light of military developments or orders from his superiors. Inevitably, the coverage is patchy, even over the civil war period, and unfortunate gaps remain during which few letters survive. In general, the correspondence became more informative as the civil war progressed, culminating in the very detailed series addressed to Speaker Lenthall from Ireland and Scotland, and thence on to Worcester. In contrast, surviving letters tell us very little of Cromwell's life and movements before the civil war broke out and even the opening phase of that war is poorly recorded.

Other contemporary sources follow much the same pattern. Accounts of battles, sieges and other actions poured from the presses to meet public demand and pander to public prejudices, and contemporary newspapers, pamphlets and broadsheets survive in very large numbers, particularly amongst the huge collection amassed by George Thomason. Again, Cromwell really features from 1644 onwards, when he had become a prominent commander, and even then inaccuracies abound. Other contemporary works, particularly Joshua Sprigge's narrative of Thomas Fairfax's campaigns, supply further information and estate and municipal papers sometimes record Cromwell's presence, welcome or unwelcome, in particular areas. In short, despite elements of confusion and uncertainty, together with occasional inconsistencies and periods of silence, it is possible to sift through the surviving material and to draw up a reasonably thorough, reasonably accurate itinerary of Cromwell. What do we find?

From his birth in Huntingdon in 1599 to the very eve of the Short Parliament, Cromwell led in geographical terms at least a very limited and narrow life. For over four decades he seems rarely to have left an area of East Anglia roughly circular and barely fifteen miles in radius.

Born and brought up in Huntingdon, where he took over his father's house and land after Robert's death in 1617, he moved east to St Ives in 1631 and east again to Ely in 1636; Cambridge, to the south, was home for a year during his brief spell as a student and was doubtless visited from time to time thereafter. It is hard for us today to understand a life spent on such a scale, still more to appreciate the psychology and localism it must have engendered. By 1640, of course, Cromwell had also visited London on a handful of occasions, to sit in the parliament of 1628-9 and to attend other business, not least his marriage in Cripplegate and possibly a brief period at Lincoln's Inn. He must have acquired some knowledge of Hertfordshire and perhaps of parts of Buckinghamshire and Essex too as he journeyed to and from the capital. It is also clear that our knowledge of his early life is scanty and that trips further afield cannot be ruled out entirely. But there is every indication that right up to eve of the civil war Cromwell's personal knowledge of the kingdom did not extend much beyond the area of modern Cambridgeshire and London. Indeed, had there been no war, the minor fenland gentleman would probably have travelled no further. As it was, he appeared woefully ill-equipped to lead troops on campaign around Britain. Unlike many civil war commanders, Cromwell had served no military apprenticeship on the Continent, fighting in the Thirty Years War, and even the more peaceful roads of his native land were largely outside his experience. Before the 1640s he had probably never travelled beyond the Wash, and northern England, the west midlands and the south west were unknown territories. When Cromwell led armies into Scotland and Ireland he was entering unfamiliar countries, and that less than a decade after he had first picked up a sword in earnest. Up to 1640, there was little in the history of the parochial farmer and fenland dabbler in politics to suggest the travels and the triumphs which were to follow.

Nor were travels and triumphs particularly evident during the first stages of the war. Cromwell was almost certainly with the parliamentary army as it marched across England from Northampton to Edgehill and thence back to London, but he remains a shadowy figure and probably took no part in the battle. Indeed, his military career as a whole down to the winter of 1643-4 appears to be that of an inexperienced but keen regional commander, a man struggling to overcome inexperience, advancing years and uncertain health as well as his royalist enemies, and who won through to become a star performer in his own fairly small area. It was a pattern common to perhaps a dozen or more parliamentary commanders. The Edgehill campaign excepted, Cromwell's movements from the outbreak of war to March 1644 show the rather modest nature

of his early military career. In March 1643 he rode to Lowestoft, where a show of force bloodlessly cowed local royalists, and in September 1643 he went north to confer with Fairfax and others in Hull. These trips aside, his travels were confined to a small region, comprising the present counties of Cambridgeshire, southern Lincolnshire and the eastern fringes of Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire, with passage through Hertfordshire as he travelled between the east midlands and London. He silenced the sheriff of Hertfordshire at St Albans, secured or strengthened Cambridge, Huntingdon, Peterborough and Ely, watched King's Lynn being bombarded and confiscated the plate and arms of his aged royalist uncle at Ramsey. Real military experience did not come until April 1643, when he bombarded the royalists within Crowland abbey into surrender, and similar action secured Burghley House in July. As for field engagements, Cromwell took part in a confused twilight skirmish near Belton in May 1643 and relieved Gainsborough in July by crushing a royalist detachment outside the town, only to fall back on the following day when Newcastle's army approached. Not until October 1643 did Cromwell really shine in a full-scale battle, prominent in the decisive engagement at Winceby which ended royalist dreams of taking the whole of Lincolnshire. The battle was the culmination of Cromwell's career as a local commander and from this point on he begins to receive greater attention in the newspapers and to be looked upon as more than just one of the dashing provincial officers with sound war records who were to be found in most regions. Winceby marks the end of the first stage of his military career and it is noticeable that thenceforth he very rarely returned to the east midlands; he took no part in the later clashes in Cambridgeshire and south Lincolnshire. From 1644 he acted on a different, much larger stage.

Events in 1644 confirmed the earlier promise but also raised problems. As Manchester's second in command, Cromwell was often held back by his senior's lacklustre and unenthusiastic approach and the year was marked by a degree of inactivity—a month before York and two months around Doncaster and Lincoln. Cromwell took part in two of the greatest battles of 1644, but from neither did he emerge covered in glory. He was wounded at Marston Moor and left the field and he appeared strangely indecisive at the second battle of Newbury, failing to drive home a clear advantage on his wing. Against these should be placed his two campaigns in Oxfordshire in late winter and late autumn where, although not strong enough to tackle the main circuit of bases protecting the royalist capital, still less Oxford itself, he did useful work, taking Hillesden, harrying the King's men and tying down royalist units which could have been inflicting damage elsewhere.

It is during final eighteenth months of the first civil war, from the resumption of the campaign in 1645 to the surrender of the King in summer 1646, that Cromwell's military career really takes off and with it the enormous trecks backwards and forwards across southern England, an area of which he had no previous experience. After a foray west probably taking him just into Somerset and then down around Dorset in March 1645, he embarked upon a two month campaign in Oxfordshire and Berkshire, which included the capture of Bletchingdon and the unsuccessful operation against Faringdon. Orders to march into Warwickshire were reversed when Cromwell was already en route and instead, after a brief visit to his native Cambridgeshire, he rejoined the main army in Northamptonshire. The crushing victory at Naseby in June and the recapture of Leicester immediately after formed the most northerly of Cromwell's actions at this time. He quickly headed south-west once more, capturing Highworth on the way, and returned to the south and south-west. Over the following months he saw action at Langport and Bridgwater, Sherborne, Bristol and Devizes, moving east to capture Winchester and Basing House and then heading west at speed—he covered the ground from Basing to Crediton in little more than a week—to rejoin Fairfax for the long but successful campaign in Devon and Cornwall, a campaign which took him as far west as Truro. A triumphant parade through Plymouth on 25 March 1646, old New Year's Day, was followed by the capture of Exeter, a return to London—on this occasion taking a relatively leisurely twelve days to travel up from Devon—and six weeks before Oxford during May and June. The sheer distances which Cromwell travelled are impressive and the speed with which he was able to move around southern England gives rise to suspicions that the shortcomings of the seventeenth century road network have been exaggerated by historians.

If 1647 was a less arduous year, an interlude of peace passed in and around London or with the peripatetic army HQ in the home counties, it proved only a lull before the final military storm of Cromwell's career. Between May 1648 and September 1651 he was almost constantly on the move, spending in all little more than six months in London, travelling extensively around four countries, three of which he had never visited before, and covering well over 4,000 miles, perhaps nearer 5,000. Cromwell's movements over this period—the campaigns and travels in South Wales, north and north west England and Scotland during 1648, at Burford and then on to Ireland in 1649, to Scotland in 1650 and south again to Worcester in 1651—are very well documented, not least in his own letters, and need not be rehearsed at length here. A few points, however, are worth underlining. Again, the speed of his movements

is impressive—London to Berwick in less than three weeks, Perth to Worcestershire in less than four. The purposes were always specific and the routes direct. With the exception of the Scottish campaign, where enemy tactics forced him to cross and recross the same ground, Cromwell's movements over these years were clear and he invariably took the straightest, quickest and shortest route possible. Nonetheless, the Irish and Scottish ventures must have been formidable undertakings for a fifty year old already in poor health and, triumphant as they turned out, the campaigns were punctuated by interludes when Cromwell's health completely failed him. He spent periods lying ill at New Ross, Cork and Youghal in Ireland and for almost four months during the first half of 1651 he was dogged by illness and confined to Moray House in Edinburgh. The crossings from Milford Haven to Dublin and from Youghal to Avonmouth were the only occasions on which Cromwell ventured out on the open sea, and he was sick on both trips. Within Ireland, he had quite specific objectives, duly reflected in his itinerary. He made no attempt to cover the whole island or to assault every enemy enclave and instead he hit at a few well chosen targets along the eastern seaboard and in the south east. In Scotland his objectives were even clearer, his itinerary even more confined, and a map of Cromwell's movements soon becomes very complex as he marched backwards and forwards along the south bank of the Forth, attempting to draw Leslie out to battle.

But perhaps the most interesting aspect of these years is the frequent and prolonged absence from London, brought about by far flung campaigning. He was away for seven months between May and December 1648, for thirteen from May 1649 to June 1650, and for almost fifteen from the end of June 1650 to September 1651. During the first civil war Cromwell had returned to London and to parliament quite frequently, not only during the military lulls of autumn and winter but also on occasion during the spring and summer. But in 1649-51, at a time when the whole political and constitutional system was in the melting pot and being debated in London, Cromwell was usually hundreds of miles away. Although he had already been bitterly attacked, both inside and outside the House, and clearly had numerous critics and many outright enemies in the political world of London, by accident or design he all but deserted the central political stage from spring 1649 to autumn 1651, and instead spent two and a half years on the move, travelling around three kingdoms and one principality.

And then, just as suddenly, the travelling stopped, and Cromwell switched almost overnight from the itinerant soldier to the fixed, London-based politician. On 12 September 1651 he re-entered the capital and

for the remaining seven years of his life he seems to have left the London area only twice, both in May 1652, for very brief trips to Rochester and Dover on naval business. From 1654 he spent many weekends and occasional longer periods at the Protectoral country retreat of Hampton Court, he probably paid several visits to the Lamberts at Wimbledon, and he travelled east to Woolwich to view the construction and launching of ships. But after 1651 he went no further and he seems never to have returned to his old haunts in Cambridgeshire or to have visited the many properties he had acquired in Essex, Buckinghamshire, south Wales and elsewhere. Instead he settled firmly into the social and political world of London—his wife and family had moved there from Ely around 1646-7—living first in rented houses, then in lodgings allocated to him at Whitehall, and finally given the whole of that palace, together with Somerset House, Hampton Court and other ex-royal properties on becoming Lord Protector. If he ever left the area again, it was not until autumn 1658, by which time Cromwell was presumably in no condition to appreciate the rural delights of Huntingdon, Naseby, Newburgh Priory or wherever!

What is the relevance of all this and what can we learn from a Cromwell itinerary? At its simplest, there is the sheer fascination of watching Cromwell on the move, in tracing his journeys, in following in his footsteps even, and in seeing where he went, where he fought, where he slept. Towns and villages, country houses and humbler urban and rural buildings can be linked with Cromwell's name with more certainty and accuracy. But there are other, possibly more important conclusions to be drawn.

Cromwell's name will always be linked in tradition and the popular mind with every desecrated church, ruined castle, battlefield and parliamentary regiment. The Duke and Duchess of York have only to acquire a country house in Dorset and the national media tell us that Oliver Cromwell himself was once there, leading an assault party and personally overpowering the royalist troops. Of poor Thomas Pyne, the real conqueror of Chideok castle and a genuine if local hero, there is not a word. Doubtless, it will continue so. Curious myths and colourful tales have their value, but they should be placed against a clear and accurate account of Cromwell's movements, so to discover whether there is any possibility of a genuine Cromwellian connection worthy of further investigation. Most such claims would, of course, fail the test and the list of castles and churches which could possibly have suffered at Cromwell's own hands would be reduced to sensible proportions.

The itinerary also makes clear the various, very distinct phases in Cromwell's career. There are the curious ties to particular areas at the

different stages of his life—to a small part of Cambridgeshire from 1599 to 1640, to the east midlands in 1642-3, to the London area from 1651 until his death. The itinerary demonstrates that in 1644-5 Cromwell's military career took off, as he advanced from being a mere regional officer active in a distinct and fairly confined area, to being a commander of national standing. Cromwell's almost static life before 1640 or 1642 and after 1651 only highlights the enormous movement of the intervening period and demonstrates once again the huge influence of the civil war on Cromwell—and doubtless on thousands of others—and the manner in which it completely changed his way of life. The physical impact of his unprecedented travelling around the country during the wars must have been huge, particularly after what was in many ways a very sheltered and narrow life up to that point, and it must surely have affected his psychology and outlook.

When Cromwell became Lord Protector in December 1653 he had a very wide and recent experience of the countries which fell under his control. Indeed, his knowledge of Britain may have exceeded that of any monarch over the previous century and a half or more. James I had ruled Scotland for years before succeeding to the English throne and uniting the two countries in his person, if not in law or practice, and he and his son occasionally returned to the land of their birth. Henry VIII and his children had enjoyed frequent royal progresses, eating their great subjects out of house and home, though they had been very much concentrated in southern England, particularly the south eastern region; their own royal houses and palaces stood in the same general area. But for the same sort of detailed personal knowledge which Cromwell had gained of England and Scotland, Wales and Ireland, we have to look back to earlier rulers, to Henry VII or to the warrior kings of the middle ages and the Wars of the Roses. Perhaps there is a parallel with Edward I, whose long campaigns involved extensive journeys around England, Scotland and Wales—though Edward seems never to have set foot in Ireland. Not only did Cromwell have extensive personal knowledge and experience of the four nations but he was also living in a new age, with new opportunities. Scotland and Wales had been united with England in name if not in deed, Irish resistance was crumbling, advances in transport and communications were making greater unity possible and civil war had shaken men's outlook, brought accepted constitutional ideas crashing down and opened the way for administrative realignment. Is it just co-incidence that Cromwell's rule saw the first serious attempt, however shortlived, to unite the whole of Britain and Ireland into a single practical, operational body with one political and administrative head? Is it mere co-incidence that he presided over the first parliament

containing representatives of all four nations, or that so much of the parliamentary and conciliar legislation of the Protectorate tackled the problems of Scotland and Ireland and tried to modernise and harmonise their legal and administrative systems? Perhaps, but it was without doubt a very fortunate co-incidence.

1. *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, ed. R. Latham and W. Matthews (12 vols., London, 1970-82), I, 265, 13 Oct. 1660.
2. Attributed to John Byng, and quoted in *Folklore, Myths and Legends of Britain* (Reader's Digest, London, 1973), pp. 268-9, which contains a useful summary of some of the commoner Cromwell "myths".
3. Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches* (revised edn., 3 vols., London, 1904); Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (4 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1937-47).

THE PLOT TO BETRAY GLOUCESTER TO THE ROYALISTS

by John Jackson

The siege of Gloucester, which had begun on 10 August 1643 and been led personally by King Charles, ended on 5 September when a force under the Earl of Essex relieved the city. Essex, the King and their two large armies left the area almost immediately, chasing each other along the road to London. Despite parliamentary assurances that the Gloucester garrison would be granted more arms, ammunition, men and money to strengthen the defences and counter any renewed royalist threat, governor Sir Edward Massey had in fact been left with a relatively small force of poorly paid troops, a very depleted arsenal and military debts totalling over £8,000. In contrast, the royalists quickly re-organised and renewed their operations in the area during the early autumn. Sir William Vavasour was appointed commander-in-chief of Herefordshire and Gloucestershire, with orders to recruit more men, re-establish the royalist stranglehold around the obstinate city and, if possible, bring Gloucester itself tardily to heel. Boosted by reinforcements and new recruits, the royalist presence in the region was increased to over 7,000 men and Massey faced a tense and dangerous period. Having failed so badly over the summer, the royalists were unwilling or unable openly to attack Gloucester itself, but where direct assault and formal siege had failed, it was hoped that bribery and corruption would lead to the fall of the city through treachery.

The royalist attempts to induce one of the garrison's officers to betray the city were described in detail in an account written by that officer, Captain Robert Backhouse, Massey's Sergeant Major and the commander of the Gloucester horse. Backhouse had pretended to accept the royalist offers and played along for several weeks and his behaviour had aroused suspicions in parliament and the army command and amongst London journalists. In order to counter these rumours and, as Backhouse himself put it, "to give the Parliament and his Excellencie [Essex] satisfaction, and the better to vindicate his owne integrity", in spring 1644 he produced a long account of the attempted treachery and of his dealings with the plotters. The account, "A True Relation of a Wicked Plot intended and still on foot against the City of Gloucester, to betray the same into the hands of the Cavaliers", was subsequently accepted and ordered printed by a Commons committee and appeared in pamphlet form on 7 May 1644. Backhouse doubtless dramatised certain incidents and exaggerated and glorified his own role, but his account must have been largely true and accurate—not only was it

accepted by initially suspicious MPs but also Massey and others would not have permitted significant inaccuracies or untruths to stand uncorrected.

The royalists had opened communications on 19 November 1643, when Backhouse received a message from an old friend, Edward Stanford or Stamford, a Catholic and a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Horse in the royalist army. The letter, delivered through an intermediary known to Backhouse, spoke of raising "a greater future than the condition of those you serve are able to afford you". The messenger told the captain verbally that the price he could expect for his treachery was £5,000. "This you may gaine by the delivery, you may guesse my meaning of what place, which is not hard for you to do". Backhouse took this information direct to Massey who, after consultation with his senior officers, put a counter-plot into operation. It was decided to play along with the plot for a time, in the hope that the royalists would all but suspend other action planned or in progress against Gloucester itself and in the surrounding area, thus creating an interlude of relative peace during which the recent harvest could be marketed, distributed and stored and the city garrison re-equipped and strengthened. It might even prove possible to induce the royalists to abandon some of their strongholds or to lure them into an ambush.

Accordingly, on 20 November Backhouse replied, pledging loyalty to the king, expressing his willingness to betray the city and requesting strict secrecy and a way of corresponding safely. He wanted a free pass signed by the king for his messenger, who was a trusted friend and lived in the Gloucester suburbs "whereby he may come home without suspicion". He also stressed that he expected to be well paid for his services, for "you know my estate is not great". Stanford, who was at Worcester, received the news enthusiastically and replied within a week. He revealed that Lord Digby, one of the king's top advisers, was in on the plot and would "be able to performe to you what ever you shall expect for your reward". All Backhouse's requests were granted and in return he was to supply as soon as possible details of the ways in which he could betray Gloucester to the king's men.

On 7 December Backhouse duly set out four possible ways for gaining entry to the city. First, as captain of the horse, he could venture out of the city on night patrol and return leading the cavaliers in "upon a sudden in a moone-shine night at the gate, and so master the first guard, which may easily be done, and not discerned till too late, my troops being above sixty, who may be all in the reare and at your mercy, though I might myselfe lead in the force, which cannot give the alarum in the night so soone as to prevent the design". Alternatively, he could

persuade the Governor to take a strong force of foot and horse to stay all night some ten miles out of the city—"as I know I can doe"—but to remain at home himself, bringing the royalists in "under colour of our owne forces". The third scheme was to find a spot where the guard was weak, drawing off the sentries on some pretence, which he could do "being known to them all", so making an entrance easy. Finally, he suggested he could, at night, send for hay and "after the carts bring in some men as carters, who may have snaphance musquets in the carts, and some dragoones to fall in, in the very reare of the carts, who may master the first guards, and possesse the ordnance there, and so let in both horse, and foote, who with such ordnance may march through all the streets in towne". In the same letter Backhouse put the financial squeeze on Stanford and stated that he would need £2-300 "as soon as may be" to bear up his "port and credit", especially among the troops and junior officers, "to whom I must be open handed to ingage affection, that they may readily open when I call at any time". He wanted to bind his own troop "with a silver cord" and "plentifully to reward intercoursers between me and you, or me and such others as you shall appoint". Although offered £5,000 for his part in the plot, with beguiling generosity Backhouse said that he would happily accept just £2,000.

This letter was regarded with such importance that it was forwarded to the king's headquarters in Oxford. Stanford's reply of mid December contained an unwitting reference to the true state of affairs, for he wrote that he would meet Backhouse and was "confident you have no plot on me". Nevertheless, urgency was Stanford's keynote and he hinted that the royalists might find someone else to betray Gloucester: "Deare Robin, if you will make yourselfe a fortune, performe really what you have promised, for others may hereafter on the same conditions be glad to make good your offers". He enclosed a note of 14 December from Lord Digby, who pledged his word "both as a minister of state and as a gentleman" that Backhouse would receive £2,000 and a royal pardon immediately after he had betrayed the city. He also pledged to make a down payment of £300 which "shall be forthwith payed into what place soever you shall appoint, or to what person". As to Backhouse's four plans, Digby sensibly wrote that "as for the particular waies of effecting your designe, those you propose are very rationall, but the choise and disposition of that must be between you, and those who are to execute it, with whom if it were possible you should procure a meeting at some unsuspected place". Digby suggested that Backhouse liaise with one of four people: Sir William Vavasour; Colonel Mynne, "commander of a brigade of the English come out of Ireland"; Colonel Washington, who was at Evesham; or the governor of Berkeley castle. Backhouse

replied direct to Digby on 28 December suggesting Vavasour, who was only twelve miles away at Ledbury, whereas Mynne and Washington were both over twenty miles away and Berkeley castle at least fifteen "and of inconsiderable strength there".

At the same time, Backhouse sent a copy of the letter to Stanford with a covering note, giving further information. Backhouse pretended to have been wounded—shot in the hand—as an excuse for not having written sooner and added that he could not ride far. He suggested that Stanford come to Ledbury or Sir John Winter's quarters. "You may then in any evening meet me in Corslane, the middle way between this garrison and Ledbury, where you and I may meet, and the moon not know thereof". (Corse Lane or Lawn was an area of semi-moor, with some rough grazing and woodland, east of Staunton and almost exactly half way between Ledbury and Gloucester.) Backhouse also requested that the bearer of the letter should be given the £300 and provided with an escort of eight or ten horsemen as far as Corslane. He closed by imploring Stanford: "Sir, I beseech you be carefull of these letters, and as secret as the night, or I must perish miserably".

But Stanford was unhappy with these arrangements, as he made clear in his seventh letter to Backhouse, dated 2 January 1644. He agreed the need for an escort but was concerned "how easie that may be discovered". He suggested paying most of the money to a friend of Backhouse's choice, though £50 or £100 could be sent direct by the messenger. If the money was found, Backhouse could then "pretend you are to send me a coach and horses for it". Stanford also turned down the suggestion of their meeting at Sir John Winter's quarters. Backhouse, in turn, was dissatisfied with these developments and wrote back on the following day, stressing his need for cash. "Sir, I must tell you, that since this businesse hath been working in my head (which I have pretty well perfected now) I have been inforced to take up money at a hard hand to doe the things I intended. And it is impossible that you can imagine the sundry waies that I have layed in my head, and partly put in action, to further and prepare mine owne secret intentions". "I must tell you", he continued, "the money is so necessary to me, that next unto my fidelity, promise, and ingagement to my Lord Digby, and yourselfe, it is the chiefe moving wheele...If the summe I desire in hand, be thought too great an adventure, I would have you consider mine adventure, the least line of any of my letters being sufficient to have me hanged". He suggested that Stanford send "a dozen honest men" to guard the money almost as far as Tewkesbury, where it would be met by his own troop. If discovered, "you may pretend you are sending to pay to save the forfeiture of a mortgage". Finally, Backhouse

proposed that he and Stanford should meet alone and unarmed to discuss the plot.

On 7 January Backhouse received a brief verbal reply from Stanford, telling Backhouse to meet him in Corslane the next day. The meeting went ahead and £200 was handed over. The cat and mouse game continued, with Stanford explaining that the plot was for Vavasour, then at Tewkesbury, to enter Gloucester when the city was almost undefended. Backhouse was to persuade Massey "with a very strong party" to go to Berkeley castle on receiving word that it would be delivered up to parliament. The royalists planned in earnest to abandon the castle, thus ensuring that Massey would be absent for some time arranging the garrisoning of his new outpost. Backhouse's task was to open Gloucester city gates in Massey's absence. Backhouse cunningly suggested that while the royalists were gathered at Tewkesbury it would be difficult to persuade the Governor to leave Gloucester with most of his men. For the plan to succeed, the king's men would also have to withdraw from Tewkesbury. The parliamentary scheme was to send a garrison into Berkeley castle, "with silent forces from Presbury garrison to have possessed Tewkesbury" and to keep sufficient troops in Gloucester to repel any royalist attacks or even attempt to ambush and capture Vavasour's detachment.

Hereafter, however, things began to go awry for the parliamentarians, either through simple bad luck or perhaps because the royalists were becoming suspicious. The royalists abandoned the scheme outlined on 8 January, reportedly because the governor of Berkeley castle would not draw out his whole garrison upon Vavasour's orders and refused to abandon the stronghold "without the king's or prince's [Rupert's] speciall command". Vavasour, too, had found himself in difficulties because of the need for absolute secrecy and several royalist commissioners were opposing his plans to withdraw from Tewkesbury and wanted to know the reason. "Unlesse they might know, and approve of my designe, they would not consent to it". "I have quite left them unsatisfied with what I intended", wrote Sir William, "so that Sir Walter Pye is gone to Oxford with a great complaint". Instead, the royalists now favoured another of Backhouse's four schemes—to draw out his own troop with another to be put in the rear of the royalist horse, which would be led back into the city under Backhouse's flag. Vavasour urged Backhouse to draw his troop, and "one more if you can, a good distance from town".

Backhouse again had to think fast. He wrote back to Sir William on 17 January, claiming that Massey had scouts out day and night looking for any move towards him from the royalist garrison at Tewkesbury

"insomuch that I feare it will be impossible for my troop and your forces to joyn without discovery". He repeated that the royalists must quit Tewkesbury and suggested a move to Ledbury, from whence they could when the time came take a western route to Gloucester and so enter the city via the west gate. With the royalists out of Tewkesbury, Backhouse would talk to Massey "and then I could give him some private information that I have intelligence that Berkeley will render (though they remove not) and so draw him out in whose absence (since my hand is still lame) I must keep home". Vavasour replied on 19 January, agreeing to the plan and confirming his intention to withdraw to Ledbury, though he faced that old civil war problem—paying his troops. "We must have a little patience untill the contribution monies are brought in, for my men are very apt to mutinie, and indeed will not march without money". There followed a fortnight of relative inactivity.

On 4 February Backhouse received two letters, one from Stanford wanting intelligence on the military dispositions within Gloucester, the other from Vavasour to say that he was ready to attack, being concerned that the parliamentary commander Sir William Waller "is grown so strong, that we must attempt something out of hand"; he proposed to enter the city via the west gate—"the port on the Welsh"—on the following Friday or Sunday night. In reply, Backhouse sent Stanford a detailed report on the military situation inside the city, giving the position of the governor's residence and the number and disposition of guards in the city centre and around the gates and walls, describing the sconces which Massey was having built beyond the walls and claiming that the city had provisions for at least six months. The military information was accurate but, as Backhouse made plain in his subsequent report to the House of Commons, it was known to "the least boy that comes into our towne, being in most of the relations able to satisfie as much". Backhouse wrote more briefly to Vavasour, referring him to Stanford's letter for full details of the defences, and adding "by the time proposed in your letter, I hope the water will be down, which will much advantage your advance neere the towne".

Over the next few days letters were exchanged finalising the plot. The royalists would leave Ledbury and march through Newent, Upleadon and Rudford, carefully avoiding the parliamentary outpost at Churcham, and gather to the west of the city. Backhouse, as commander of the horse, would ensure that no patrols would be sent into that area. In the evening darkness, Vavasour and his troops would approach the city via Oversbridge, where sentries were not posted until 9 pm, cross the island immediately west of Gloucester formed by the division and reunion of the Severn, and then march to the foot of the west gate. Backhouse had

assured the royalists that the west gate was poorly defended, guarded by a single demi-culverine but no cannoner, that the drawbridges then under construction at Oversbridge and at the crossing immediately below the west gate would not be complete, and that the guard was weak and careless, and the men prone to "run from their duty to drinking"—officers and troops alike were "much discontented... for want of pay". To ensure success, Backhouse would wait at the west gate with the keys, claiming to be awaiting the return of his patrols, and would let the guards go to the ale-house. If any remained, he would say that Vavasour's troops were parliamentary soldiers from Churcham. On the morning of 15 February Backhouse sent an encouraging note to Stanford: "The plot I prescribed in my letter runs more and more feazible in my head; I could last night have done it gallantly". In reply, Stanford sent the vital message. The royalists would attack that night, Thursday 15 February, with 1500 horse and foot "so that you must not faile this night to draw off your guards from the bridge, that we may come secure to the gate, and not have any centries to hinder us".

The crunch had come at last. Backhouse immediately took the letter to Massey, who held a council of war. Civilians were to be armed and the west gate strengthened by moving three cannon and a strong guard of musketeers with grenades there. The plan was not merely to repel Vavasour but to destroy or capture most of his unit by trapping it on the island to the west of the city. To that end, four men in a boat were stationed under Oversbridge who, upon a signal, were to have "cut a gable rope; which being done, the bridge would have fallen in, whereby (by God's mercy) of necessity they [the royalists] must have been killed, drowned or taken, there being no possible meanes in humane reason of a man's escape". Backhouse sent a note to Stanford, saying that all was ready, that the west gate would be opened between 9 pm and 9.30, and that, if challenged, the parliamentary password was "Bristoll".

Once again, however, the plan foundered on the rocks of bad luck and poor coordination, and possibly of royalist inaction, cowardice or apprehensions too. Backhouse's note saying that all was ready allegedly arrived very late in the royalist camp, the king's men lost more time on the night march and they had progressed no further than Lassington Hill, two miles north-west of the city, by dawn. They dared not launch an attack in daylight and way past the agreed time for the opening of the west gate and instead withdrew to Newent. The royalists initially proposed that the operation should be repeated on the following Saturday or Sunday night and Backhouse hastily concocted a rather improbable story to encourage them. He sent word that the Governor had been warned of the royalist advance by "two countrymen" and had therefore

strengthened the sentries overnight, that rumours were circulating of a plot against the city and that he was under some suspicion, which he was attempting to deflect by launching a vigorous investigation! For the moment, close watch was being kept but time and the approaching market day would lead to a lowering of the guard. Backhouse advised Vavasour to stay at Newent and "not give us allarums till Sunday after dinner, and then advance your foot to be here by nine of the clock". The original plan could then be put into operation on the evening of Sunday 18 February. But by then Vavasour had been ordered to move the greater part of his forces to meet a parliamentary convoy coming from Warwick and the plot had to be postponed indefinitely.

On 22 February, some three months after Stanford's original letter, Backhouse wrote to him for the last time. He warned him that the plot had become common knowledge through royalist indiscretion: "it being in the mouths of most of your souldiers; from whom it hath by sundry intelligencers been spread here amongst both town and country... I have heard such things as have made my eares glow". Backhouse still held out hopes for the future, for "the strongest relations are but nine dayes' wonder" and "I shall suffer this to weare itselife off". He thought that the plan could be revived in due course but closed with an outspoken warning: "Only thus much let me begge at your hands, if ever you meane to accomplish the designe of surprisall, to be more private in your expressions, more politique in relating to your souldiers truly your own marches, more constant in your resolutions and prefixions and more sudden in your actions".

In the event, Backhouse never heard from the royalists again and during the spring he published full details of the plot. He died a year later at Ledbury, killed when Prince Rupert launched a surprise attack on the then parliamentary outpost. His two royalist "co-conspirators" of 1643-44 survived the civil war, though Vavasour shared Prince Rupert's disgrace in 1646, spent many years soldiering on the Continent and died in action at Copenhagen in 1659; in the employ of the Swedes. Edward Stanford, too, saw action overseas and for a time fought for Venice against the Turks, but he returned to England during the 1650s and spent the rest of his life in peaceful obscurity, dying at Handsworth, Birmingham, in 1675. Despite further scares, Gloucester remained in parliamentary hands for the rest of the war. In 1660 the townspeople welcomed the restored monarch with exuberance, though Charles II coolly ordered that the city walls and other defences be completely demolished. More than sixteen years after the unsuccessful siege and plot, the royalists had wreaked a tardy revenge on the obstinate parliamentary stronghold.

CROMWELLIAN BRITAIN I

Lindsey House, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London.

On the west side of Lincoln's Inn Fields stands one of the few surviving London houses of the great building programmes of the mid seventeenth century. Prior to development, the area had comprised two irregularly-shaped fields, part of an enclave of open land north of the urban crescent (centred on the Strand) linking the City and Westminster and south of new ribbon housing stretching along Holborn. The two fields had changed hands at the Dissolution, passing from church to crown, but their use was unaffected; throughout the Tudor period they had been leased to a couple of inns as rough pasture ground. In the early seventeenth century there had been increasing pressure to build there, but the Members and Society of Lincoln's Inn, which lay immediately to the east, had vehemently opposed development. During the reign of James I they successfully resisted several building projects, proposing instead that the fields be drained, pathed and turned into a place of recreation. Not until the 1630s did Charles I, eager to raise money and responsive to a genuine shortage of housing, sanction development there and elsewhere around the fringes of the growing metropolis.

During the 1630s William Newton of Bedfordshire acquired the fields, obtained a royal licence to erect 32 houses and, in 1639, reached agreement with Lincoln's Inn that a square piece of land be left open and undeveloped. Most buildings were to be arranged around three sides of the square, with Lincoln's Inn bordering it to the east. Newton built some houses himself, though he often sold off the land in plots, and progress was fitful. By 1642 most of the houses along the west side were complete, but further work was then halted both by the Civil War and by renewed complaints that the development was undesirable, that those houses already completed were a den of Popish recusants and that the central area had become an unhealthy rubbish tip. Work resumed in the 1650s and by 1657 a consortium of builders had finished the west side and started on the north and south sides. However, work was then put in jeopardy by a Building Act going through the second Protectorate parliament, designed to raise money from existing buildings and narrowly to restrict any further expansion of the the capital. Fines were imposed on every building erected since 1620 within ten miles of London and possessing less than four acres of land; very heavy fines were to be levied on any buildings erected on new foundations in the same area after September 1657; and to reduce the fire risk MPs also banned the use of timber and ordered that new buildings stand "straight up, without

butting or jetting out into the street". The Bill advanced steadily over the spring, but in June progress was held up as MPs introduced a large number of provisos excluding buildings, existing or proposed, from penalty. On 19 June it was decided to accept no further amendments, "the House seeing so many of them, almost in every Member's hand". Luckily for the Lincoln's Inn builders, a clause exempting them from the standard penalties had been introduced a week before and slipped through on the afternoon of the 19th. It permitted the completion of the remaining houses already agreed by contract, on payment of a fine of one year's rent and providing all work was finished by 1 October 1659. The remaining houses were, indeed, erected on the north and south sides of the square during the final two years of the Protectorate and by autumn 1659 the development was complete.

Almost all of Lincoln's Inn Fields has been rebuilt since, and of the mid seventeenth century development, a single house remains—Lindsey House on the west side, now numbered 59-60. The house, which was built in 1640-1, is often attributed to Inigo Jones; although no contemporary documents confirm Jones as the designer, it is certainly in his style. It became known as Lindsey House only in the eighteenth century, when it was for a time owned by two successive Earls of Lindsey, and the story that it was built for the royalist 1st Earl who perished at Edgehill in 1642 is unfounded. Instead, the first owner was Sir David Cunningham, kt. and bart., who bought the plot and perhaps the foundations of the house from Newton in March 1641 for £300. Cunningham had acquired the property as speculation and when the house was completed in June 1641 he promptly sold it for £4,000. The new owner, Henry Murray, was a groom of the King's Bedchamber but was and is a rather obscure figure. He may have been one of the "recusants" allegedly living in the area in the mid 1640s, but he was seemingly not a particularly prominent or active royalist. In March 1652 he sold the house to the first of a string of distinguished peers who occupied the property for almost exactly a century.

In 1652 Lindsey House was acquired by the Hon. Charles Rich, a younger son of Robert Earl of Warwick (d1658), the great parliamentary admiral, and uncle of the Robert Rich (1634-58) who was briefly married to the Protector's youngest daughter, Frances. Charles had supported parliament throughout the Civil War and was a Member of the Long Parliament and of Richard Cromwell's parliament. He succeeded to the Earldom on the failure of the elder branch in 1659, welcomed Charles II the following year and continued to hold office until his death in 1673. Lindsey House served as his London seat and presumably his uncle, his nephew and the latter's young bride would all have been occasional

visitors, though the whole family seem to have spent most of the year on their huge estate in Essex. Charles's only son died of smallpox at Lincoln's Inn Fields in May 1664 and within two months the Earl had sold the property. It was acquired by Charles Powlett, Lord St John of Basing, son and heir of the arch royalist and Catholic Marquis of Winchester who had held Basing House for the king during the Civil War until its capture by Cromwell in 1645. Charles, an Anglican and often on bad terms with his father, had taken no part in the conflict and was probably abroad at the time, completing his education. He was, however, briefly imprisoned in 1655 on suspicion of royalism. He succeeded his father in 1675 and, as an active Whig and supporter of the Glorious Revolution, was created Duke of Bolton in 1689. He was a rather odd character, given to long periods of silence and to bizarre nocturnal parties and hunting expeditions; in 1687 he travelled the country with four coaches and a retinue of 100 horsemen, giving elaborate entertainments by night and sleeping by day. He sold Lindsey House in 1685 and for the next seventy years it was owned or leased by a succession of noblemen: Viscount Lowther, the Earl of Dorset and Middlesex, two Earls of Lindsey and Dukes of Ancaster, and the 6th Duke of Somerset. In 1752 the house was divided in two and was owned thereafter by well-to-do commoners, including (in the years preceding his premiership) by the Hon. Spencer Perceval, the only British Prime Minister to have been assassinated in office.

Today Lindsey House is owned and occupied by a private business and is not open to the public. There is, in any case, almost no original work to be seen inside, for the house was extensively redecorated in the mid eighteenth century when it was divided in two; a new party wall and staircases were inserted and the rooms rearranged. There have been fewer external changes—the brickwork, originally bare, is now completely covered by painted stucco, and small urns and a bust which adorned a pediment and the parapet in the early eighteenth century have gone—and for the most part Lindsey House retains its original appearance. The house is of three storeys, plus attics and a basement, and is built of brick and stone, with a small section of wooden cornice and a slate roof. The five-bay symmetrical front is of stone and stuccoed brickwork, now painted reddish-brown; six white stone pilasters on the upper two storeys support a continuous entablature. Above is a fine parapet. The first floor windows are set off with pediments, the outer four triangular, the central one a broken arc formerly adorned by a crowned female bust. The forecourt is flanked by a pair of grand brick gatepiers, topped by octagonal decorated stone vases, two of a row of six which originally ran along the street frontage. In Lindsey House

we see a substantial, fashionable and well-built town property of the mid seventeenth century, of the era of Caroline urban development and Protectoral building legislation. It is a sight which must have been familiar to the parliamentary admiral, the Member of Parliament and the young Cromwellian bride who knew the house in the days of Oliver Cromwell.

CROMWELL AND HIS PARLIAMENTS: THE TREVOR-ROPER THESIS REVISITED

by Roger Howell, jnr.

Few problems in the political history of the English Revolution have occasioned more controversy than the question of Cromwell's relations with his various parliaments. On one level, it is clearly a story of continuing frustration; the man who had fought so successfully to secure the role of parliament in the constitution found himself repeatedly unable to work with or secure co-operation from that assembly, no matter how he tried to regulate or control it. The remnant of the Long Parliament was expelled by force, Barebone's Parliament ended its own life in controversial and acrimonious circumstances, and the two Protectorate Parliaments were unruly, awkward, and frequently out of control, the first being dissolved at the earliest moment on the basis of an interpretation of the Instrument of Government that bordered on fraud, the second being dismissed with a disgruntled "let God judge between you and me" from the Lord Protector. The succession of failures poses a very important question: why was Cromwell apparently so unfortunate in his parliamentary relations? To that question, a variety of answers have been offered. To Cromwell's enemies (who embraced a wide spectrum of political opinion by the late 1650s) the answer seemed to be simple enough. The ambitious, hypocritical tyrant could brook no interference with his authority; having deviously usurped the chief place in the state, he found parliaments a nuisance and would gladly have done without them. Such a view was, of course, tenable only so long as what might be called "the devil view" of Cromwell dominated the historiography of the revolution. Remove the proud tyrant from the picture and there was little left of the view that Cromwell failed with his parliaments because he was not a parliamentarian. On the other hand,

if one accepts the view that Cromwell was indeed a constitutionalist committed to parliament as an institution, the question of his incapacity to work with that body is restored to a position of central importance in the interpretation of the revolution.

Thirty years ago in a famous essay, Hugh Trevor-Roper offered a simple but ostensibly comprehensive answer to the problem.[1] Cromwell was indeed a constitutionalist and parliament man, but he was one who viewed parliament from the perspective of the back benches. A fundamental and instinctive conservative, he saw in parliament "part of the natural order of things". His back bench perspective, however, caused him to fail abjectly as a parliamentary leader. "He never understood the subtleties of politics, never rose above the simple political prejudices of those other backwoods squires whom he had joined in their blind revolt against the Stuart court". He, in common with many others, simply "turned up in parliament and, sitting permanently on the back benches, either never understood or, at most, deeply suspected the secret mechanism whereby the back benches were controlled from the front". The problem, in short, was one of management, of his use (or rather non-use) of patronage and procedural devices. Cromwell could look back to the time of Elizabeth and see in it a parliamentary golden age; the supreme irony was that it was precisely her skill in handling these matters of patronage and procedure that gave to her parliaments the successful working that Cromwell sought in vain in his. "The one English sovereign who had actually been a member of parliament proved himself as a parliamentarian the most incompetent of them all. He did so because he had not studied the necessary rules of the game. Hoping to imitate Queen Elizabeth, who by understanding those rules had been able to play upon 'her faithful Commons' as upon a well-tuned instrument, he failed even more dismally than the Stuarts. The tragedy is that whereas they did not believe in the system, he did".

The Trevor-Roper thesis was argued with characteristic elegance and has passed, in one form or another, into much of the literature on the period. Even though a number of scholars have found it unconvincing in specific detail, the central idea that Cromwell failed with his parliaments because he lacked the requisite skill in the managing of them continues to appear in accounts of the period. Trevor-Roper himself, it should be added, has conceded little if anything to his critics. In a revised version of the essay, he dismissed in a curt footnote the argument of Professor Roots that the Instrument of Government was hardly the work of the independent country gentry but rather that of a group of army officers. [2] To the demonstration by Woolrych that his account

of the selection of the members of the Barebone's Parliament was demonstrably inaccurate, he simply commented, "although convinced by Mr Woolrych's argument, I have not altered my text; the effective difference is anyway slight". [3] One must admit that there are aspects of the Trevor-Roper argument on which general agreement does and should exist. No one can argue with the historical record of Cromwell's substantial failure with parliament, nor with the view that Cromwell was nonetheless a sincere believer in the institution itself. The inability to achieve an effective civil settlement remains the essential failure of the revolution. But to say that is only to indicate that Trevor-Roper identified the problem; it is not to suggest that he provided a convincing answer to it.

From the very start, there are a number of basic problems about the picture created by the Trevor-Roper thesis. In the first place, it seems to imply an almost mythical view of the Elizabethan parliaments, on the one hand greatly exaggerating the role of Elizabeth's own political skill in managing parliament, on the other suggesting that this management was controlling an opposition analagous to that with which Cromwell was dealing in the 1650s. That Elizabeth played the roles of monarch and politician with far more than average deftness is undeniable, though to suggest that it was this alone which produced the apparent political achievement of the Elizabethan period would be misleading. External props to the system, which Elizabeth and her councillors could use but not control, seem a far more convincing explanation. [4] Not the least of such props was the fear of foreign invasion, present throughout the reign; in such circumstances, minimising the extent of domestic turmoil was obviously in the best interests of all save a tiny minority who were willing to effect religious change through the agency of foreign intervention. That Elizabeth used all the managerial techniques dwelt on so lovingly by Professor Neale is also incontrovertible. Message, rumour, the action of privy councillors, the intervention of the Speaker can all be documented, as can that vague but very real political capacity referred to as Elizabeth's tact. But it would surely be a mistake to think that these devices in and of themselves were sufficient to achieve a royal mastery over parliament. If nothing else, the famous debate over monopolies suggests that the capacity of privy councillors to control the House on a day to day basis was already noticeably in decline in the Elizabethan period. Nor, for that matter, was the privy council always an unqualified support to the royal position. The Elizabethan privy council was rent by faction, and while Elizabeth was able on many occasions to use this factionalism to control it, it was always potentially volatile. More to the point than

the mechanisms, however, was the context within which they operated. Much of the recent work on the history of parliament has demonstrated the need to revise long-held views about the nature of the growth of parliamentary opposition. In the days when historians followed Notestein and talked about the winning of the initiative by the House of Commons, the picture of Elizabeth as the supreme parliamentary manager carefully controlling an increasingly difficult and self-conscious group of parliamentary politicians made more sense than it does now. If one accepts the view that consensus rather than confrontation was the hoped-for outcome of a parliamentary session, the whole question of management takes on a rather different aspect and the usefulness of comparing the Elizabethan and Cromwellian periods becomes somewhat more problematical.

A second general difficulty about the formulation suggested by Trevor-Roper is his view that Cromwell was both inconsistent and without positive purpose. That there are inconsistencies in Cromwell's behaviour is, of course, obvious. To the extent that he was a revolutionary at all, he was very much a pragmatic, not a doctrinaire one. He was too much of an opportunist to be otherwise. On the other hand, to argue as Trevor-Roper does that "no political career is so full of undefended inconsistencies as his" is to overstate the case. [5] There is an important element of consistency in his political behaviour and failure to recognise it seriously complicates understanding of what he was doing. In addition, the consistency in question is more than an adherence to the "negative agenda" of the country party of 1640. Cromwell consistently sought to translate military predominance into a civil constitutional settlement; he likewise saw as part of that settlement a reform of the law, the establishment of a generous measure of religious toleration, and a reformation of manners. It was the practical impossibility of achieving such ends that occasioned the apparent inconsistency in Cromwell, rather than a deeply rooted inconsistency in him that frustrated their being brought to perfection. The survival of the revolution depended on the army and that made the hope for a civil constitutional settlement ultimately futile. Reducing the strength and position of the army was the prerequisite for a civil settlement; maintaining both was a prerequisite for the survival of the whole revolutionary experiment. The reform of laws, the creation of religious toleration and the reformation of manners each involved the vigorous exercise of central powers. Given the parliamentary stress on decentralisation, such leadership was unlikely to come from that quarter. To the extent that Cromwell expected a godly parliament to emerge to take the lead in such matters, he was, indeed, a naive parliamentarian. On the other hand, both his lack of a positive

programme and his unwillingness to push for that programme because it meant substantially increasing the degree of centralisation, have been badly exaggerated. His early Protectoral ordinances testify to the survival of an active reform programme on his part after the failure of the Barebone's experiment, which Hill has identified as the turning point in his faith in reform. [6] His use of the major generals to be the agents of reformation as well as the arms of repression suggests that (unlike the backwoods figure Trevor-Roper portrays him to be) he was willing to experiment with central direction to attain reform when it would not come from other quarters. Despite Cromwell's often-quoted remark about disarming the nine who were against him and arming the tenth who was for him, one has the feeling that his ultimate objection to this way of achieving reform was precisely that it institutionalised the role of the military in the government and frustrated the hopes for a civil settlement. The national reaction against the major generals may well have been influenced as much or more by "country" objections to centralisation as by dislike of military rule. Cromwell's attitude was not so closed to the role of the central authority; the nature of that authority, in the last analysis, was what made the crucial difference to him.

A third general difficulty with Trevor-Roper's thesis is his explicitly held view that Cromwell was simply not a parliamentary politician. As Trevor-Roper has argued, Cromwell never learned or understood the techniques of parliamentary politics; at the most, he was simply suspicious of the way they had been used by others. Maintaining that this was the case is, of course, central to the thesis. Knowing the rules but playing the game badly might well seem implausible given what we know about Cromwell; instead it seems better to explain failure by assuming that he (unlike Elizabeth) had never studied or understood the rules in the first place. But is it in fact convincing to argue that Cromwell neither knew nor employed these so-called rules of the game? There would seem to be substantial indications to the contrary. One of the least studied (and admittedly least well documented) parts of Cromwell's career is his activity in parliament before the outbreak of hostilities. But to assume that he could, for the better part of two years, work as one of Pym's lieutenants without learning something about the nature of parliamentary politics and tactics requires a monumental suspension of disbelief. Between 1640-42 he had been an active committee man, an increasingly frequent speaker, a messenger between the two Houses. As such he was involved in the workings of what Trevor-Roper himself has described as the most effective parliamentary management since the time of the Cecils. That absolutely nothing about

management penetrated his obdurate "country" mind seems inconceivable. [7] Once that is admitted, an alternative hypothesis at once suggests itself: it was not that Cromwell was totally ignorant of the ways of the game but rather that the game itself had changed in ways that made the old rules (whether employed for the government by the Cecils or against the government by Pym) useless planks to which to cling.

Before pursuing this point—namely that parliamentary management in the sense in which Trevor-Roper appears to employ the concept was not in fact the crux of the matter in the 1650s—it is important to note two further pieces of evidence which would seem to indicate that Cromwell cannot be described adequately as a back bencher quite out of his depth in playing the game of parliamentary politics. Cromwell's intentions and actions at the time the Self Denying Ordinance was under discussion were obscure and they remain so. But if one sets aside the admittedly important question of what his expectations were with regard to his own military command, one must recognise a high degree of political skill in the manner in which he helped to force the issue to a resolution. Having raised the issue of the army command by the virulence of his attack on Manchester, Cromwell, with considerable political adroitness, suddenly shifted the ground and placed the argument on a new and more constructive level in a memorable series of speeches in the House on 9 December 1644. [8] While the concern was neither new nor original with Cromwell (Waller, after all, had argued for a new model for the army in June), the intervention was a masterly stroke; the personal quarrel with Manchester was altered to a general point of principle and the upshot was the Self Denying Ordinance. One should not minimise the scope of the gamble that Cromwell was making at this point, but the coolness and skill with which he played the game hardly suggests the picture of one who did not know the rules.

The second case involves the offer of the crown to Cromwell by the second Protectorate parliament. Again, an important question on which attention is focussed—this time the central issue of why he refused the offer of kingship—has diverted attention from the obvious parliamentary and political skill shown by Cromwell in handling the situation. [9] The proposal for a new settlement that would make Cromwell king, lead to a settlement of the succession (increasingly a key issue as Cromwell aged) and revive the House of Lords had much to offer Cromwell. The financial settlement that was offered was better than anything provided under the Instrument and it is clear that Cromwell was much attracted (for constitutional reasons) to the proposed renewal of the House of Lords, for he saw such a body as an essential check and balance to the

power of the existing House, a point he made forcefully with reference to the House's proceedings in the case of James Naylor: "By the proceedings of this Parliament you see they stand in need of a check or balancing power..., for the case of James Naylor might happen to be your case. By their judicial power, they fall upon life and member, and doth the Instrument enable me to control it?" [10] The problem was the army's hostile attitude towards the restoration of the kingship. Discussion of what ensued has tended to focus on the fact that army intransigence over the issue forced Cromwell to refuse the offer. On the basis of the Trevor-Roper thesis, the situation represents yet another Cromwellian parliamentary failure. At last, so the argument runs, he had a party in the House, even if he had not made it, but instead of using it, he ruined it: "after infinite delays and a series of long speeches, each obscurer than the last, he finally surrendered to the army and accepted the new constitution only in a hopelessly truncated form". [11] But was this in fact the case? To be sure, he had given in on the kingship, but during the five weeks that conferences and negotiations continued, Cromwell suggested numerous amendments to the proposed constitution and they were accepted. Indeed, one can suggest that there was a skillful and successful Cromwellian strategy at work here, designed to get the best possible out of the proposals without letting the army position on kingship ruin all. By the beginning of May 1657, the less controversial but nonetheless significant parts of the constitution had been agreed on and by then parliament had come so far with the proposed constitution that they were now unlikely to abandon the product of such efforts on the grounds that the offer of the crown was an integral part of the whole (a position many held at the beginning of the discussions). There can be little doubt that Cromwell's ultimate refusal of the crown was a considerable disappointment to his "party" in the House; on the other hand, when the House on 25 May re-offered the constitution to him with the title of protector replacing that of king, Cromwell had by patience and parliamentary skill won a significant battle without totally disrupting the army. Far from being "a hopelessly truncated" thing, the new constitution meant that Cromwell's government now rested as near to having a constitutional basis as it ever would. He now ruled by a parliamentary constitution, not an army settlement. He had gained the desired second House and the power to name his successor. The financial settlement of the government was improved and if the diminishing of the power of the council represented a gain for parliament, it was a gain for the Protector too, since it was critical in curbing the power of Lambert in the government. Looked at in this way, the episode hardly appears as the story of the failure of a man hopelessly lost in

the tangles of parliamentary politics but rather one of skillful maximisation of potential opportunities based on a shrewd perception of the political realities of the time, not the least of which was the troublesome and ambiguous position of the army.

Enough has perhaps been said to suggest that some restatement of the problem identified by Trevor-Roper is in order. That restatement should include at least four points: 1) that the basic problem was not in fact one of management in the conventional sense applied by Trevor-Roper to the handling of Elizabethan parliaments; 2) that there is an essential difference in context between the Elizabethan and Cromwellian parliaments that makes a straight comparison misleading; 3) that the nature of expectations about the parliamentary occasion had changed considerably from the Elizabethan period, and the assumption that consensus was normal and expected and confrontation abnormal and unwanted cannot be taken to apply to the Cromwellian situation; and 4) that the role of the army frustrated the legitimation of government at the same time as it assured its continuance, which meant that the shortcomings of the executive cannot be explained solely by reference to a failure to organise and control parliament.

The point that management in the conventional sense employed by Trevor-Roper was not the real issue needs to be seen on several levels. There is truth enough in Trevor-Roper's assertion that Cromwell was less than active about organising the management of business in the House and that this allowed others like Scott and Hesilrige opportunity to do so. But that point accepted, the question remains, what were the alternatives? The very methods by which Elizabeth managed her parliaments—control of the Speaker, the active intervention of privy councillors and so forth— were largely unavailable to Cromwell, and in any case were already beginning to be unavailing for Elizabeth at the end of her reign. Like Elizabeth, he did employ messages and rumours; the use of his son-in-law Claypole to convey the message that Cromwell would agree to the dropping of the major general system provides a case in point. But the critical difference was in the nature of politics itself. Cromwell was attempting to manage parliament at a time when the Elizabethan conventions had faded, but more modern forms had not yet emerged. In the years after 1660 the monarchy would devise new ways of working with the House that recognised the extent to which the executive had to seek out and work with figures in the House who could control votes and, more importantly, coalitions of votes. But the "undertaker" who would manage a majority for the monarch was a figure of the future. The nearest Cromwell came to this expedient was with the kingship party in the second Protectorate

parliament, but the fact that their ideas of kingship ran counter to army opinion made it impossible for Cromwell to use them in this way. To argue that Cromwell ruined them by failing to employ them properly is to gloss over the realities of the political situation.

The differences in context between the two periods compared by Trevor-Roper are also of central significance. A convincing case can be made that the Elizabethan political system functioned as it did in considerable part because of the existence of external props to the system that served to cancel out or gloss over the obvious contradictions that existed within the governmental structure. If danger from abroad placed an increasing strain on Elizabethan finances, it also provided a focal point that helped to hold the system together. Cromwell obviously faced external threats to his regime as well, but the difference was that substantial portions of the population sympathised with the intended results of such threats, the restoration of the Stuarts and of the Anglican church. Cromwell was never in a position to exploit the external menace as a prop to the regime in the way Elizabeth and her councillors were. Not that he did not try; the attempted creation of a neo-Elizabethan foreign policy based on the Protestant interest, war with Spain, and naval war in the Caribbean, certainly appears to have been aimed in this direction. [12] The other great external prop to the Elizabethan regime had been the reality of a substantial community of interest among the political nation. On one level that community of interest persisted; the men of property continued to look with alarm at the prospect of the stirrings of the many-headed monster below them, and between that chaos and Cromwell the choice was clear. On the other hand, the war had been the product of deep rifts within the political nation. These too persisted and one result was that there was no consensus that Cromwell was the only alternative to the many-headed monster. On the contrary, the intrusion of his major generals into local affairs suggested to many that he was the potential begetter of such developments, not the salvation from them, and no manner of conservative rhetoric in parliament on his part could entirely overcome that perception. [13]

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the nature of the parliamentary occasion had itself changed. Men like Scott, Hesilrige, Vane and Harrison came to parliament with an attitude widely distanced from that of the majority of Elizabethan MPs. To them, parliament was increasingly seen as a forum for confrontation, not an occasion characterised by consensus. Consensus involved compromise and they were not compromising men. This is not the place to explore the process by which the politics of confrontation replaced the politics of consensus

during the revolution. Suffice it to say that Cromwell reaped the awkward harvest of that development. Like so much else, it meant that old-style parliamentary management had limited relevance to the immediate situation.

Finally and most obviously, there was the position of the army. The weapon that won the revolutionary war made the peaceful settlement of it impossible. It is surely wishful thinking to assert, as Trevor-Roper does, that Cromwell could have solved the problem of the army's intrusion into politics by cashiering a few senior officers as an example to the rest. Roots is far closer to the truth when he observes that "petulant and bickering though they might be on so many smaller issues, on this the generals would cohere...A few commanders detached by threats or promises would mean very little in the long run". [14] So long as the army occupied this position, it both stood in the way of the legitimation of the government via the parliamentary route and heightened the level of the politics of frustration and confrontation within parliament itself. The wonder is not that Cromwell failed with his parliaments under these conditions but that he did as well as he did.

On the whole, Cromwell was not a good parliamentary manager in the sense in which one might apply that term to Cecil or Pym. To that extent the analysis provided by Trevor-Roper is correct. But to go on from that to assert that Cromwell's failure to work with parliament was substantially the product of the failure in management serves to create a double-barrelled myth about how Elizabeth managed parliaments and how Cromwell mismanaged them. The central difficulty with the Trevor-Roper thesis is that an Elizabethan style parliamentary management by itself was not the answer to the political problem of the 1650s, nor, for that matter, was it even within the realm of practical possibility.

- 1 H.R. Trevor-Roper, "Oliver Cromwell and his Parliaments", was first printed in *Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier*, ed. R. Pares and A.J.P. Taylor (London, 1956), and reprinted in Trevor-Roper, *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change* (London, 1967), pp. 345-91. The quotations in this paragraph are from pp. 346, 388, 390-1.
- 2 I.A. Roots, *The Great Rebellion* (London, 1966), p. 182; Trevor-Roper, "Cromwell and his Parliaments", p. 374 n. 2.
- 3 A.H. Woolrych, "The Calling of Barebone's Parliament", *English Historical Review*, LXXX (1965), 492-513; Trevor-Roper, "Cromwell and his Parliaments", p. 366 n. 3.
- 4 On the importance of such props see L. Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution* (London, 1972), pp. 76 ff.

- 5 Trevor-Roper, "Cromwell and his Parliaments", p. 346.
- 6 C. Hill, *God's Englishman* (London, 1970), p. 143; on the early Protectoral ordinances see R. Howell, *Cromwell* (London, 1977), pp. 199 ff.
- 7 A point stressed by Hill, *God's Englishman*, pp. 61-3.
- 8 See Howell, *Cromwell*, pp. 66 ff.
- 9 See *ibid*, pp. 236 ff.
- 10 *Diary of Thomas Burton, Esquire*, ed. J.T. Rutt (new edn., 4 vols., New York, 1974), I, 384.
- 11 Trevor-Roper, "Cromwell and his Parliaments", p. 384.
- 12 Cromwell's speech of 17 Sept. 1656 with its opening theme of "truly, your great Enemy is the Spaniard" is a significant attempt to reach unity by invoking the foreign danger. T. Carlyle, *The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (3 vols., London, 1904), II, 511 ff.
- 13 The 1656 elections with their slogan "no swordsmen, no decimators" makes this abundantly clear.
- 14 Roots, *The Great Rebellion*, p. 217.

THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, 25 APRIL 1987 in the National Portrait Gallery

The Chairman, Mr Trewin Copplestone, opened the meeting at 11 am by thanking Mr John Cooper for providing the Association with such an interesting venue. He mentioned that it was disappointing to see fewer members than usual at the AGM. Apologies for absence were noted and the Minutes of the previous AGM (available to all those present) were taken as read and signed by the Chairman. There were no matters arising.

Chairman's Report

The Chairman reported that the Council had met five times during the previous year and that there had been several changes of personnel. Two members had resigned—including Mrs K Robinson, who was thanked for her long and valuable service—and four new members would shortly be joining. Mr M Byrd will be the Association's librarian and Dr P Gaunt will in future edit *Cromwelliana*.

The Chairman turned to *The Cromwellian Gazetteer* and stated that, although there had been a number of publication difficulties and delays,

both the author and publishers could be commended for producing a very worthwhile book. He said that Dr Gaunt was extremely grateful for the support he received from members.

The Chairman said that the Marston Moor problems appeared resolved and that the Association had contributed £500 to the appeal. He wished to record the valuable contribution of the Yorkshire Group and of Mr Good, who gave the Address at the 1986 Memorial Service.

The Chairman noted the participation of our President, Professor Roots, in the recent *Timewatch* programme on Cromwell. He also mentioned that the statue of the Protector in St Ives was now floodlit, but that the Cheshunt tomb of Oliver Cromwell (the last male descendant of the Protector) was in need of restoration.

The Chairman reported that the Naseby link-road project had become a harrowing experience and that it appeared the proposed road would be routed through significant parts of the battlefield. He said that Naseby is one of our most important battlefields and that, although he was not optimistic, members should continue efforts to have the route changed by lobbying their MPs and local press. The Chairman noted that an alternative southern route would not be more expensive than the battlefield route, but that it appeared to impinge upon other interests which seem to override the preservation of our heritage.

The Chairman said that many matters had been considered in Council over the year, including the still unresolved issue of the affiliation of local groups.

The Chairman noted that the Association had received considerable publicity through the efforts of Barry Denton, whose disability had not stopped his enthusiasm. A letter from Mr Denton was read, reporting increased interest in Oliver and his era and, for the first time, an entry for the Association in the *Artists and Writers Yearbook*. Mr Denton urged members to order *The Cromwellian Gazetteer* from their local libraries, so that more people will see the book and be made aware of the Association. The Chairman thanked Mr Denton for his splendid work and asked that the thanks of the meeting be conveyed to him; he also thanked Miss Barnes and Mr Byrd for their valuable contributions.

The Chairman produced a leaflet concerning battlefield tours, organised in conjunction with Ladbroke Hotels, copies of which would be circulated with the next newsletter.

Mr Good, Chairman of the Yorkshire Group, reported on their activities over the year. He noted that there had been a long struggle with Marston Parish Council, but that the Marston Moor Memorial had been fully restored and a small wall built around it. No further repairs would be needed for some years and a local builder had agreed to clear

weeds and rubbish. Mr Good itemised the cost of the Memorial restoration to date, amounting to £2,533. He said that a further £2,000 would be needed to invest, the interest used to maintain the memorial. Mr Good turned to Kirkby Malham Church, reporting that John Lambert's standard was to be replaced but that Church rules prevented the return of his portrait. He concluded with Sir Francis Drake's prayer before the Armada conflict.

The Chairman asked for comments. In response to Mr Gervase Newport-Tinley's question on the Naseby link-road, he reiterated that in his view and in that of the Society for the Preservation of the Battlefield, a route south of Naseby village would be preferable and cheaper than that proposed to the north, through the battlefield. However, pressure from interested parties seemed to have been influential in the decision to favour the northern route and the Minister appeared unconcerned. Mr D Cozens reported that Huntingdon District Council was promoting "Cromwell Country" with a folder of leaflets for tourists. Mr Lythgoe suggested that the Association have a memorial made.

Treasurer's Report

Mr Westmacott, the Treasurer, reported a surplus of £112, though this only resulted from the delay in printing *Cromwelliana*. Printing costs would probably result in a deficit of about £550. There was a balance of £1,774, the bulk of which was invested. Subscription payments were almost identical to 1985, even though subscriptions had been increased midway through the year. There had been a drop in the number of new Life Members, new annual subscriptions were 23 and there had been donations of £413. Secretarial/postage expenses were an unwelcome burden and the newsletter cost about £60, excluding paper and printing. The Treasurer went on to say that a major objective was the restoration of the tomb at Cheshunt, for which £450 is needed. The Treasurer commended *The Cromwellian Gazetteer* as a superb publication and stated that some members had taken advantage of the pre-publication price; he had some copies with him. Major Battcock then thanked the Treasurer for a very clear and concise statement.

A member questioned the arrangement with the publishers of the *Gazetteer*. The Chairman replied that the arrangement, with the Association taking 300 copies, seemed satisfactory. Professor Roots added that several other publishers had been tried and that if the deal with Alan Suttons Ltd had not been struck, the *Gazetteer* could have been lost. Mr B Evans thanked Dr Gaunt for his efforts.

The Treasurer's report was received.

Mr Byrd talked about the Association's library, for which he had taken responsibility, pointing out that some books were in poor condition and would need rebinding. The Chairman appealed for members to donate books and Mr Goodman reported that he had made arrangements to deposit various Association records and documents there. Major Battcock is to be the London telephone contact.

The Chairman then asked for questions and comments from members. Mr M Lankester noted the large expenditure on publicity and suggested that a simpler medium be employed, on the lines of the present newsletter, with more contact and news to and from members. Mr Thompson of Reading asked if contact could be made with members of the English Civil War Society and the Sealed Knot to alert them to the existence of the Cromwell Association. The Chairman confirmed that contact had already been made. Mr Thompson also said that the Cromwell Association should have a reciprocal arrangement regarding membership. Mr Batty noted that the Sealed Knot had a very good publicity campaign and that its members are seen, in contrast to the Cromwell Association, and he suggested that publicity should be improved. Professor Roots said that the Association did its best but that the Sealed Knot was more pictorial; moreover, he noted that if *Cromwelliana* had not increased membership, it had increased interest.

At the Chairman's request, Professor Roots introduced Dr Peter Gaunt, who gave a paper on "Cromwell and Great Britain" an edited version of which appears in this edition. The Chairman thanked Dr Gaunt for his address.

The Chairman said he would like to place on record the thanks of the Association to Professor Roots for his work over many years on *Cromwelliana* and he affirmed that the Association is indebted to him for the work he has done.

The meeting closed at around 1.15 pm and, after a short break, Major Battcock conducted members around the Gallery of seventeenth century portraits.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Cromwellian Gazetteer by Peter Gaunt (Alan Sutton, 1987, £14.95) is a guide to sites in Britain and Ireland associated with the Civil War and Interregnum from 1642 to 1660. It covers both locations of military conflict and places and buildings connected with leading soldiers and politicians and the occasional cleric and artist. The significance of a county by county topography—rather than a simple military chronology—is that (as Dr Gaunt points out in the introduction) the Civil War was essentially a regional conflict, affecting different areas in very different ways; full-blown, major battles were comparatively rare. Equally refreshing is the fact that the gazetteer deals with the parliamentary cause, largely to the exclusion of the royalists, and that, despite its title, the coverage extends far beyond Oliver Cromwell (for we should not forget that until the late 1640s he was at most the second, not the first, in command). Yet although it is a corrective to traditional royalist military history, it is telling that we learn here, for example, not of the place where John Okey was a stoker and Chandler but of the sequestered property he acquired, not of the location where Thomas Pride was a brewer and drayman but of the royal palace in which he died. The appendices include an itinerary of Oliver Cromwell (illustrated by a series of maps) covering the Civil War and 1650s, an era when for most of the country communication and transport were slow and hampered by the weather. Surely no other ruler of England or Britain has travelled around his or her domain so extensively as Cromwell?

Doubtless we will all have our favourite omissions, but this is a very thorough and detailed study. As a gazetteer, it also provides national grid references and indicates whether a site or building is open to the public (and, if so, roughly when it can be visited). Many of the entries refer to buildings not generally open to the public and before the appearance of this guide, they would all too often have escaped our attention. Now we can at least view them from the roadside or footpath. The accompanying photographs are interesting (see, for example, the church at Staunton Harold, Leics., which was built in the 1650s), though the standard of reproduction could well do with improvement; the inclusion of county or regional maps would also have been useful. But perhaps *The Cromwellian Gazetteer* would not then have been available at such a reasonable price.

Sarah Jones

Cambridge University Press have inaugurated a handsome new series of 'Studies in Early Modern British History' with several volumes on the Stuart and Cromwellian era. From a historian's viewpoint, Kevin Sharpe's *Criticism and Compliment* (1987, £27.50) investigates through case studies "the politics of literature" in the England of Charles I (mainly in the 1630s, when the royal court was the cultural centre). Dr Sharpe argues that its literature was not so removed from the consensus of 'the Country' as is usually supposed. "The court did not exclude country ideology nor did country ideology exclude the court. It embraced the court". Values were shared. He asserts that the last masque of the reign, *Salmacida Spolia*, was "a plea for the king not to rule over his people by authority but...by conjunction with them". "Charles was prepared not for civil war, but for a parliament which, he hoped, might unite him in love with his subjects". Few, in fact, have argued that civil war was in anyone's mind in 1640, but what were the reconciling preparations the king was making? They were certainly not substantial. Dr Sharpe has made a major contribution to that revisionism which has been gaining momentum over the last couple of decades, stressing consensus in the early Stuart era while its acolytes fiercely confront a battered 'orthodoxy'.

Some believe they have already triumphed, among them Dr J.C.D. Clark, a young specialist in the era of the first three Georges. In setting out to reinterpret its "high politics", he has felt constrained to turn his attention to the preceding century. His *Revolution and Rebellion: State and Society in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Cambridge U.P., 1986, £20.00 cloth, £6.95 paperback) brings together the historiography of the two ages. His book is confidently pyrotechnical, vividly lighting up his themes. It is always good to have received opinions subjected to irreverent scrutiny, but there is something somewhat unpleasant about Dr Clark's relish in accusing the villains of his piece, most but not all of them Marxists, of twentieth-century party bias, while himself taking a conservative, even Conservative or, indeed, Thatcherite position. It is, moreover, a position which seems just as anachronistic and, as the brilliance of his fireworks splutters away, just as obfuscating as that which he ascribes to his opponents, the "Old Guard" and the "Old Hat".

Back to the Cambridge Studies series, where we find Dr Ann Hughes's *Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire 1620-1660* (1987, £30.00), which certainly enhances interest in and understanding of peace and war, not only in the West Midlands but also within the national communities. It takes in religion and economics which, intermingled with politics, have drawn Dr Hughes further and further away from

a concept of county communities, naturally existing, towards ones "created and developing in specific and concrete ways", involving a variety of shifting and overlapping relationships. This is, of course, not a novel notion but never to date has it been pursued in so substantial a case-study. A version of a long-admired PhD thesis, this scholarly work will take a long time to digest but will be worth the effort. Its one disappointment—to this reader at least—is its comparatively cursory treatment of the 1650s, a decade during which so many of the positions taken up in the 1640s were subject to modification.

Dr Tim Harris's *London Crowds in the Reign of Charles II* (Cambridge U.P., 1987, £27.50) is a foray into "propaganda and politics from the Restoration until the Exclusion Crisis". It tackles many themes, but most notably crowd behaviour and control, both fashionable. Some politicians in the reign of Charles II, emulating those of 1641, were prepared to appeal downwards to people not always admitted to the political nation. Dr Harris shows that there was far more political consciousness, even of a "rich and sophisticated" sort, among London folk, backed by religious, economic and social expectations. As at all other times, monarchy and its tinsel enjoyed considerable support among the meaner sort of people and there was a polarity between "deluded Tory multitudes" (as seen by Whigs) and misled Whig mobs (as seen by Tories), reflecting as in a flawed mirror a divided society and one which was close enough to the Cromwellian decade to be a little influenced by some of its consequences.

London is also the location for Dr Jeremy Boulton's *Neighbourhood and Society* (Cambridge U.P., 1987, £27.50), which takes seventeenth century Southwark as a case study of a developing suburb. Close-packed, going wide and deep, its concentration is on economy and society and Dr Boulton has combined the traditional skills of the historian, not excluding imagination, with those of the social scientist and computer operator to reconstruct the life and work of an area "very much part of the metropolitan whole", while having its own distinctive qualities. It is not an easy book to read and cannot have been to write, but it exemplifies, as the series to which it belongs—"Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy and Society in Past Time"—requires, the value of interdisciplinary work, mercifully without too much jargon or word processor austerity in production.

Austin Woolrych has turned back from the 1650s for his remarkable reconstruction and assessment of "the General Council of the Army and its Debates 1647-48" under the apt title *Soldiers and Statesmen* (Oxford U.P., 1987, £30.00). Obviously, the Putney Debates are prominent in a discussion which produces many surprises—for instance,

that the debates were not in the Council itself but in a committee and were not held in Putney church. But much attention is given to other debates of the period, including those at Reading and Whitehall. While acknowledging the value of Mark Kishlansky's *The Rise of the New Model Army*, Professor Woolrych modifies and displaces some of its conclusions. Yet the object of the book is not simply to revise revisionism, but to make as thorough and objective a survey as seems possible of two pregnant years. Written with clarity, courtesy and conviction, this scholarly work is essential reading for anyone interested in the Interregnum generally.

The Literary Culture of Nonconformity in late Seventeenth-Century England by W.H. Keeble (Leicester U.P., 1987, £35.00) is innovative and comprehensive in its coverage of "the literary response" of nonconformity, the successor to pre-Restoration puritanism, to the Clarendon Code and beyond. Dr Keeble argues that both qualitatively and quantitatively nonconformist cultural achievement was more substantial than has been acknowledged hitherto. He is very effective in his discussion of the plain prose style that began to come into its own with say, Dryden and Sprat, arguing that there was at least one thread of nonconformist tradition that went back to William Perkins's Elizabethan requirement that writing should be "both simple and perspicacious, fit for the people's understanding and to express the majesty of the spirit". True, some nonconformists went in for "extravagant excesses", imprecise phraseology and "wild flights of fancy", but perhaps not so much as charged by more orthodox opponents. There is much more in this richly-textured, enthusiastic—in the modern, not late seventeenth-century sense—and well-researched monograph.

Oliver Cromwell first appeared at Westminster in the parliament of 1628, which produced the Petition of Right as a reaction to strained issues raised chiefly in the period between Charles's I's second and third parliaments, and largely associated with the policies of the Duke of Buckingham. Prime among the matters which Cromwell must have heard debated from his back bench was the forced loan of 1627, which led on to the Five Knights' Case and which provides the pivot of an admirable monograph on the disturbed early years of Charles I by Dr Richard Cust, *The Forced Loan and English Politics 1626-1628* (Oxford U.P., 1987, £30.00). Its scope is wider and deeper than the title suggests, taking in local and national developments in politics and administration, leading into parliament, Whitehall and beyond. This is the most telling contribution to the reassessment of the 1620s since Conrad Russell's seminal *Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629* (1979).

Fear, Myth and History by J.C. Davis (Cambridge U.P., 1986, £22.50) is a stimulating though marred piece of iconoclasm. In trying to disprove the existence of a Ranter movement, as distinct from that of a handful of diverse individual Ranters, he posits what amounts to a marxist plot to distort the seventeenth century for (somewhat uncertain) twentieth-century purposes. Certainly Professor Davis makes some palpable hits, but neither his account of his modern target's position nor his argument about the 1650s will convince every reader. It would not be difficult to extend his case to expunge quakerism, levellerism, fifth-monarchism or any other 'isms' that historians have devised, honestly and with no intention to subvert, in their efforts to make it possible to get under the skin of the period. We have not heard the last of the Ranters.

Indeed, Dr Jerome Friedman's *Blasphemy, Immorality and Anarchy: The Ranters and the English Revolution* (Ohio U.P., 1987, £31.30), though clearly written before, has appeared since Professor Davis's dismissive essay. No doubt there are confident statements here that Dr Friedman might now wish to modify. Even so, the mass of detail he has accumulated adds to one's doubts about the completeness of Professor Davis's debunking. Of particular interest is Dr Friedman's effort to provide Ranters with a family tree, a task for which his earlier work on sixteenth-century heresies has well fitted him. He concludes with the suggestion, which he might follow up in depth, that the Quakers, growing ever more sedate after the Restoration, cleaned up many Ranter attitudes and made them respectable.

Dr Wilfred Prest, who has previously written on the Inns of Court where country gentlemen like Oliver Cromwell acquired a spattering—sometimes more—of law, provides "a social history of the English bar from 1590 to 1640" in his *The Rise of the Barristers* (Oxford U.P., 1986, £35.00). It is the first volume in another new academic series, 'The Oxford Studies in Social History'. Under such headings as "demand and supply" and "advancement" and with appendices of biographical notes and computerised statistics, a picture is built up of barristers, like clergy and physicians, developing "a distinctive professional ideology and self-image, which emphasised their separation and elevation above the laity and other practitioners in the same field". Prest demonstrates effectively that not all lawyers who accepted office in the Crown's gift identified themselves whole-heartedly with all policies "promulgated in the king's name". Certainly many found the law profitable there, but there were more ways than office of accumulating wealth. There was nothing homogeneous about the profession on the brink of civil

war. One would like to have this admirable approach pursued into the 1640s and beyond.

Yet another new Cambridge U.P. series—'Ideas in Context'—goes into "the emergence of intellectual traditions and of related new disciplines", aiming to dissolve "artificial distinctions between the history of philosophy, of the various sciences, of society and politics and of literature". Plenty of scope there! The seventeenth century, for many the "century of revolution", seems particularly apt for this sort of approach. The first to come out is *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order* by Margo Todd (1988, £27.50), emanating from the U.S.A. where, given their early colonial history, puritan studies flourish. Fashionably, Dr Todd is in the business of demythologising. She seeks to connect puritan social thought (and in the Interregnum, practice) with the humanism of the early sixteenth century. "Even in protestant dress in the midst of civil war, the social goal...remained that of Erasmus and Vives, More and Whiteforde, Starkey and Lupset—to transform social stasis into [something] progressive, sober, hard-working and disciplined". The argument is convincing so long as we bear in mind that not all that was said and done in this field during the Interregnum drew upon such a tradition. History is never monocausal.

Dame Veronica Wedgwood, a distinguished veteran of the Association, has brought together her essays and occasional pieces, many of them about the seventeenth century, into a single bumper volume, *History and Hope* (Collins, 1987, £17.50). Some are very general—"The Historian and the World"—others more particular—"The Strategy of the Civil War". All are marked by the elegance and directness of her style, her eye for a telling detail, her love of art, a respect for truth and her capacity to tell a story. These qualities have made her a most effective evangelist of the worship of Clio, who is, after all, a Muse. History and hope are not always juxtaposed these days, so it is encouraging that after fifty years of her craft she is still drawn to "the human landscape", finding something "ennobling" in common humanity.

The English newspaper, first appearing in a recognisable form sometime under James I, rapidly developed a capacity to inform and influence as various interests pursued causes and conflicts in print during the 1640s and 1650s. In reaction, the restored monarchy rapidly endorsed a Licensing Act which restricted the medium to the government's *London Gazette*. As an unintended consequence of the Exclusion crisis, the Act lapsed in 1679. For a few years press freedom prevailed until Charles II managed without any statutory backing to gain control again. This brief fruitful interlude is central to James Sutherland's *The Restoration*

Newspaper and its Development (Cambridge U.P., 1986, £25.00). Dr Sutherland makes no claim to be a historian but he is better equipped than most English Literature scholars to put journalism into its wider social and political context. Of particular interest is a solid chapter on the newspaper men and (significantly) women, not always admirable in their motives, who nonetheless have earned Dr Sutherland's respect (surely shared by his readers) for their courage, resilience and burgeoning professionalism. Literature was not their goal, but like Dr Keeble's nonconformists, they contributed to the permanence of the plain style of the Augustan Age by their impact upon their mainly middle-class and educated readership. Dr Sutherland himself has substantially enhanced our knowledge of the rise of English journals and journalism.

Kevin Sharpe provides a chapter covering much the same period and on similar lines to his *Criticism and Compliment for The English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War*, edited by David Starkey (Longman, 1987, £15.95 cloth, £7.95 paperback). Ten articles by different hands are intended to back a reinterpretation of court history, which David Starkey's introductory essay argues (with some justice) has been underrated and misunderstood, mainly through sheer neglect. During the years when Oliver Cromwell was 'a private man' the court was, it seems, central to political ideas and realities of politics, administration, culture, the lot! On this standing, it would have been unthinkable for Cromwell as Lord Protector not to have had a court. He certainly did have one and it was vital to some of his achievements.

Charles II has always seemed the most human of the Stuarts. The unashamed womanising, the wit, the easy affability and indolence, all appear to contrast with his father's reserve, seriousness and energy. But, in fact, as Professor J.R. Jones demonstrates convincingly in *Charles II: Royal Politician* (Allen and Unwin, 1987, £25.00), "Old Rowley" was by nature and nurture a devious, selfcentred and ambitious performer of subtle monarchy. His determination not to pack his bags for a second exile, far from making him supine, dedicated his undoubted talents to maintaining, indeed extending, royal authority to the point perhaps of contemplating absolutism. Like many others, he had learned some lessons from the Interregnum.

A straight reissue of J.G.A. Pocock's *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, that pregnant study of Stuart and Cromwellian historical thought, would have been welcome. But Cambridge U.P. have gone one better and have brought it out with a thoughtful "retrospect" as well (1987, £27.50 cloth, £9.95 paperback). For students of the English revolution, the chapter on Harrington's *Oceana* (1656), which led on to Professor Pocock's great edition of Harrington's political writings,

provides a centre for the book, but their attention should not stop there.

Another reissue, very different in outlook but still to be reckoned with, is Lawrence Stone's *The Causes of the English Revolution* (Ark Paperbacks, 1987, £3.95), originally published in 1972. A chapter of "second thoughts" is not notably deferential to the revisionists.

Ivan Roots

BOOKS RECEIVED

Destiny Our Choice, by John Attenborough (Hodder & Stoughton, 1987, £10.95)

Subtitled "a novel of Cromwell's England", this fictionalised biography explores the career of Cromwell's son-in-law, Henry Ireton. Ireton's short but eventful life is followed through almost three decades, from the death of his father in 1624 to his own premature death beneath the walls of Limerick in autumn 1651. In the process, we are introduced to the social, academic, political and military worlds of Nottinghamshire, Oxford and London, and to a host of characters who inhabit them, real and fictional. The book traces the fortunes of the young Ireton and his friends as they repeatedly intertwine during the troubled 1630s and on through the Civil War and the negotiations which followed. We see Ireton toiling on the battlefields of England, arguing in the smoke-filled rooms of constitutional conferences, and winning the trust and affection of Fairfax, Cromwell and his bride, Oliver's daughter Bridget. Finally, and rather briefly, we follow him to Ireland and to the fever-ridden camps in which he and many of his men perished.

The author stresses that this is a work of fiction and that many characters and events are imaginary. Indeed, so little is known about parts of Ireton's life that it would be hard to provide a rounded picture without resort to invention. The 1630s obviously presented difficulties, for we know almost nothing of Ireton's life then and there is, in reality, little to suggest that he did other than quietly farm in Nottinghamshire—hardly ideal material for a gripping novel. So instead the author has Ireton engaging in more interesting pursuits on frequent visits to Oxford and London. Again, despite the silence or impenetrable ambiguity of contemporary sources, Attenborough's Ireton is given direct responsibility for proposing and initiating the army's seizure of the king in 1647 and the purge of the Commons in December 1648. It is also curious that so little is made of the Putney debates, an occasion not

only central to the political future of the country but also one of the very few upon which Ireton's own thoughts and very words have been preserved.

However, these reservations are outweighed by the many strengths of the book. It is a well written and engaging blend of fact and fiction which paints a generally convincing picture of Ireton's world. The characterisation is strong, the action exciting and the analysis perceptive. Attenborough usually displays a sure touch in his treatment of the historical background and he provides a colourful view of Caroline and Civil War England. Above all, the portrait of Henry Ireton seems just right. We see a young man of intelligence, clarity of mind and restless energy, capable of detached calculation but spurred into action when convinced of a cause. Though these qualities were proved on the battlefield, Ireton's real importance lay in the years immediately after the first Civil War, as the army's political theorist and as a close confidant of Fairfax and Cromwell. His relationship with both—particularly his father-in-law—is of great interest and importance, and the author is surely right in showing Ireton cajoling his hesitant seniors and cutting through their uncertainties. With a mind far sharper but narrower than Cromwell's, Ireton came to have great influence upon his father-in-law, pushing him forward when he had become immobilised by doubt and intellectual inertia. Though it is a work of fiction, *Destiny Our Choice* provides valuable insights into the life and times of Henry Ireton and will be of interest to historians and general readers alike.

London and Liberty, by Keith Roberts and *All Did Command*, by Paul Bembrose (Partizan Press, 1987, £3.50 and £3.25 respectively)

In recent years Partizan Press has specialised in inexpensive, card bound booklets on military topics, particularly the English Civil War. Aimed at military historians as well as war-gamers, the subject matter ranges from reprints of original pamphlets and broadsheets and of other contemporary writings through to general historical accounts on a variety of more or less military topics.

The latest two offerings fall within the last category. Keith Roberts's *London and Liberty* looks at the London Trained Bands, the city militia which not only defended the capital but also (often unwillingly) contributed to parliament's armies and garrisons throughout southern England. The early chapters explore the origins, development, organisation and contribution of this force, though much of the booklet is given over to regimental lists of the various Bands, illustrated by black

and white drawings of their ensigns. In *All Did Command*, Paul Bembrose has tackled the daunting subject of political radicalism in the rank and file of the New Model Army during the mid and late 1640s. He provides a sound and intelligent review of the issue, based upon a critical reading of recent interpretations—Kishlansky emerges far from unscathed—and upon original printed sources. However, the subject is enormous and complex and in barely forty pages the coverage is inevitably rather thin.

Charles I and Oliver Cromwell, by Maurice Ashley (Methuen, 1987, £12.95)

In the latest of his many distinguished books on the mid seventeenth century, Maurice Ashley has focussed his attention upon the two great leaders of that period, King Charles I and Lord Protector Cromwell. The intention is not to supply complete and distinct biographies of the two, but to highlight the differences and similarities in their lives and persons, to provide ‘‘a study in contrasts and comparisons’’. Various aspects of their lives are explored, from boyhood to death, religion, character and private lives, military methods, domestic policy and foreign relations. Although the two fought on different sides in the 1640s and faced very different situations when they held effective power in government—Protectoral Britain was far removed from Charles’s kingdom of the pre-war decades—Dr Ashley finds that they had much in common not only as people but also as rulers.

[This work was received too late to be reviewed at length here; a fuller appreciation will appear within the next edition.]

Peter Gaunt

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
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Mainly Cromwellian Crossword (A copy of the *Gazetteer* may help you)



Across

- 1 Train up into a moral person (7)
- 5 Soldiers walking in Welsh borders? (7)
- 9 Tours around to win battles (5)
- 10 Amorous solution to starvation (5)
- 11 Avoid doing work to meet Grandfather of O.T. prophet (4)
- 12 There's no point to one in the eye for the pigs (3)
- 13 Palindromic relation of 8 down (4)
- 17 The Generals would have one of these to plan strategy (7)
- 18 Completion is imminent (4,3)
- 20 Oliver's horse didn't need this to make him eat when hungry (7)
- 22 Always green in the forest (7)
- 23 Take care with plot of land (4)
- 25 See 14 down
- 26 See 5 down
- 29 Cromwell took this with Charles I (5)
- 30 He acquired Nonsuch Palace during the Civil War (5)
- 31 & 32 Possible burial town of Cromwell's namesake son (7,7)

Down

- 1 Not a Royalist (15)
- 2 Boss of an orbital school? (9)
- 3 It's—old style (3)
- 4 Diminutive Protector (4)
- 5 & 26 across. Large weight holds up a planet & space reverts to the battlefield (7,4)
- 6 It helped to get cannons up a step (4)
- 7 Did Cromwell wear these inside his boots? (5)
- 8 An R.C. initially (though not by conviction), he became J.C. (7,8)
- 14 & 25 across. Was it a polite conflict? (5,3)
- 15 King of Bashan—O.T. (2)
- 16 Emaciated, but able to conduct you around Cromwell country (5)
- 19 Tense situation like loaded cannons (9)
- 21 Hold musket like a nettle? (5,2)
- 22 Abbreviated sister of Oliver (2)
- 24 Repair button torn from buffcoat (5)
- 27 Oliver was this to some people (4)
- 28 Was this steak on the menu in the House? (4)
- 30 Any old earthenware vessel (3)

