

Cromwelliana 1995



The Cromwell Association

The Cromwell Association

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THE CROMWELL ASSOCIATION was founded in 1935 by the late Rt Hon Isaac Foot and others to commemorate Oliver Cromwell, the great Puritan statesman, and to encourage the study of the history of his times, his achievements and influence. It is neither political nor sectarian, its aims being essentially historical. The Association seeks to advance its aims in a variety of ways which have included:

- a. the erection of commemorative tablets (e.g. at Naseby, Dunbar, Worcester, Preston, etc) (From time to time appeals are made for funds to pay for projects of this sort);
- b. helping to establish the Cromwell Museum in the Old Grammar School at Huntingdon;
- c. holding two annual meetings, one the now traditional Memorial Service by the statue outside the Houses of Parliament, the other a business meeting at which the Council presents a report on its year's work for discussion by members. At both, an Address is given by a distinguished Cromwellian;
- d. producing an annual publication, Cromwelliana, which is free to members;
- e. awarding an annual prize for an essay on a Cromwellian theme;
- f. maintaining a small reference library for the use of members;
- g. supporting the formation of local groups of paid-up members of the Association meeting for study or social purposes;
- h. acting as a "lobby" at both national and local levels whenever aspects or items of our Cromwellian heritage appear to be endangered.

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CROMWELLIANA 1995

edited by Peter Gaunt

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**OLIVER CROMWELL:
A GREAT PARLIAMENTARIAN?**

by David L. Smith

Early in 1895, when the Prime Minister Lord Rosebery proposed that a statue of Oliver Cromwell be erected here, some Members of Parliament were outraged. A.J. Balfour complained that Cromwell was 'not honourably connected with parliamentary government'; indeed was 'the only man who absolutely succeeded in uprooting our whole parliamentary government'. After acrimonious debate, the Commons refused to vote any public money towards the statue. This defeat proved to be the last straw for Rosebery's ailing government, and a week later he resigned. However, he pressed ahead with a commission to the sculptor Hamo Thornycroft and footed the entire bill of £3,000 as a (thinly veiled) 'anonymous donor'. Thornycroft relished the task. He was a keen admirer of Cromwell and had even named his eldest son Oliver after him. Many of Thornycroft's patrons were leading Liberals, and he patiently tolerated Rosebery's repeated suggestions as work on the statue progressed, for example: 'Make him rougher, the Bible and sword are right, but make him more militant. He had to do terrible things and this would have affected his appearance.' When the bronze figure was finished in 1899, the tercentenary of Cromwell's birth, Rosebery hailed it as 'the finest statue in London'. Yet it remained dogged by controversy. The unveiling ceremony had to be scheduled for a date when parliament was not sitting in order to avoid hostile demonstrations; and ever since there have been those who question whether a man whose relations with parliaments were so very turbulent should be commemorated on this spot. This afternoon, as we gather once again at the foot of Thornycroft's statue, that is the issue I wish to address.

Nobody could deny that Cromwell failed to establish a harmonious working relationship with any parliament during the Interregnum. Who can forget Hugh Trevor-Roper's wonderful prose on this subject:

Again and again [Cromwell] summoned [parliaments]; again and again he wrestled with the hydra, sought to shout down the noise; and again and again, in the end, like the good man in a tragedy, caught in the trap of his own weakness, he resorted to force and fraud, to purges, expulsions and recriminations. He descended like Moses from Sinai upon

the naughty children of Israel, smashing in turn the divine constitutions he had obtained for them; and the surprised and indignant members, scattered before their time, went out from his presence overwhelmed with turbid oratory, protestations of his own virtue and their waywardness, romantic reminiscences, proprietary appeals to the Lord, and great broken gobbets from the Pentateuch and the Psalms.

This passage beautifully captures the frustration and mutual bafflement which afflicted Cromwell and the members of successive parliaments alike. Neither side fully understood why they were unable to work effectively together. Yet Trevor-Roper also evokes the extraordinary resilience of Cromwell's attachment to the institution of parliament. Whatever his impatience with individual parliaments, Cromwell continued to see a parliament as an integral part of any viable constitution. As he put it in September 1654: 'The Government by a Single Person and a Parliament is a fundamental. It is the [essence]; it is constitutive.' And so, no matter how many times a particular parliament failed to live up to his expectations, he optimistically summoned another, hoping that this 'fundamental' institution would ultimately fulfil the plan he believed God had for England.

The roots of Cromwell's commitment to parliament lay deep in his early career. His first experience of parliament was in 1628-9, and thus preceded by a year or two the religious 'conversion experience' which changed his life. Thereafter, the co-existence of his profound religious convictions with the memory of that early experience of Westminster produced in Cromwell an almost instinctive belief that parliaments could serve as an instrument of God's purpose. At no time was this link more clearly seen than during the civil war, when he felt that the Long Parliament and God's 'cause' were in complete harmony. As he wrote to Colonel Valentine Walton in September 1644:

We study the glory of God, and the honour and liberty of the Parliament, for which we unanimously fight, without seeking our own interests...I profess I could never satisfy myself of the justness of this war, but from the authority of the Parliament to maintain itself in its rights; and in this cause I hope to approve myself an honest man and single-hearted.

Yet it was the Rump of this same parliament which Cromwell was subsequently to dissolve amid scenes of bitter recrimination. Why?

The answer, I think, lies in Cromwell's very high sense of the trust incumbent upon parliament. One of the earliest glimpses of this came in January 1648, when Cromwell urged the Commons to pass the Vote of No Addresses with these words:

Look on the people you represent, and break not your trust, and expose not the honest party of the kingdom, who have bled for you, and suffer not misery to fall upon them for want of courage and resolution in you, else the honest people may take such courses as nature dictates to them.

That last, strangely menacing phrase sowed the seed of an idea which could ultimately justify the most radical forms of action against parliament. For if parliament betrayed its trust, if it failed to fulfil what Cromwell called 'the end of [its] magistracy', then the 'honest people' [viz. the godly] might follow the dictates of a natural law which could overturn existing customs and constitutions.

This principle offers the key to explaining why Cromwell destroyed the Rump. Throughout the early 1650s, he repeatedly begged members of the Rump to 'be mindful of their duty to God and men, in the discharge of the trust reposed in them'. But by April 1653 he had become convinced that the Rump was no longer discharging its responsibility to build a godly commonwealth. He thought it had ceased to be a 'Parliament for God's people'. Blair Worden has shown that Cromwell's overriding objection was not that the Rump sought recruiter elections (if indeed it did), but rather that its members intended to organise free elections to a new representative. This raised the hazard of a parliament dominated by 'Presbyters' and 'Neuters', people wholly unsuited to shoulder the responsibility of furthering God's cause. So, overwhelmed by a sense that the Rump had betrayed its trust and now posed a direct threat to the cause for which he had fought, Cromwell dissolved it. A few months later, he insisted that the dissolution of this parliament was as necessary to be done as the preservation of this cause.

Yet Cromwell's conviction that a parliament could not only preserve but further the cause remained undiminished. Hence, even though he wielded potentially more sweeping powers in the early summer of 1653 than perhaps at any other stage of his career, he nevertheless chose to entrust authority to the Nominated Assembly. Convinced that the Rump had betrayed the godly, Cromwell now adopted Major-General Thomas Harrison's suggestion of a parliament consisting of the godly. The army officers, together with the separatist congregations, nominated 139

persons fearing God, and of approved fidelity and honesty'; people, in Cromwell's words, with the root of the matter in them. Surely, he reasoned, these would be suitable people to carry 'the great charge and trust of so weighty affairs'. Full of optimism, he welcomed the Nominated Assembly as 'a door to usher in things that God hath promised and prophesied of'. He exhorted its members: 'God hath owned you in the eyes of the world; and thus, by coming hither, you own Him... Therefore, own your call!'

Within six months, however, the Nominated Assembly had fallen victim to internal squabbles, dissolved itself and surrendered power back to Cromwell. Once again, his response was highly revealing. He immediately adopted a written constitution, the Instrument of Government, which stipulated in its very first clause that 'supreme legislative authority' would 'reside in one person; the Lord Protector, and the people assembled in Parliament'. Throughout Cromwell's uneven relations with the Protectorate Parliaments, we find the same preoccupation with the trust vested in parliament, and the same ruthlessness when members failed to discharge that trust in ways Cromwell found acceptable. The specific example of the first Protectorate Parliament serves to illustrate this general point.

When Cromwell welcomed that parliament on 4 September 1654, he stressed the 'great works' its members had 'upon [their hands]'. He emphasised the extraordinary responsibility entrusted to them:

You are met here on the greatest occasion that, I believe, England ever saw; having upon your shoulders the interests of three great nations with the territories belonging to them; and truly, I believe I may say it without any hyperbole, you have upon your shoulders the interest of all the Christian people in the world.

Yet, only five months later, at the earliest possible constitutional opportunity, Cromwell dissolved this parliament. His reasons hinged on what he saw as a betrayal of God's cause by the 'Trustees in Parliament'. He attacked them for 'throwing away precious opportunities committed to us', lamented the 'briers and thorns' which had grown up in the shadow of parliament, and finally insisted that it was his 'duty to God and the people of these nations, to their safety and good in every respect' to dissolve the parliament. He concluded, crushingly: 'It is not for the profit of these nations, nor fit for the common and public good, for you to continue here any longer'. He saw no alternative to the dissolution of a parliament which had preferred tinkering with the Instrument of

Government to furthering the cause of God's people.

I therefore want to suggest that much of the turbulence of Cromwell's relationship with this and other parliaments derived from his belief in the solemn trust bestowed upon those assemblies. It was precisely because he had such a clear ideal of parliament's responsibilities, such a profound commitment to its place within the constitution, such a deep conviction that it could be a worthy instrument of God's cause, that he was unable to stand by when he saw its members betraying that trust through their own lukewarmness or lethargy or self-interest. His sense of parliament's duty explains Cromwell's optimism and resilient desire to summon parliament after parliament. But it also accounts for the anger, the frustration, the brusque dismissals. It explains why he was never 'wedded and glued' to any particular parliament but remained 'wedded and glued' to the principle of parliaments.

This attachment to parliaments in principle also explains Cromwell's underlying respect for constitutional propriety. He made great play of the fact that he always allowed his parliaments to deliberate free from Protectoral interference; and throughout his career he carefully distanced himself from the more flagrant breaches of parliamentary privilege, such as Pride's Purge or the exclusion of elected members from both the first and second Protectorate Parliaments. Although Cromwell probably approved of the motives which lay behind these episodes, he apparently did not wish to be associated with unconstitutional purges of parliament. When the interests of the godly and the interests of the nation, or of a national institution, came into collision, Cromwell usually drew back, waited and reflected.

This trait was symptomatic of a profound ambiguity at the very core of Cromwell's personality. His speeches to successive parliaments never quite resolved one pivotal issue: who were members representative of and responsible to, 'the people of God' or 'the people' as a whole? He hoped that ultimately these two interests would be reconciled; that the entire nation could be turned towards the ways of godliness; and that parliament would play a crucial role in leading this process of spiritual regeneration. As he told the framers of the Humble Petition and Advice:

I think you have provided for the liberty of the people of God and of the nation; and I say, he sings sweetly that sings a song of reconciliation betwixt these two interests, and it is a pitiful fancy and wild and ignorant, to think they are inconsistent.

The problem was that Cromwell was trying to use an institution

which had evolved as the 'representative of the whole realm' to advance the cause of a godly minority who remained only one section of that realm. Such a strategy was bound to destabilise his relations with successive parliaments; yet its boldness and vision surely deserve admiration. Above all, it was a strategy based upon a profound belief in parliament's importance in the life of the nation.

It is here, in his sense of parliament's public responsibility, that we find the essence of Cromwell's claim to be a great parliamentarian. He was, in the fullest sense, a parliamentarian during the civil war; and thereafter he displayed a high sense of the trust inherent in parliament and an unquenchable faith that sooner or later an assembly could be found which would discharge it. He never felt bound to individual parliaments, but he did see a parliament as a 'fundamental' of the constitution. His sense of parliament's responsibility was a highly personal one: it was intimately tied up with his characteristic religious convictions; and, like other aspects of his personality, it contained complexities and ambiguities. It reflected a tension between the godly interest and the national interest which Cromwell was never able to resolve. 'Upon these two interests' Cromwell had pledged to 'live and die'; but their essential irreconcilability was nowhere plainer than in the parliaments with which he wrestled only a few yards from here.

And so we return to Thornycroft's fine statue, standing outside the one portion of the present Palace of Westminster which existed in Cromwell's own lifetime. As we look back over the long history of the 'mother of parliaments', there have been few statesmen with such a profound sense of the trust and duty incumbent upon parliaments, or with such high expectations of the assembled members. This important sense of parliament's public responsibility commands respect and is still worth remembering and reflecting on today. And it is what leads me to reject Balfour's claim that Cromwell was 'not honourably connected with parliamentary government' and to suggest instead that it is entirely appropriate that we should annually commemorate him on this spot.

CHESTER'S ROLE IN THE CIVIL WAR


by Peter Gaunt

Gentlemen, I am glad of this yeare's period that I am come at goinge out of my office of maioralty to give you of the commons thanks for your election, you of the howse or counsell thanks for your approbation, and you of the bench thanks for your confirmation of this great honor on me to be your majestrate beinge farr unworthy therof: which honor brought a great burden with it in respect of the tymes troublesomnesse for what my predecessors only or with the finger touched I have heavily felt, but by God's mercy have ran through the same, although with many an akinge hart: for to see our anntient plate diminished, our benefactors mony exhausted, the cittizens estates empoverished, our suburbs fired and cittizens oppressed the necessity of the tymes requireinge it (and I much grieved I could not remedy it) only our comfort was, it was for a good Kinge and in a good cause; and though in all thinges I could not doe what I would, yet I have done what I promised in performance of my fialty and preservation of this citty for his Majesty, and hope my successor will doe the same to whom I leave the citty and priviledges in good order; the stone and mudd walls in good condition farr better than I found them; and as a dyinge man I bequeath my staffe, place and authority to you and you to God, and God give you much joy and peace therein to God's glory, the Kinge's honor and tranquillity of the citty and so I take my leave.[1]

The 1644 valedictory address of Randle Holme, outgoing mayor of Chester, was a sombre affair. Although confident they had been in a 'good cause', Holme was all-too aware that Chester's sufferings had been heavy. Not only had the material and landed wealth of the corporation and citizens been diminished, but also the very suburbs of the city had been razed by fire. Holme closed by expressing a hope that God would grant 'much joy and peace' to Chester, but in reality the following years witnesses an intensification of the city's sufferings, as the parliamentary troops stepped up operations against this royalist outpost. The physical defences of the city - 'the stone and mudd walls' - as well as the resolve of the citizens were to be tested to breaking point and beyond by the protracted parliamentary operations, which eventually led to the surrender of Chester in February 1646.

Chester played an important role in the civil war of 1642-6,

quickly becoming both a key royalist centre, a focal point for the royalist cause in much of North Wales and the northern Marches, and a major parliamentary objective. Although by no means in the first rank of English cities in terms of size or wealth, throughout the seventeenth century Chester was the largest and most important urban centre in Cheshire and the adjoining parts of Wales - Wrexham, probably the largest town in North Wales at this time, had a population less than half the size of Chester's and possessed none of the latter's prestige. A closer comparison might be drawn with Shrewsbury, another county town close to the Welsh borders which came out for the king and which served to syphon resources from predominately royalist Wales to aid the royalist cause in England until isolated, neutralised and captured by the parliamentarians.



John Speed's map of Chester, c1610

Stuart Chester was a compact city, still largely contained within the circuit of masonry walls initially built by the Romans but then enlarged and repaired during the medieval period. Speed's map of c1610, one of the earliest detailed plans of Chester to survive, vividly shows the confined, compact nature of the seventeenth-century city, the residential areas largely within the roughly rectangular circuit of walls. The walled city was (and still is) divided into four sectors by the two main roads of the city, which run straight across from wall to wall and which cross each other at right angles, forming the natural central point of the city - the Cross. Most of the remaining side streets within the walls run parallel to these main roads. The north-eastern sector was dominated by the cathedral, the south-western by the castle, a medieval stronghold which comprised an upper and a lower ward and which stood inside the city walls, with its own complete and separate circuit of defended walls; the castle walls did not form part of the city walls. In the seventeenth century, the land within the city walls was not entirely built up, and quite large open spaces remained, especially on the western side. The southern city wall skirted the Dee. On the west side, a tongue of open, undeveloped flat land, the Roodee, lay between the western wall and the looping river. By this time, Chester also possessed extra-mural suburbs on three sides, largely in the form of ribbon development along the main roads out of the city: to the north, beyond the north wall, along the road to the out-port of Parkgate and the Wirral; to the east, beyond the east wall, stretching towards the separate hamlet of Boughton; and to the south, on the other side of the Dee and its bridge, the suburb of Handbridge. Speed's map also shows that one of the most important churches of the city, St John's, lay close to but outside the eastern city wall, near the south-east angle.

During the seventeenth century Chester's population fluctuated considerably but probably always remained within the range 5-10,000. During the 1640s, with the arrival first during winter 1641-2 of parts of the English army en route to Ireland and then during the civil war of a considerable royalist garrison and other civilian 'refugees' from the county, the figure was probably nearer the top than the bottom of this range. The city had a long-established history as the major military, civil, administrative and ecclesiastical centre not only for the county of Cheshire but also for a wider geographical area. It was situated on the lower reaches of the River Dee, at the lowest easily bridgeable point of that river - the Old Dee Bridge, at heart medieval though widened and much repaired since, still spans the Dee south of the city centre. Medieval Chester had been an important commercial port, handling international as well as coastal trade and serving as the main port of

embarkation for Dublin. Although its hinterland was not particularly rich and it was never a centre for trade in wool and cloth, the port did handle a range of agricultural produce, most notably the hides and leather goods in which Chester specialised. By the seventeenth century the silting of the River Dee, long a problem, was becoming acute and Chester increasingly looked to out-ports on the Dee estuary. However, Stuart Chester and its out-ports together remained a commercial trading centre of regional and national importance. Chester and its out-ports also possessed a military potential, a potential that was underlined in the months before the English civil war broke out.

In the wake of the Irish rebellion of autumn 1641, Protestant settlers in Ireland began fleeing back to the English mainland. A large proportion of this tide flowed through Chester, and many of them halted and sought refuge within the city. By February 1642 the mayor was complaining of 'the great confluence and resort of people to this City from Ireland nere to the number of 1000 now resident whereby the prices of Corne and all other victuall are daily advanced'. By then Chester was also full of troops, for much of the army raised in England and Wales to put down the Irish rebellion gathered in and around Chester, awaiting embarkation to Dublin and the Pale. These largely unwelcome guests increased the pressure on Chester and its citizens, who were 'forced to entertayne the said souldiers at under rates', despite the increased cost of food. Moreover, the soldiers allegedly committed 'great insolences' in seizing food both from the citizens and from 'countray people coming with victuall to the market'. To cap it all, outgoing trade through the port almost ceased, for all available ships were being requisitioned 'for the transportacon of his Majesties forces for their expedition to Ireland'. [2] Although the English civil war proved to be very much a land war, decided by the possession of territory and by field engagements, there was a naval potential to the struggle; one in which Chester might play a large part. Having proved its capacity to funnel English and Welsh troops from the mainland over to Ireland in 1641-2, it might play an equally decisive role in funnelling back into the civil war on the mainland not only parts of the English and Welsh army returning from Ireland but also, perhaps, native Irish troops. This Irish dimension gave Chester an importance in the civil war far beyond its role as a military centre within the purely England and Welsh arena.

The story of Chester during the civil war, like that of most important military and administrative centres, can be understood and appreciated only if seen within a broader regional context. Ultimately, Chester's role and fate were determined by the course of events in Cheshire and north-east Wales. Initially, these two areas

followed apparently different courses. Denbighshire and Flintshire; like almost the whole of Wales, came out quickly and decisively for the king in the opening weeks of the war, and became part of the royalist heartland, held by the king until the closing stages of the war. In contrast, the mood in Cheshire - as in many English counties - during the opening phase of the war was marked by caution, apathy and neutralism. In the late summer and autumn of 1642 only a small proportion of the Cheshire gentry, the traditional leaders of society, committed themselves decisively to one side or the other and attempted to raise troops within the county; such attempts often met with little success. For example, an attempt by Sir William Brereton and others to raise troops in Chester in August 1642 met with a hostile response, and Brereton had to be escorted out of the city for his own safety. The king was more successful during a four day visit to the city in late September, receiving a loyal and respectful reception and gathering a steady flow of volunteers from Chester and the surrounding area. But they soon departed with the king, to Edgehill and beyond, and Cheshire settled back into a state of inactivity or neutralism. This was underscored in December 1642 when such committed royalists and parliamentarians as were to be found within the county agreed and signed a peace treaty, in theory demilitarising Cheshire and ensuring its neutrality in the unfolding civil war.

The situation was changed and clarified during the opening months of 1643 with the direct military intervention of Brereton - the only Cheshire MP actively to support parliament - at the head of a small body of horse and dragoons. Entering the county in late January, he moved quickly to secure Nantwich, Cheshire's second town and an important centre of communications. Over the following weeks, he firmly secured most of the other towns in central and eastern Cheshire, including Northwich, Middlewich and Knutsford, in the process defeating and scattering local royalist forces in a series of limited engagements. By spring 1643 both royalism and neutralism had been largely overwhelmed and most of Cheshire had been firmly secured for parliament. The royalists were left with the city of Chester and the western fringes of the county, including the Wirral. The Cheshire royalists were on the defensive for the remainder of the war, trying to preserve Chester and its hinterland.

From spring 1643 onwards Cheshire was a divided county, the centre and the east in parliamentary hands, the west, including the county town, in royalist hands. Although many English and some Welsh counties were similarly divided during the civil war, the boundary line tended to be fluid, moving one way or the other as one side or the other gained the upper hand. In Cheshire,

however, the territorial dividing line of spring 1643 proved to be remarkably static and durable. Only in a very gradual and piecemeal way were the parliamentarians able to push into the western parts of the county and onto the Wirral. But Chester and its hinterlands held out for years, in the city's case through to February 1646, almost three years after the parliamentarians had overrun most of the county. The explanation for the long royalist survival certainly does not lie in any lack of interest, on the part of Brereton and the parliamentarians in capturing Chester. Although Brereton did prove to be one of the more regionally-minded local commanders, devoting men, money and time to eating into the neighbouring and initially largely royalist counties of Staffordshire and Shropshire, he could not feel entirely secure in Cheshire while the king's men continued to hold the largest and wealthiest town in the county, its natural focus for political, administrative and social life, a major port and centre of commerce as well as an excellent landing and marshalling point for royalist reinforcements from Ireland. Indeed, from summer 1643 onwards Brereton mounted increasingly robust operations against Chester and its hinterland. Both in word and in deed, he made clear that the city was his major objective. Why, then, did royalist Chester survive for so long?

In part, the answer is to be found in the repeated interruptions to parliamentary operations against Chester, allowing the city to be reinforced with men and, even more important, supplies. Brereton's operations in the Chester area and beyond were disrupted by the intervention of royalist forces based, not in Cheshire itself nor even in the surrounding area, but much further afield. Potentially the most serious of these threats materialised in the closing weeks of 1643 with the landing along the Dee estuary of several thousand hardened and experienced troops from Ireland, part of the English and Welsh army dispatched during winter 1641-2. Combined with reinforcements which Lord John Byron, the new royalist commander in North Wales and the northern Marches and the decisive figure in the defence of Chester, had brought from Oxford, they provided the king with a formidable field army in Cheshire. Having rested briefly in Chester, they engaged in a successful and brutal campaign within the county, before which Brereton's forces were forced to fall back. It took the intervention of another foreign force, Sir Thomas Fairfax's Yorkshire and Lincolnshire army, to save the day, when they engaged and destroyed Byron's army outside Nantwich on 25 January 1644.

Although no further large batches of reinforcements from Ireland materialised thereafter, parliamentary operations against Chester were disrupted several times during 1644 and 1645 by the approach of large armies of English royalists. Sometimes the forces

were just marching through, as in spring 1644 when Rupert halted in the city before resuming his slow, circuitous march which would eventually bring him to Marston Moor. With the remnants of his army, he again halted in Chester after the battle before resuming his march south. Sometimes the armies were marched towards or into Chester specifically to relieve pressure on the city. Thus in February 1645 Prince Maurice marched an army into Chester and in the following May the king, accompanied by Rupert, led a larger army north towards Chester, only to swing away south-east into the Midlands, en route to Naseby. On 23 September 1645 Charles paid his last visit to Chester, leading a small force into the now besieged city, while most of his remaining troops were to approach on the following day. Now, for the first time, instead of simply pulling back and allowing the royalist army of relief a free hand, the parliamentarians felt strong enough to challenge the royalist forces. On 24 September there developed a series of running battles south-east of the city, on and around Rowton Moor, as the royalist army of relief was destroyed. The king slipped out of Chester the following day, never to return. Henceforth, there would be no external military relief and the parliamentary operation could proceed unhindered.

However, these interventions from royalist forces, which temporarily but repeatedly caused the parliamentarians to suspend operations against Chester, do not in themselves account for the city's prolonged resistance. We must also look at the strength of Chester's defences. In part, that strength is to be found in terrain and geography. Chester protected the main route into North Wales and was itself strengthened and relieved by the flow of men, money and supplies from this solidly royalist region. Unless and until they could sweep round west of Chester and thereby break its lines of communications with North Wales, the parliamentarians would find it very difficult to end Chester's resistance. The apparent strength of royalism west of the Dee, royalist control of the major river crossings at Chester itself, Farndon-Holt, Overton and Bangor, and the nature of the terrain immediately south-west of the city - in the seventeenth century, before the canalisation of the Dee and other flood relief work, much of this area was low-lying marshland - would make it very difficult for Brereton's men to break into this region, firmly to occupy it and thus completely to isolate Chester. So it proved.

In late 1643 Brereton launched an attack on north-east Wales, surging across the Farndon-Holt bridge, occupying Wrexham and then pushing north to Hawarden, Flint and Mostyn. One of the main objectives of this campaign was presumably to isolate Chester from North Wales. But the operation failed and

Brereton was forced to fall back as the reinforcements from Ireland began arriving. By Christmas, the region was firmly back under royalist control and it remained so until the latter half of 1645. Even in the spring and summer of that year, as the parliamentarians overran the Wirral and were thus able to surround Chester on three sides with an arc of hostile garrisons, it proved almost impossible completely to break and to close Chester's lines of communications into Wales. This is amply demonstrated by the ease with which Charles and his small body of troops were able to slip into and out of Chester in September 1645. Not until late in 1645 did the royalist hold over north-east Wales really crumble and were the parliamentarians able virtually to cut off the stream then trickle of supplies into Chester from Wales. Eventually it was shortage of supplies with attendant starvation and disease, exacerbated by the general hopelessness of the royalist cause nationally, which led to the surrender of Chester in February 1646.

That Chester had been able to resist for so long was also due, in part, to the man-made defences of the city and to the resolute way in which the citizens as well as the soldiers sought to hold them. The masonry walls with their medieval defended gateways were repaired both before the civil war broke out and again in the early stages of the war. During the latter stages of the war the northern wall was further strengthened by banking earth against the inner face. But in an attempt to defend the northern and eastern extramural suburbs, the royalists also constructed an outer line of completely new earthwork defences. Originally constructed during the first half of 1643, by Colonel Ellis and his engineers, they comprised a single snaking line of earthen bank and ditch, complete with salients, bastions and mounts, running out from the western end of the north wall, around the suburbs, and eventually ending at the River Dee near the hamlet of Boughton. The main part of Boughton, lying outside this line, was abandoned and deliberately destroyed to deny it to the parliamentarians. The earthwork defences, originally two miles in length, were later judged too long to be held against determined attack and were progressively shortened. In 1644 the area north-east of the walled town was abandoned and largely razed and in early 1645, even more drastically, the entire northern suburb was abandoned and razed. By late summer 1645, as parliamentary operations against Chester stepped up, the royalists were left holding the walled town, the eastern suburbs defended by the now shortened earthwork line, together with a single, free-standing earthwork artillery fort or sconce, which the defenders had constructed just beyond the north wall after they abandoned and demolished the northern suburbs, and a similar earthwork sconce standing on rising ground south of

the river and defending the approach to the Dee bridge, which stood amidst the site of the now abandoned and razed suburb of Handbridge.

Down to 1645, the parliamentarians had been content to harass and blockade the city. The strength of its defences had deterred any attempt at a full-scale attack. In January 1645, however, perhaps bolstered by the failure of an attack by the royalist defenders upon a parliamentary garrison at Christleton, Brereton tested the strength of the soon-to-be-abandoned northern earthwork line. On 27 January he launched a pre-dawn assault somewhere along this line, probably adjoining the 'turnpike gate' where the Parkgate road ran through the earthwork line. But the parliamentarians received 'so hot a breakfast'[3] from the defenders that they quickly turned tail, leaving behind many of the scaling ladders with which they had intended to carry the line. To encourage the citizens, Byron had the captured ladders and weapons put on display at the Cross. For his part, Brereton preferred to stress how 'Gods goodnes did wonderfully appeare in preserveing us all soe as though our body of horse stood within half musquett shott of their workes yet not one man that I have heard was slaine or wounded or taken'.[4]

By September 1645 the northern earthwork line and suburbs had been abandoned by the royalists. Instead, the parliamentarians focussed their attention on the eastern line, on this occasion successfully. Parliamentary troops gathered during the night of 19-20 September, those marching from Beeston avoiding the main roads for fear of detection. The parliamentary attack was launched at daybreak and seems to have caught the royalists completely by surprise. Even though the scaling ladders proved too short, parliamentary troops were able to carry several 'mounts' at the eastern end of the line and then opened the gates where the Boughton road pierced the earthwork defences, allowing the parliamentary horse to charge in. The royalist troops and civilians within the eastern suburbs hastily fell back inside the walls, closing and blocking the east gate behind them, though in the process they managed to fire parts of the suburbs to deny them to the parliamentarians. Other buldings and whole streets were set on fire the following day when the royalists within the walls fired out flaming arrows designed to ignite the thatched roofs. St John's Church, however, was too large and too strong to be destroyed in this way and both the church and its surrounding churchyard subsequently served as the parliamentary strongpoint during the next stage of the operation.

Having successfully carried the eastern suburbs, the parliamentarians brought up a range of artillery pieces. Most were

placed within St John's churchyard, though a couple of lighter pieces were hauled up into the church tower, which also served as a base for snipers. From these vantage points, a sustained bombardment was directed at the nearby southern part of the eastern city wall and by the afternoon of 22 September it had opened up a breach so wide, Byron estimated, that 'six horses might have marched up in rank'.[5] However, by that evening, when the parliamentarians attempted to storm the walls, the breach had been effectively blocked using woolpacks and feather beds. Repeated attempts during the night both to storm the patched breach and to scale adjoining sections of the wall were all beaten off. One account alleges that, before launching the assault, the parliamentarians had been served a brew of 'aqua vitae and gunpowder' to give them 'more than ordinary spirrits'. Byron notes sourly that captured parliamentary troops were 'so drunk that the scent of them was very offensive'.[6]

The arrival of the king on 23 September and the approach of a royalist army of relief disrupted the parliamentary operation. The defeat of that army at Rowton Moor and the departure of the king allowed the siege to be renewed with vengeance. After a week or so of sporadic bombardment and an unsuccessful attempt to undermine the walls, parliamentary attention shifted to north wall. A heavy bombardment on 4 October knocked out the sconce which the royalists had constructed outside the north wall earlier in the year. Five days later, on 9 October, an even heavier bombardment opened a new breach in the circuit of walls, somewhere near western end of north wall. In the late afternoon, the parliamentarians launched their second and far more ambitious attempt to storm the walled city, a co-ordinated attack at several points around the circuit, including the new breach in north wall and the old breach in east wall, as well as attempts to scale undamaged sections of the wall. But all the assaults were beaten off and the parliamentarians forced to fall back, 'to use their heels and hide themselves like harts in bushes, not dareing to looke the hounds in the face', as a royalist account has it.[7] A parliamentary account claims the assault only narrowly failed, but that in any case it resulted in far heavier royalist than parliamentary losses, many of the defenders perishing dreadfully through cannon fire - 'swords, armes, leggs, whole bodies were seene to flye in the ayre, cart loads of bodies drawne off'.[8] Byron claims that the citizens, and especially the women of Chester, willingly played a key role in the defence -

I must not forget the great courage and gallantry the Chester women expressed that day, who all the time the cannon played upon the new breach...carried both earth and

featherbeds and other materials incessantly and made up the breach in the very mouth of the cannon. And though 8 or ten of them at the least were killed and spoiled with great shot, yet the rest were nothing at all dismayed, but followed on their work with as great alacrity and as little fear as if they had been going to milk their cows.[9]

A pro-parliamentary account claims, in contrast, that the men and women who repaired the breach only did so because they were driven up by 'the Horse in the reare'. [10]

No further attempts were made by the parliamentarians to storm the city. Instead the emphasis shifted to encircling and isolating Chester, cutting off communications with Wales and thus starving it into submission. To aid communication between parliamentary detachments north and south of the river, a bridge of boats was thrown across the Dee east of the city. Brereton, who returned from London during October and resumed personal command of the operation, did maintain an intermittent artillery bombardment, directed especially at the water tower and mills in the Dee bridge area. He also brought up a mortar piece which was employed to lob explosive shells over the walls and into the city centre, where they would explode killing and maiming the defenders and starting fires. Royalist accounts stress the terror and indiscriminate destruction which these mortars - 'granadoes' - brought.

By this time they have unmused death and swear theyle let him loose amongst us, a wide mouth'd mortarpeice in which like the mouth of Etna spitts little mountaines in our faces and grinds our dwellings into dust and ashes...

But all this while our women like soe many she astronomers have so glew'd their eyes to heaven in expectation of a second thunder that they canot easily be got to bed lest they dreame of a granado...

Eleaven huge granadoes, like so many tumbling demy-phaetons, threaten to set the city, if not the world, on fire. This was a terrible night indeed [10 December], our houses like so many splitt vessells crash there supporters and burst themselves in sunder through the very violence of these descending firebrands. The Talbott, an house adjoining to the East gate flames outright; our hands are busied in quenching this whilst the law of nature bids us leave and seeke our owne security. Being thus distracted another

Thunder-cracke invites our eyes to the most miserable spectacle that spite could possibly present us with - two houses in the Watergate streete skippes joynt from joynt and creates an earthquake, the maine posts josell each othere, whilst the frightened casements fly for feare, in a word the whole fabrick is a perfect chaos lively set forth in this metamorphosis. The granmother, mother and three children are struck stark dead and buried in the ruins [of] this humble edifice, a sepulcher well worth the enimy's remembrance...

But for all this they are not satisfied, women and children have not blood enough to quench their fury, and therefore about midnight [10 December] they shoot seven more in hope of greater execution, one of these light in an old man's bedchamber, almost dead with age, and send him some few dayes sooner to his grave then perhaps was given him...

The next day six more breake in amongst us, one of which persuade an old woman to beare the old man company to heaven because the tymes were evil! [11]

As Byron feared and Brereton hoped, these night-time mortar bombardments, combined with growing shortages of food and ammunition and the general collapse of the royalist position nationally, sapped the will to resist. It seems that the citizens of Chester and the civic leaders put pressure on Byron and his garrison to end the futile resistance. Serious negotiations for surrender opened in January and although Byron by his own admission deliberately stalled in the hope of winning better terms for his men and perhaps, even at this late stage, of obtaining outside relief, by the end of the month he accepted the inevitability of defeat. Chester was formally surrendered on 3 February 1646. In his subsequent account of events, Byron expressed satisfaction that the terms imposed upon the civilians were, in his eyes, quite harsh, 'as ill as I could wish, their folly as well as knavery deserving no better'. [12] Although Chester's civil war ended in a reasonably orderly surrender on terms, not by storm, the closing stages of the war had seen terror, suffering, destruction, bitterness and divisions spread within the beleaguered city. An account of the physical condition of Chester after the war indicates that most of the extra-mural suburbs and great houses which stood outside the walls had been largely flattened and that within the city walls whole streets had been destroyed or badly damaged - 'not a house from Eastgate to the midle of Watergate street on both sides but received some hurt' [13] - largely during the mortar bombardment of the last three months of

the war. Byron claimed that he ordered elaborate precautions to counter the threat from mortars, including the provision of tubs of water, raw hides and a nightly watch, but even he admitted that 'these granadoes were very terrible to the people, causing great spoil in that part of the town where they fell...the city for the most part consisting of old wooden buildings'.[14] For Chester, as for most towns and cities caught up in the conflict, the civil war must have been a shattering experience. At least the city avoided any direct or substantial involvement in the subsequent conflicts of 1648 and 1651, though a visitation of the plague in 1647 was a terrible enough finale to Chester's sufferings.

It was common for large towns and cities to play a key role in the civil war. It was also by no means uncommon for an urban centre to hold out for months or years despite intense and sustained enemy pressure - one thinks of Plymouth or Lyme Regis, Hull or Pembroke. Generally, however, such towns were parliamentary outposts in royalist areas, relieved and sustained by parliamentary control of the navy and the open sea. It was unusual for the outpost to be a royalist town under prolonged parliamentary attack.. Although Chester was a port, and one with a great if largely unrealised potential in the civil war as a landing place for royalist reinforcements from Ireland, Chester's strength and relief did not come by water. Chester's prolonged resistance can be explained by a combination of the intermittent and temporary relief afforded by the arrival of royalist armies, the natural and man-made defences of the city, the resolution of the royalist governor and garrison and, perhaps most important, the support and strength it drew from royalist North Wales and the inability of the parliamentarians until very late in the war either to break the royalist hold in that region or effectively to sever the lines of communications between Chester and North Wales. However, although long a thorn in parliament's side, royalist Chester did not seriously disrupt parliamentary operations within, or hold over, a wider region. The royalists in Chester were on the defensive and were remarkably inactive. Unlike the city of Gloucester at the other end of the Marches - a parliamentary outpost in an area which was for a time overwhelmingly royalist - Chester did not become a base for wideranging and destructive raids and longer operations throughout the region. However much Chester may have suffered, especially during the closing stages of the siege, the county of Cheshire was thereby spared the worst excesses of the civil war.

1. British Library, Harleian Ms 2125, f.138.
2. Cheshire Record Office, DDC/47/27.
3. British Library, Harleian Ms 2125, f. 148.
4. Public Record Office, SP21/17, p. 204.
5. Lord John Byron's account printed in *The Cheshire Sheaf* 4th series 6 (1971), p. 9.
6. British Library, Harleian Ms 2155, f. 114v; Byron's account in *Cheshire Sheaf* 4th series 6, p. 9.
7. British Library, Harleian Ms 2155, f. 118v.
8. Nathaniel Lancaster's account printed in *The Cheshire Sheaf* 3rd series 38 (1943), p. 62.
9. Byron's account in *The Cheshire Sheaf* 4th series 6, p 15.
10. Lancaster's account in *The Cheshire Sheaf* 3rd series 38, p. 62.
11. British Library, Harleian Ms 2155, ff. 121, 125, 125v.
12. Byron's account in *The Cheshire Sheaf* 4th series 6, p. 23.
13. British Library, Harleian Ms 1944, ff. 98-9.
14. Byron's account in *The Cheshire Sheaf* 4th series 6, p. 19.

THE ARMY AND THE EXECUTION OF CHARLES I

by Peter Reid

In 1647, the New Model Army lacked any political voice and remained both firmly in parliament's control and wholeheartedly loyal to its defeated sovereign. Yet two years later it effected a political revolution, which was opposed by the majority of both parliament and the country. Thus the army's entry into politics must be explained as well as its alienation from Charles. However, it is also necessary to consider the army's composition and condition before 1647, and its effects on later political manoeuvres.

During its first two years of existence, the New Model Army grew into a force unique in its religious zeal. Great emphasis was placed on the need for spiritual equality among believers, and this led to a great feeling of egalitarianism within the army. Moreover, this had direct results on the army's politicisation, not only encouraging the rank-and-file to petition Fairfax over their material conditions and later on to seek the political initiative, but also encouraging the officers to respond favourably to the soldiers' cause. The members of the army were also encouraged to wrestle with the scriptures and to apply their own reason to them, and this led them to the conclusion that they were blessed by God. They saw themselves as underdogs - Cromwell himself referred to the victorious army at Naseby as 'a company of poor, ignorant men'[1] - and thus with their unbroken string of victories came a great self-confidence. The political manifestation of this was the army's ruthless actions, once convinced of Charles's treachery. Equally, when combined with the army's egalitarianism, this also explains the often obsessive desire for unity which strengthened its resolve against parliament.

By the end of the war, and particularly once the Scots had disbanded, almost the entire population, exhausted by the high taxation which the army's existence necessitated, longed for its disbandment and a return to normality. This unpopularity played into the hands of the Presbyterian party. In February 1647, they persuaded parliament to reduce the army's strength by three quarters and send most of the infantry to Ireland, without satisfying the army's arrears. The soldiery, however, although troubled by their unpopularity, were not prepared to disband unless their security was assured and their arrears paid; this was the least they felt they deserved in recognition of their services to parliament. The issue of safety was seen to be paramount since now the army's enemies

were gaining control of parliament and the localities, all soldiers seemingly had just fears for their safety - some soldiers had, in fact, already been prosecuted for 'crimes' that they had committed during the war. Consequently, the rank-and-file raised a petition which they presented to Fairfax on 26 March, in which they requested an indemnity, arrears of pay, and an end to conscription.

The petition was couched in extremely loyal terms, yet still managed to provoke an inexplicably harsh response from parliament. Holles prevailed upon the Commons to pass the Declaration of Dislike, in which soldiers who continued to petition were defined as 'enemies of the state'.^[2] What made the Declaration so inflammatory was the fact that the army's material grievances were so undeniably just, particularly as the Scots had received full payment of their arrears. Furthermore, by rejecting the army's right to petition, parliament challenged one of the soldier's basic rights as a citizen, and was thought to have slighted the army's honour, thus leaving the army's grievances more generalised and more difficult to redress. This feeling was all the more acute as parliament had already welcomed non-military petitions from around the country.

Yet parliament took little heed of this and proceeded with its active campaign to promote the Irish service and to divide the army by offering financial incentives to disband or to go to Ireland. However, to the soldiery it appeared that parliament was acting purely out of political considerations, since it accompanied this by purging the London militia of Independents. Equally, the officers appointed to lead the expedition to Ireland - Skippon and Massey - had strong Presbyterian links. To the soldiery there were few greater crimes, and following their instincts they turned to their officers for support, presenting two 'Apologies' to their officers, signed by sixteen 'commissioners', soon to be known as 'agitators'. This struck a chord with the officers, who had always seen the soldiers' grievances as just and they were thus willing to reciprocate the soldiers' calls for unity, by inviting the sixteen 'agitators' to join the Council of War (thus creating the General Council of the Army). However, Fairfax also checked the rank-and-file's power by balancing the Council with an equal number of officers from each regiment. This gave the officers a permanent majority within the Council, and this was to prove crucial when the officers defeated the Leveller threat in November 1647.

Such actions conclusively demonstrated the lengths to which the army would go in order to win redress of its grievances, but it was not too late to quell the flames of revolt. Consequently parliament, buoyed up by City support, decided to offer most of the concessions demanded in March and to press on with the

disbandment. However, this strategy once again came to grief, since these concessions - which in any case were limited and partial - were overshadowed by parliament's vote to allow the City to raise cavalry. Consequently, when parliament issued the precipitate order of disbandment in May, the army remained unconvinced of parliament's sincerity and was thus unwilling to comply with it. This order effectively ended the army's loyalty to parliament and left it with a clear choice: either it could disband or it could fight back.

Once again, it was the agitators who seized the initiative, the officers remaining unconcerned while the soldiery were relatively unaffected by Leveller propaganda. The most decisive step taken was the seizure of the king on 2 June - his seizure though not his removal by Joyce and his men probably approved by the officers - and this was followed on the 5th by the general rendezvous at Newmarket. The rendezvous proved to be an extremely intoxicating experience of unity, and climaxed in the unanimous adoption of the *Solemn Engagement*. It stated that the army 'would...readily disband' only when its grievances were met, and nine days later, in the *Representation of the Army*, the army announced its entry into politics, declaring that they 'were called forth...to the defence of...our people's just rights'.^[3] By implication, the army had begun to claim to represent the people better than parliament, thus precipitating a direct confrontation. Further, once the eleven Members had been impeached and Fairfax had moved headquarters closer to London, the Presbyterian coalition collapsed, and belatedly began to seek a rapprochement with the army. The Declaration of Dislike was at last repealed. This was followed by the withdrawal of the eleven members on 26 June, and Fairfax's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of all the forces in England on 16 July.

The agitators remained unapacified - they sought the release of political prisoners such as Lilburne, the restoration of Independents to the London militia and provisions to prevent the eleven Members returning to the House - and they continued to demand a march on London. However, this was too much for the officers, who instead placed their confidence in a negotiated settlement, both with parliament and with Charles. Throughout the spring of 1647, there were numerous reports of royalist sentiments within the rank-and-file, even to the extent that, in Norfolk, soldiers were heard to cry 'viva the king', one of many such examples.^[4] Evidence so persistent and widespread cannot be dismissed as merely an attempt to blacken the army's name, and it seems certain that there was in all ranks less resentment of the king than of the parliamentary peace party. Consequently, the officers, believing themselves justified by parliament's recent concessions and popular opinion within the army, increased their moves towards a settlement

with Charles. These efforts began in the Reading Debates on 16 July, where Cromwell persuaded the agitators that army unity was more important than occupying London, and articulated the officers' fear of a breach of parliamentary privilege, warning 'that [which] you have by force, I look upon it as nothing'.^[5] However, the agitators were left feeling that for the first time unity meant agreeing with the grandees.

Nevertheless, the grandees continued by advancing the *Heads of the Proposals*, which were both the most radical and the most generous peace package ever offered to Charles. Indeed, some progress was made, but before the talks could come to fruition, they were interrupted by the counter-revolutionary violence which gripped London on 22 July. The decision to return the London militia to Independent hands inflamed Presbyterian opinion which had already become disenchanted with parliament's failure to achieve a Presbyterian settlement. A mob was provoked into storming parliament, forcing it to return to its Presbyterian stance; the minority of Independent MPs and peers fled to the army. These developments vindicated the agitators' call for a march on London, particularly once Charles had refused to condemn the assault on parliament. Thinking that the *Heads* would still be on offer after events had unfolded in London, the king's deluded sense of optimism instead led him to tell the army's emissaries 'you cannot be without me...you will fall to ruin if I do not sustain you'.^[6] His eventual belated condemnation did little to restore his reputation among the rank-and-file who, quite correctly, realised it only occurred once he could gain no more from the situation in London.

Despite this setback, though, the army was able to defeat the counter-revolution by occupying London, thus allowing the Independents to return to both Houses and again forcing the eleven Members to flee the capital. Yet this acquisition of power merely multiplied the army's problems, the most serious of which was the problem of radical infiltration. The Levellers, sensing the officers' vulnerability in continuing to negotiate with the king, attempted to use the army's proximity to London to infiltrate its ranks. Moreover, in August, with the incorporation of all English forces into Fairfax's command, there was a swelling of the army's numbers which enabled many London radicals - most notably Captain Bray and other so-called 'agents' - to enlist with the purpose of influencing the army's political agenda. They began in October by savagely attacking the officers in *The Case of the Army Truly Stated*. They claimed that the dissolution of parliament and the social reform which awaited a political revolution was a more satisfactory way of ending the army's unpopularity. Although the manner in which the army repudiated the Levellers at Ware in

November suggests that their support was shallow-rooted, it would be wrong to under-estimate their significance both in introducing the concept of a political revolution and in gaining a degree of support in a number of regiments during autumn 1647.

This Leveller success, and its threat to unity, was what necessitated the debates at Putney in October. The original object of the debate was to discuss this challenge, but the publication of the *Agreement of the People*, which made no provision for monarchy, the day before the Council met, rather hijacked the debates. Further, by attacking the agents on the issue of the franchise - over which he was unlikely to win support, since many soldiers were denied the right to vote under the existing franchise - Ireton ensured that the Council was virtually won over to the Leveller way of thinking. Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe was even prompted to add that 'God has not been with us as formerly', [7] thus first introducing the suggestion that by seeking a restoration they had abandoned God's ways. Moreover, this forced Cromwell to admit that, though he still believed only parliament could decide what was fit for the country; if the destruction of the king was God's will, then it could be done without shame.

Yet for Fairfax, who had missed the debates through ill-health, and for his fellow grandees, the Levellers had already enjoyed too much success. Consequently, he resolved to meet them head on. Now back in the chair, he was able to use his influence and the officer majority in the Council to secure a vote sending the agitators back to their regiments and ordering the army to three separate rendezvous. By contrast, the Levellers, buoyed up by the king's flight on 15 November, instructed the whole army to attend the rendezvous at Ware instead. However, paradoxically, Charles's flight also aided the restoration of unity, since it ended the grandees' negotiations with him, thus removing the main source of tension within the army. In the event, the Levellers managed merely to win over four regiments at Ware, and even this resistance was soon ended - not least by Fairfax and Cromwell personally ripping Leveller colours from some of the soldiers' hats - when all seventeen regiments endorsed Fairfax's *Remonstrance*. Although this restored army unity, blaming division on the agents and reasserting the loyalty of the army to the king, it also contained a strong Leveller-influence, the price paid by the grandees to re-establish unity.

In the period following the rendezvous, the army was left to contemplate a return to fighting, following Charles's signing of the Engagement with the Scots on 26 December. Moreover, the army began to see further bloodshed as unnecessary, since God had already judged against the royalists in the first civil war. Charles

was now not only trying to overturn providence, but also invading his own kingdom; and it was thus perceived that he had broken his contract with his people. There was a strong belief within the army in natural law contractualism. Equally, now for the first time a restoration of the king seemed also to mean the establishment of Presbyterianism, and the end of the army's religious cause. Thus this contemplation led to discontent in the army which prompted the officers into calling a prayer-meeting at Windsor. Initially, there was no progress; but on the third day a breakthrough was made when Goffe rose and attributed all the army's troubles to not following God. This affected everyone, and hard on the heels of emotional catharsis came consensus. Without dissent, they agreed that they would fight the enemies arrayed against them, and would call Charles Stuart, that man of blood, to account for the blood he had shed. [8]

In the event, the opposition's inability to coordinate their risings ensured that the army incurred few problems in its triumph. Yet, even once the second civil war had been won, some officers - most notably Fairfax and Cromwell themselves - were not yet ready to support political revolution. Although Gentles has suggested that Cromwell remained in northern England during the closing months of 1648 for purely military and technical reasons, the most plausible explanation remains that he still had some scruples over the intended revolution. The task of convincing these doubters fell to Ireton, who more than any other officer threw himself behind the revolution; and set about forging an alliance between the army, the Levellers and the republicans, in order to give at least a degree of consent to the political revolution.

However, what was really to convert these remaining officers was parliament's actions subsequent to the war. The crushing defeat that was inflicted on the 'royalists' left parliament free to impose any terms on Charles. But to the officers' astonishment, parliament instead embarked on the Treaty of Newport negotiations, and appeared ready to give in to 'the author of the late troubles'. [9] Ireton was thus able to persuade the Council of Officers to adopt the *Remonstrance*, since it seemed that political revolution was now not only backed by providence, but also demanded by necessity, as the extinction of both the army and its cause seemed imminent. Consequently, when parliament, on 2 December, voted the king's answer to the Newport Treaty to be an acceptable basis for settlement, the officers crossed the political Rubicon by purging parliament. The trial and subsequent execution of the king was the logical successor to this, as the army acted to safeguard the cause to which it had become attached in its formative years.

Therefore, we can see that the revolution was essentially made by events, and that it was parliament's treatment of the army which converted it into a revolutionary body. The Declaration of Dislike opened a chasm of distrust, and had the effect of generalising the army's demands. Moreover, parliament's order to disband forced the army into positive action. Thus once the Presbyterian coalition had collapsed and the counter-revolution been defeated, the army was assured of political power. Yet, the ideology which came to underpin the army's actions was very much a product of its early years. Many of its actions were motivated by the desire to protect both its religious cause and its unity. Religion was also instrumental in imbuing within the army a self-confidence, which, along with its egalitarianism, laid the foundations for its revolt. The army's alienation from the king was, meanwhile, a result of his actions. Having failed to negotiate in good faith, he really antagonised the army by initiating the second conflict and trying to overturn the judgement of heaven. This was exploited well by the Levellers, who introduced the concept of political revolution. Yet it needed the Treaty of Newport negotiations finally to unite even the unconvinced officers behind the revolution.

1. W C Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (4 vols, Cambridge, Mass., 1937-47), I, 365.
2. Quoted in A H Woolrych, *Soldiers and Statesmen* (Oxford, 1987), p. 38.
3. Quotes in I Gentles, *The New Model Army* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 174 and 178-9.
4. Quoted in Woolrych, *Soldiers and Statesmen*, p. 69. For other examples, see *ibid*, pp. 69-71 and Gentles, *New Model Army*, chapter 6.
5. C H Firth (ed), *The Clarke Papers* (vols I and II reissued in a single volume, Woodbridge, 1992), I, 184-7.
6. Quoted in Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 184.
7. Firth, *Clarke Papers*, I, 226.
8. Quoted in Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 246.
9. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 266.

TENSION BETWEEN THE RUMP AND THE ARMY 1649-53, AND CROMWELL'S EJECTION OF THE RUMP

by Lee Wood

The army was the instrument of origin and demise of the Rump. In 1649 the army had been the catalyst for regicide but it had not established a military dictatorship. Instead, army leaders welcomed the Commonwealth and supported it against royalist, Celtic and Leveller insurgents. In return the army hoped that the government would embark on a series of reforms that would provide justice and allow the regime to be based on a wider foundation than just the army support. However, the conservative element within the Rump, who feared power falling into the hands of the army or sectarian radicals, were in consequence reluctant to respond to the army's 'pressure' for reform. Furthermore, given increased army influence within politics, financial weaknesses, the allegations of corruption, and disagreement over social, religious and foreign policies, there developed a growing estrangement between the grandees and the government. Hence, it was this army disillusionment by 1653 that led Cromwell forcibly to dissolve parliament.

Increased army influence within politics embittered and polarised Rump-army relations. Threats to the regime came from the Levellers who were disappointed at the Rump's failure to accept the *Agreement of the People* (1647), thus regarding the new government as more tyrannical than Charles Stuart. Indeed Lilburne was thoroughly disenchanted with the new regime, expressing through *England's New Chains Discovered* how, 'the fair blossoms of hopeful liberty had ripened into bitter fruit'. Revolts at Ware, London and Burford created anxiety for, as Trevelyan states, 'if the army revolted the new state would fall'. The grandee crushing of these disturbances made the regime stable, though more importantly, increasingly dependent upon army support, thus polarising Rump-army relations. These disturbances blocked the pace of reform, with the dangers of a radical spectre further increasing army dependence and influence within politics. Popularity was also increased by Cromwell's, Ireton's and Fairfax's crushing of the Irish, Scottish and English supporters of Charles II, removing the military threats to the regime. However, though revolts were defeated, MPs feared that the consequences would be power falling into the army's hands. Though this is true, army influence and support was inevitable for, as Aylmer suggests, 'without the support of the army, the government's roots would be

shattered'. Hence, it was essentially this lack of army support for the new regime that led Cromwell to dissolve parliament in 1653.

The existence of a large army exacerbated financial difficulties within the regime, further widening the division between the government and the army. Worden believes that 'finance was the Rump's greatest political liability, and was the unsolved problem which overshadowed Rump politics from beginning to end.' Firth has estimated that the Rump years saw an expansion in the army from 47,000 to 70,000 as war was undertaken against the Irish, Scots and the Dutch. Certainly, this issue was to create tensions within the new regime. The Rump found itself in what appears to be a perpetual dilemma, where the more unpopular it became, the more it needed army support; the greater the size of the army, the more its financial demands became inevitable, thus enhancing its unpopularity. Indeed, support was poor from London merchants, which reflected the lack of confidence in the regime's durability, and by 1650, the Rump's deficit was over £700,000 which was half its annual income. Paul has even gone as far as to suggest that in 1652, 'the Commonwealth was in sad straits', citing how at the end of a ruinous civil war, it had become involved in an expensive naval war, at the same time as the extraordinary means of revenue, such as the compositions of cavaliers and the sales of delinquents' lands, church lands and royal property, 'were rapidly drying up'. Certainly such tactics created tensions, annoying both royalist and army leaders. The General Pardon and Oblivion Act (1652) exemplified discontents, as in the eyes of Desborough, Lambert and Rich, it gave too little protection to defeated royalists and made too many exemptions for conciliation to be achieved. Clearly the Rump needed to win back support, though as Cromwell said, 'there must be no volition of the public faith for the Parliament and army's honours', feeling that the Rump was allowing the army deliberately to become unpopular so as to widen the basis of support for the government in order to disband the threat of the army's political power. However, in the wake of its perpetual ineffectiveness to deal with finance, it was the Rump's failure to secure wider support that hindered progress and further polarised divisions, culminating in Cromwell's dissolution of the Rump.

The belief amongst the army that the Rump was predominately 'corrupt' generated tensions, further polarising Rump-army relations. Indeed many Rumpers made profits out of the administration and government, though it is going too far to agree with Yale that 'the Rump was an Oligarchy with no positive policy except that of self-interest.' Sir Arthur Haslerig developed his wealth through the ex-Bishop of Durham's estate, Wildman became a successful dealer in confiscated property, and Sir Henry Vane was

amply pensioned on retiring from the treasurership of the navy. Modern day historians have argued Yale's viewpoint, taking a more sympathetic line on these allegations of corruption. Underdown has defended the Rump on the grounds that 'the expectations demanded of MPs were unrealistic and there is little evidence to suggest that they put self-interest before that of the nation.' Aylmer suggests that 'many MPs came into office in the years 1645-9 and that this take-over created the image of self-interest': he believes that 'officials were deliberately paid higher salaries in the hope that they would not recoup themselves at the expense of the public.' Certainly, one must agree with such interpretations, and must too stress the importance of Leveller, royalist and Presbyterian propaganda in emphasising the self-interest of MPs; press coverage was only further to entrench the belief of 'corruptness' within the regime and hence further polarise divisions. Further, army grandees were soon contrasting their experiences in Ireland and Scotland with those of the politicians who had stayed at home. Perhaps the criticism arose because it was felt that the Rump was not embarking on a reforming programme and that self-interest dominated. The solution was possibly to give office to God-fearing men who would fulfil the needs of the nation before self. Paul suggests that 'the corruption within the Rump rapidly brought Parliament into disrepute with the army officials.' It was this disrepute that led to a growing estrangement between the Rump and the army, thus forcing Cromwell to dissolve Parliament in 1653.

The failure of the Rump to effect satisfying legal reforms further alienated the army command. Law procedure was believed to be too complicated and too slow, and lawyers were thought to be more concerned with maintaining their vast profits than with reforming procedure or laws. Levellers stressed the importance of a codification and simplification of the laws, to return to England the freedoms of the Saxon times, which had been initially broken by the Normans and exacerbated by the House of Stuart. The Hale Commission (1651) had represented the establishment of more county courts and land registers in order that more cases could be settled locally. Cromwell sought to 'reform the abuses of all professions that makes many poor to make a few rich'. However, divisions grew wider as lawyers who were MPs prevented improvement and offered only limited reform: easing the debtors law, and permitting the use of English instead of French and Latin. Underdown has stressed the inadequate legal system, showing that there were 44 lawyer MPs and believing that 'too many sessions consisted of less than 100 MPs, which allowed lawyers to block reforms'. For example, only three bills on legal reform reached the committee stage; most were forgotten. Woolrych believes that 'the

Rump was too concerned with its constitutional origins [and] that made it sensitive to lawyers' wishes...Law reform was a guide to the extent of social reform and that many of its proposals [were] blocked...reflected the Rumper's view that 'normal' government must be maintained.' In the discussion over law reforms, the Rump was eventually obliged to decide between the lawyers on the one hand, and the sectarian radicals on the other. It is not surprising they chose the lawyers. Certainly, it was the Rump's procrastination to implement satisfactory legal reforms that further polarised the Rump-army dichotomy, compelling Cromwell in 1653 forcibly to dissolve parliament.

Tensions were also generated through the Rump's unwillingness to respond to reforms sought by the army. Some of the grandees wanted to achieve a just government and society, based upon the belief that the government should be beneficial to those under their control. Monopolies, pluralities and excessive salaries for public officials were to be controlled, cheating at market stopped and scarce foodstuffs allocated equitably. The unemployed were to be found work, better care was to be provided for those injured in the civil war and for their widows and children. It was the Rump's failure to solve such grievances that contributed to the army's growing sense of active involvement within politics, polarising their relationship with MPs, and hence becoming another factor behind the dissolution of April 1653. Rump inadequacies and army discontent have been examined by Hirst, who shows how bills for stopping deer poaching received greater priority than reform of the poor laws. Indeed, Lockyer believes that this lack of legislative reform 'raised fundamental questions'. And Cromwell himself showed his discontent, directing his anger at what seemed to be efficiency without idealism, government without morality. He could not believe that a great war had been fought and a monarchy overthrown simply to give power to a handful of men who had come to stand for nothing but themselves. At times it seemed as if the Rump was deferring to gentry interests, and perhaps realising that in the long term it would need the support of the gentry; however, by doing so, it raised a fundamental belief of distrust within the army, consequently losing its support. Further, its politics of consensus never really gained the support of the gentry and limited attempts at reform upset the army. Given that the army wanted more innovation, mixed with a hierarchical structure of society, the Rump's procrastination became evidently more apparent, thus further polarising the division, which by 1653 had reached the point of no return.

The Anglo-Dutch war (1652) exacerbated tensions as army generals were unsure of the Rump's objectives. War itself against

the Dutch was perfectly justifiable for some groups, like Harrison's Fifth Monarchy Men. Conflicts over trade in the New World, Africa and the Indies, as well as disputes over territorial waters, generated mutual mistrust. The Navigation Acts (1651) further developed tensions. But while the war was popular with people like Maurice Thomson because of his shipbuilding and military contacts, people like Cromwell looked on with concern. Though accepting commercial competition, Cromwell believed that religion should be a key element in the nation's foreign policy. Thurloe believed 'he deplored the lamentable state of the Protestant cause whilst the war continues', and Roots suggests that 'he was determined to end the Dutch war as soon as it was practicable to give foreign policy a[n]...Anti-Spanish tone.' Cromwell became disenchanted with the Rump as he disliked its aggressive nationalism and commercialism, seeing it as a divergence away from the main task of internal reform. Certainly, this would seem to accord with what Barnard has implied, in that some officers even suspected that the Rump was deliberately building up the navy as a potential political counterweight to that of the army, and that money earmarked for internal reform was being misused in naval reform. Hence, it was this element of suspicion created through the Rump's direction of foreign policy that exacerbated the Rump-army dichotomy and so contributed to Cromwell's actions in spring 1653.

The Rump's failure to solve the issue of a national church settlement and to ensure Godly reformation added to the tension between MPs and army grandees. Baptists favoured the abolition of a national church supported by tithes; the Independents within the army sought a parliamentary framework of organisation for the protection of a national church. Under this guidance, individual sects would be given toleration, provided their dogma was in the interests of Protestantism and would not endanger the security of the state or provide religious or social unrest. However, through doing this, it seemed that instead of attempting comprehension, the Rump would be accepting religious disorder. In 1650 it had repealed the Elizabethan law compelling attendance at church, and not only did its Blasphemy and Adultery Acts seem incapable of establishing discipline with tolerance, but they also created tensions as army generals feared 'unacceptable' sects, like Catholics, Episcopalians, Ranters and Anabaptists re-emerging; fears were raised in 1649 when only the Speaker's vote had stopped the Rump from introducing Presbyterianism as England's religion. Moreover, the Rump's failure in 1653 to renew the Commissions for the Propagation of the Gospel in Wales and the North further embittered Rump-army relations. Such reluctance to spread religious faith upset generals, who believed that their victories in Ireland, Scotland and

England were due to God's will. Cromwell and Harrison's Fifth Monarchy Men began to lose faith in the government and its lack of desire to commit itself to religious reform and effect a Godly reformation. Indeed, as Barnard suggests, 'Cromwell was now thrown decisively against the Rump.'

In 1653 army disillusionment came to a head when Cromwell forcibly removed the Rump. A number of explanations are feasible as to why Cromwell undertook this action. It is possible that the members of the Rump were thinking of recruiting new MPs rather than new elections. The fact that Haslerig was in charge of the bill suggested to Woolrych that 'the bill would have been unacceptable to the army'. It could well have been part of parliament's wider scheme of purging the army of its political leaders and preventing all serving officers from becoming MPs. Another explanation is that the Rump sought new elections which the army refused to accept. Worden believes that 'the new MPs would not be susceptible to the wishes of the army, and that the soldiers suspected that the Rump would allow a Parliament to come into existence which would probably start dismantling what gains the revolution had so far achieved.' Moreover, what the bill did was to open up wider questions about the years 1649-53. Clearly, many of the army leaders had grown discontented with the Rump and were beginning to consider whether the government was to be permanent or temporary. Lambert wanted to base a regime on civilian gentry support, Harrison on Fifth Monarchy fervour. Cromwell himself was undecided until the last moment over the possibility of using force to remove what he saw as a legitimate government. Possibly, he came to appreciate that after four years of Rump rule very little had been achieved, but what was equally important was a belief that there was little chance of future reforms if the Rump continued. Given the army's perspective that the regime had achieved little, this may have been the decisive factor in overturning a regime that they saw becoming an oligarchy.

OLIVER CROMWELL, ENGLISHMAN AND WELSHMAN: HIS IMAGE AMONG HIS CONTEMPORARIES

by Stephen K. Roberts

Surely no single ruler of Britain had ever been as scrutinised, vilified or publicly weighed in the balance as Oliver Cromwell during the period of his Protectorship? His inauguration as Lord Protector in December 1653, coming as it did after eleven years of civil wars, the execution of King Charles I, the radicals' elation at the Commonwealth and their swift disappointment; the bitterness of royalists and the sourness of frustrated Presbyterians; not to mention legacies of hatred and resentment in Ireland and Scotland, was bound to find critics aplenty. The question of the very legitimacy of the Protectorate was a live one for so many alienated individuals and political groupings: for angry republicans as well as for monarchists. In the printing presses of London there was a ready outlet for their spleen. The 1640s and 1650s were the first age of newspapers, and even taking into account the government clampdowns on works of what were judged to be a blasphemous or seditious character, this was a period of remarkable literary, journalistic and polemical freedom. Because of these disputes about legitimacy and because of the busy presses ready to print a variety of opinions, the reputation of Cromwell was from his first elevation as a public figure during the mid-1640s much discussed. For Andrew Marvell, of course, and for many radicals between 1648 and 1653 he was 'our chief of men'; for many of those same radicals after 1653 he was a perfidious turncoat whose apostasy from true republicanism sprang from his boundless personal ambition. These themes in interpretations of Cromwell's life have been well covered in the dozens of biographies of the Lord Protector and collections of scholarly essays. In this paper I should like to focus not on Oliver's personal reputation, but on the public image of the man and the office of Protector, looking particularly at Cromwell's embodiment of Britishness. To what extent was Oliver Cromwell, through a projected image of his office, able to 'cast the kingdoms old into another mould', to use Marvell's celebrated phrase?

The inauguration of the Protectorate involved a major shift in the concept and image of the government of the British kingdoms. Some truths about this may be uncovered by comparing the Great Seal of the Protectorate with that of the Commonwealth it had replaced. The second Great Seal of the Commonwealth (1649-1653) showed on one side the Members of Parliament sitting in session,

with the Speaker at one end. It is an illustration reminiscent of the title page of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*, with its pictorial image of the sovereign being literally composed of the persons of the commonwealth. Around it in English the legend, 'In the Third Year of Freedom by Gods Blessing Restored'. On the reverse was a cartographic representation of England, Wales and Ireland. The Great Seal of the Protector, by contrast, reverted to an older model. On one side, Oliver was shown on horseback, in classic military pose. The arms of the Commonwealth were relegated to a small cartouche. In the background was a scene of London, and around, the legend in Latin, 'Protector Olivarius, Dei Gratia, reipublicae Angliae, Scotiae et Hiberniae'. On the other side, the arms of the Protector's family, a lion rampant, inserted into St George, the Irish harp and the Scottish saltire. The Scottish version of the Protectoral Great Seal was based very directly on that of Charles I, but with significant differences. The image of Oliver on horseback was identical to the English version, and showed a stately warhorse. Charles I's seal had shown a more ebullient, galloping monarch in full armour. Making the point that the government in Scotland was based on conquest, a scene of the battle of Dunbar replaced a view of Edinburgh on the royal seal. It was hardly surprising that many contemporaries saw the Protectorate as a real step backwards towards monarchy. The divergencies between the Scottish and English seals showed also that experiences of being subject to the Protectorate differed in the British Isles.

Before looking at what being British meant in the mid-seventeenth century, we need to remind ourselves of a few salient features of Cromwell's life and career. We have no time here to rehearse the biographical facts, but can identify a number of the more striking aspects of his story. The first would be his modest country gentry background in the East Anglian Fens and his need to earn a living, as an agent for the dean and chapter of Ely cathedral, in the administration of the tithes due to them. Cromwell began his adult life struggling economically and began it as a man beholden to a Church of England which he found increasingly unsympathetic. As far as we know, in those early years of his life Cromwell travelled no further than London. Not for him the period of service in continental armies which was common enough vocation for men of his modest background. Although he began his parliamentary career in 1628 at the age of 29, we need to bear in mind that he made very little impact then in the House of Commons. As that parliament was dissolved angrily by Charles I in 1629, his first appearance in national public life was brief, until the summoning of the Short Parliament of 1640. Even then Cromwell was not among the famous Five Members sought by the king in January 1642. He

won his reputation as a soldier, not in the early set-piece battles of the civil war, but from 1643 as an organiser and discipliner. Cromwell was in his mid-40s before he was in any sense famous. Cromwell's reputation as a great soldier is all the more impressive in view of his complete lack of military experience before 1642: both political activism at Westminster and soldierly prowess came late to him.

Cromwell's relations with the multiple kingdoms of the British Isles was, as I have hinted, an important theme in his career from 1649, when Charles I was executed and the Commonwealth established, until his death while Lord Protector on 3 September 1658. His predecessor as single ruler, Charles I, had been King of Scotland by reason of the union of the crowns of England and Scotland in the person of his father, James I and VI. Charles had been King of Ireland, too, though with rather less authority. The title King of Ireland had been claimed by Henry VIII from 1541, and was simply an expression of his determination that English influence in Ireland should not be confined to a colonial regime within the Pale, along the east coast. When Irish Catholics rose in 1641 and slaughtered Protestant 'planters' who had from the reign of Elizabeth taken land in Ireland in increasing numbers, it was perceived as a revolt against the English Crown. Cromwell's personal role in the relationships between the kingdoms was to personify the coercive power of the English state. In Ireland the Catholic natives were subdued in 1649 with repressive force. After Ireland was pacified, Cromwell's personal attention was directed to Scotland. There after a campaign culminating in the rout of the Scots army at Worcester in September 1651, a military government of occupation was established. The outcome was a closer kind of union between the kingdoms, prefiguring the eventual Union of 1707. The force behind these changes contributes much to the ambivalence which so many have detected running through Marvell's discussion of 'casting the kingdoms old' in the 'Horatian Ode'.

Despite these dramatic doings in the kingdoms of the British Isles, Cromwell was only well-travelled in a very specific sense. He never visited Scotland, Ireland or Wales except on what in another age would have been called active military service; never travelled outside the British Isles at all, and after the battle of Worcester in 1651 until his death in 1658 seems not to have left London or its immediate environs. In this regard Cromwell was infinitely less cosmopolitan than Charles I, lacking also the latter's access to and appreciation of the fine things of the princely courts of Europe. And yet even if his travels were accompanied by violence, he did at least visit places in the British Isles beyond the Home Counties, often

covering huge distances in short periods. On the basis of counting miles travelled, Cromwell had seen more of his territories than probably any Tudor or Stuart monarch. The cardinal features of Cromwell's career to bear in mind in our discussion would therefore be his Englishness and provincialism; his late entry to elevated public life; his lack of a professional army background; and the robust approach, based on his personal experience, that he brought to bear on the problem of multiple British kingdoms.

All of these features have contributed to the pleasing sobriquet 'God's Englishman' which was bestowed on Cromwell by Christopher Hill in his 1970 biography of that title, and is now given universal cultural validity as the title of a W.H. Smith Exclusive video about Oliver. It is pleasing not least because it sounds contemporary with Cromwell's own time. But more than that, it identifies aspects of Cromwell's life with adjectives for one image of Englishness: provincial, effective but amateur (not amateurish); reluctantly political; unintellectual; common-sense. (Christopher Hill identifies other virtues, perhaps less enduring in the English character: honesty, sobriety, godliness.) The real merits of the phrase lie, of course, in its encapsulating the truth of contemporary perceptions, especially Cromwell's own. 'We are English, that is one good fact', the Lord Protector declared to his second parliament, in 1656. 'You have accounted yourselves happy on being environed with a great ditch from all the world besides', he asserted, again to parliament, in 1658. Cromwell's vision of the destiny of the English people derived from his own sense of religious assurance and from the providence of a run of spectacular military victories. It was hardly surprising that in the high days of radicalism in the early 1650s, he should see himself as a Moses figure, leading the nation metaphorically to a Promised Land. With the disappointments and frustrated radicalism of the Nominated Assembly and the establishment of the Protectorate to achieve through strength what could not be achieved by godly zeal alone, Cromwell's perceptions altered. After 1654 his thoughts, as revealed in his public utterances, suggest a separation in his mind between God's people and the English people, where previously they had been synonymous.

In Cromwell's last years, he seems not inclined to challenge the pulpit assertions of orthodox puritan preachers like Richard Baxter and John Owen that the people of God were in fact a 'remnant', a separated people. The language and concept of the remnant came from the Old Testament, and when preachers used the phrase on public occasions, when assizes were opened or when a sitting of parliament was begun they had in mind the godly, the peaceable or sometimes those who were members of gathered or

Independent churches. The idea that God's people were a specific section of the community was easier to sustain in the circumstances of the mid to late 1650s than a general identification between the English people and the people of God. Not only were divisions within the political nation running deep, but the pulpits were occupied by ministers who felt that they had received inadequate protection by the government from the disruptions and persecutions of sectaries.

The notion of the English as being especially singled out by God for great things was difficult to sustain when domestic affairs were considered. It was less open to challenge when applied to foreign affairs. In this field, the building up of the navy, the peace made with England's commercial rival but Protestant co-religionist state, the Dutch, the treaty with the Protestant Swedes, the subsequent war with the Catholic Spanish, whom Oliver considered the 'natural enemy' of the English, and the attempts to establish England as a colonising power to displace Spain in the West Indies, can all be seen as a Grand Design. There were inconsistencies, such as the peace made with the French and the treaty with Portugal, in which trade seemed to take precedence over religion, but the rhetoric of England as a crusading, vanguard, godly Protestant nation held good and worked well.

In all this, what of Britishness? Was this a peculiarly English vision? John Morrill believes that Cromwell had no sense of a British elect nation. In order to address this, we need first to be clear what was meant by British in the seventeenth century. The phrase Great Britain was first employed in the Union of the crowns under James I, when it was used to describe the unity of two equal nations under one king. In this context the phrase was little more than a legal flourish. It was not used routinely to describe any particular place. More commonly, the word British was used to mean the ancient British, or appertaining to the ancient Britons, who were taken to be the longest settled inhabitants of these islands. This antiquarian usage of British was in fact the most common one; rarely was the word used to describe the present, and then only in very specific contexts. The word British could be used more particularly as a synonym for Welsh, and the logic for this derived from the belief that the Welsh were the nearest descendants of the ancient Britons. Here the word was likely to be used jocularly or archly, typically by an English person to describe some puzzling aspect of Welsh behaviour: 'Pray you bear a little with our British zeal', wrote the English major-general James Berry to Secretary John Thūrløe in 1655 when he was investigating an anti-Cromwellian outburst from a group of fiery Welsh preachers.

Generally, the adjective British had a wider currency than

the noun Britain. On the Great Seal of the Commonwealth of 1651, which we discussed earlier, appeared a map of England, Wales and Ireland: Scotland was omitted as it was still regarded as a separate state. On it, the English Channel was represented as 'The British Sea'. When an army was assembled to be shipped to Ireland in order to put down the insurrection there in 1649, it was referred to by parliament as the British army, the word being used there to avoid any connotation of its being a colonial or invading army of occupation. The Welsh were sometimes (usually in literary or antiquarian contexts) the British, but Wales was never Britain.

Given the ambiguities of what to be British meant in the period, it is therefore hardly surprising that Cromwell or his contemporaries could not develop a sense of destiny for the British. The concept had hardly been invented. 'Britain' in our everyday modern sense scarcely existed in the seventeenth century. It is like another modern concept which we take for granted, that of 'local government', which Cromwell's contemporaries managed to do without: and I am not referring only to the phrase, but to what we understand by the phrase. And yet, despite the pleasing title of 'God's Englishman', the provincial English upbringing, the easily satisfied appetite for travel, the glorying in the isolation of this country from the rest of Europe and the ambiguities of Britishness, it would be reductive to make Cromwell a little Englander or to pin him down to a narrow, 'middle-class', Grantham-like background. For a significant dimension in Cromwell's life and outlook was his identity, privately and publicly, with things Welsh.

It could be said to be merely an accident of history that Cromwell's name was not Williams. By the usual rules of English surnames Oliver should have been the Lord Protector Williams. Oliver's great-grandfather, Richard Williams, changed his name to Cromwell to emphasise his family links with Henry VIII's chief minister, Thomas Cromwell. Richard's mother was before her marriage to Morgan Williams, Katherine Cromwell, and was sister to the famous Thomas. Morgan Williams, Oliver's great-great-grandfather, had been brought up in London. It was the name-changing Richard Cromwell, Oliver's great-grandfather, who had acquired an estate at Hinchinbrooke in Huntingdonshire and had established the family with its new name in East Anglia. At one level, this information is little more than an illustration of the arbitrariness of family history and conventions about names. It has been pointed out that in Wales where surnames had not settled down as in England, and where patronymic names, in which the first name of the father would commonly form the second name of the children, were common, Richard Williams's name change would hardly seem odd. In fact the family continued to be known as

Cromwell alias Williams until around 1600, and a branch of it prudently reverted to Williams after the disgrace which fell upon the name Cromwell after the Restoration. But in tracing the image which Oliver Cromwell had of himself and which was projected in public during the Protectorate period the Welsh connection is significant.

When in the 1650s the heralds were compiling for official iconography an appropriate pedigree for Oliver Cromwell, it was to his Williams ancestors they turned for material. The Welsh gentry were renowned genealogists; any culture which practises gavelkind or partible inheritance, by which estates were divided among children rather than passed on to one son, are always likely to have a vested interest in accurate family trees. There would probably have been more genealogical information on Cromwell's Welsh ancestors than on others, and in any case the connection with Thomas Cromwell was at best of dubious value for those trying to create a modest myth. At any rate it was the glories of names that can be rolled around the mouth, like Howell ap Madoc, Madoc ap Meredydd, and Gwrgani ap Gwifestan ap Gwaith Foed, that Cromwell chose to commemorate. On his private seal, the most personal of the sources of authority open to the Protector, it was the Welsh arms in his family background that were shown.

Another view of Cromwell's image of himself can perhaps be gleaned from the pageantry of his funeral in 1658. Pageantry is not an inappropriate word here. The burial of Cromwell's corpse was probably undertaken virtually without ceremony in Westminster Abbey, perhaps as early as the day after Oliver's death on 3 September. The funeral, minus the body, and with an effigy as the focus of the action, was a grand affair, involving a lying-in-state and culminating in an elaborate procession through London on 23 November. The effigy was a wooden construction, designed to appear realistic, with a wax face. There may indeed have been more than one of these. We have an account of the pennants, banners, escutcheons and other flags and emblems accompanying the hearse and monster procession as they progressed slowly through the London streets. The images are revealing. The standard of England naturally was much in evidence, with Oliver's motto, *Pax Quaeritur Bello*, 'Peace is Sought through War', accompanying. The great banner of the Union (between Scotland and England in 1603), the great banner of the State's arms (incorporating the arms of England, Scotland and Ireland), the standard of the red dragon and the great banner of Ireland were near at hand. Separate standards for Ireland and Scotland were on view, the one for Ireland with the panglossian motto, *Concordia nutrit Amorem*, 'Agreement nourishes Love'. The lesser banner rolls, which presumably must have provided the

background decoration for the great banners of state, were made up of arms from Cromwell's family, and here the Welsh arms of Cynfrig Sais, Ynyr, King of Gwentland, Iestyn, Kemys and Button flew alongside those of Bouchier, Warren and Steward. In death as in life, Welsh iconography surrounded the most personal identity of the Protector.

One can hardly prove Cromwell had a significant involvement in Welshness through his taste in heraldry and the funeral arrangements that were made for him, however. We need to return to the politics and people of the Interregnum to make other connections between Cromwell and Wales. A number of key figures surrounding Cromwell were Welsh or had Welsh interests. His chaplains Peter Sterry and John Owen come first to mind. Sterry was a Cambridge platonist, one sympathetic to the more mystical varieties of Protestant theology. He was an enthusiastic correspondent of Morgan Llwyd, the principal Protestant mystic in Wales, who was in turn influenced by the writings of Jacob Boehme. Llwyd was the major writer in Wales during the Interregnum, publishing a number of Welsh language books and works in English, and Sterry may have introduced Llwyd to Boehme's work. Certainly their correspondence during the 1650s was warm and intellectually creative. Cromwell's other chaplain was John Owen. He was Cromwell's chaplain on his campaigns in Ireland and Scotland in 1649 and 1650, and was close to the Protector subsequently. Owen was chosen on several occasions to preach before parliament, and from 1652 was vice-chancellor of Oxford University. He was a classic example of a London Welshman, brought up in England but with a firm sense of his roots as being in Wales. His public sermons dwelt on a concern for the church in Wales and on the need for a dispensation of resources towards that neglected region, to provide the ministers needed for effective proselytising.

Beyond the preachers patronised by Oliver Cromwell, there were others in his entourage who were sympathetic to Welsh interests. The comptroller of his household, a man whose career was wholly bound up with his master's, was Philip Jones, originally of Llangyfelach near Swansea, who came to Oliver's attention during his quelling of the second civil war of 1648 in Wales. Jones has been described as the 'virtual ruler' of South Wales during the 1650s, and he combined immense power in the region with service as a Cromwellian trusty in the council of state and in the Protector's household. Jones was elevated to the revived House of Lords or Other House in 1658, and was bitterly attacked in print as a creature of Oliver's. As well as managing Cromwell's household in London, Jones was steward to the extensive estates in

Wales that his master had acquired from the royalist Marquis of Worcester's forfeited estates, by grant of parliament. These grants, which included the seignory of Gower and large tracts of land in Monmouthshire, gave Cromwell a status as a Welsh landowner to match his pedigree, although it is interesting that he never visited his new estates in person after 1650.

So Welshness was an aspect of Cromwell's life constructed from the reworking by heralds of his ancestry and from the company he kept. Land grants in Wales further cemented the connection. Within the household there were even more personal ties. His family had a Welsh representative in his brother-in-law, Colonel John Jones, another London Welshman, but with very active family and business interests west of Offa's Dyke. Jones married Oliver's sister, Katherine. Against this background, Cromwell's declared concern for the Welsh, and specifically his concern for the state of Welsh souls, is not surprising. Cromwell gave his personal and enthusiastic backing for a scheme of 1650 which involved the redeployment of confiscated tithes in Wales, and when the scheme fizzled out in 1653 because of lukewarm support from MPs and venomous hostility from Anglican clergymen, Oliver intervened to allow the scheme to continue on his personal authority. In his speeches to parliament, Cromwell evinced nothing but compassion, sympathy and genuine concern for the plight of the Welsh. The same could not be said for his view of the Scots, let alone the Irish.

I have implied that Wales was given the most favoured nation status by Cromwell's English government. But what was Wales? (Gwyn A. Williams has in a brilliant overview posed the question another way: *When Was Wales?*) Wales was missing from the Latin inscription on the Great Seal. There was no kingdom of Wales. What the Tudors had done was to shire Wales into English-style counties and to extend some features of the medieval Principality of Wales, territorially a much smaller area than the Wales we know today, over the new principality they created. They ironed out some legal anomalies. English and not Welsh law now prevailed everywhere, and the legal status of the Welsh language was removed. They introduced some new anomalies of their own: Monmouthshire, a new county not in the principality nor a former marcher lordship, was one, and the jurisdiction by the Council in the Marches of Wales over an area as far east as Evesham, another. But Wales as a state disappeared for good into the generalities of its description as 'principality and dominion.' During the Interregnum, when all things princely or kingly were taboo in public language, it was a dominion only.

Wales was a stateless nation from the Tudor statutes

onwards, and it is easy to demonstrate that the standing of the Welsh people in English eyes was as diminished as their nationhood. The English parody of the Welshman as impoverished, unwashed, obsessed with ancestry and the status of gentility, still measuring wealth by the numbers of cattle in store, dangerously dependent on a diet of leeks and dairy products and flatulent as a result, stretched from its most famous invocation in Shakespeare's Henry V to the ballads and gutter press outpourings of the civil war. From the appearance of Welsh footsoldiers at the battle of Edgehill in 1642 onwards the Welsh were derided as a lousy rabble, and were of course not the only victims of English xenophobia. Historians have, however, tended to emphasise this contemporary image of the Welsh at the expense of other, more subtle perceptions. The functions of Wales, or the idea of Wales in the English state were multi-layered. One important dimension was Wales as the locus of the prophesying and rediscoveries of prophecies, which were current in the 1650s as they had been earlier. These may be divided into three main areas. One was the Arthurian legend, in which Wales provided England with a myth of regal continuity. Put simply, this was the idea that the Tudors fulfilled Arthurian prophecies, that kings of England would rise from the west or Wales. This myth was backpedalled in the years when the monarch spoke with a Scots accent, for obvious reasons, but in the last years of Oliver Cromwell, it was revived again: books entitled *British and Outlandish Prophecies* (1658) and *Prophwydoliaethau Myrddin* ('Merlin's prophecies') rebuilt the links between the increasingly monarchical Cromwell and the range of antiquarian and literary reference that kings could normally trade upon. A second area of myth was that surrounding the church. Here the function of Wales was again to provide legitimacy for forced change. In the published works of Morgan Llwyd during the 1650s, the authority of the church was derived not from Rome but from British - in the seventeenth century sense - roots: 'This was the island that accepted the gospel first in the time of Lles, son of Coel. Here, some say, Helen was born, and her son, Constantine...Britons have stood until death for the true faith.' In this interpretation of church history, the gospel was brought to Britain by Joseph of Arimathea. A third myth rooted in readings of Welsh history was that of Madoc, the supposed Welsh discoverer of America. Like the church history myth, the Madoc myth flourished most powerfully in the Tudor period, but never went completely away subsequently. The Madoc myth performed the same function for the Tudor imperial impulse that the Joseph of Arimathea myth did for the Protestant church militant under Elizabeth. The claims of the Welsh prince, Madoc, to the Americas, supposedly made in 1170, justified the actions of

Elizabethan privateers against the Spanish. The historian of Madoc has shown how the story died down a little in the seventeenth century, but was revived in books by James Howell between 1645 and 1655.

Cromwellian Wales was in literary and cultural terms, therefore, very much in a Celtic twilight. The three myths I have mentioned all had a main function of providing legitimacy to English state action. Arthur helped explain the Dynasty of the Tudors and of Cromwell; Joseph of Arimathea accounted for the rupture with the Catholic church which accompanied the setting up of the Church of England; Madoc helped justify English overseas imperialism. In the practical world of public affairs, the function of Wales was not so very different. During the Commonwealth period Wales was the only place in the British Isles where a practicable alternative to tithes as a system of funding the church was tried out with any success. The experiment involved pooling the resources of tithes and funding a cadre of itinerant preachers. Its opponents repeatedly denounced it in pamphlets published in London as a trial run for something to be foisted on the unwitting English tithe owners. To the extent that the fortunes of the experiment were followed with interest by Cromwell, the critics were probably right. Again an episode of a seeming peculiarly Welsh interest turned out to be arguably of an English dynamic. Associated with the church administration experiment in Wales was a long-running saga of allegations of fraud and mismanagement. A mini-genre of reports of scandal in Wales made the dominion in the 1650s a by-word for what in 1995 we might call 'sleaze', and contributed significantly to changing definitions of political corruption in England during the period. In a variety of respects, therefore, Wales was an anomalous annexe to the English state, which could provide material for, or a trial ground for, contentious developments in England.

As so often in discussing this period, the verdict of Andrew Marvell on the death of Cromwell sums things up:

Since him away the dismal tempest rent,
Who once more joined us to the continent;
Who planted England on the Flandric shore,
And stretched our frontier to the Indian ore;
Whose greater truths obscure the fables old,
Whether of British saints or Worthies told;
And in a valour lessening Arthur's deeds,
For holiness the Confessor exceeds.

What Wales and Welsh imagery provided Oliver Cromwell was a more rounded sense of identity. An identification with things Welsh

gave Cromwell a more rounded public image than his own immediate life story and background could sustain. God's Englishman he may have been in effect, but he and his entourage preferred the more comprehensive vision of Oliver as Englishman and Welshman. It was in fact the nearest plausible image of Britishness that was available at the time. The fact that England, under the direction of Lord General Cromwell, had conquered Scotland and Ireland by force prevented any development of the notion that protectors, like kings, were nursing fathers to all their people. The historic definition of Britishness, with its backward-looking, romantic associations helped give the Protectorate a kind of legitimacy. In Cromwell's ancestry lay the convenient material for a working-up of these elements, and at the time of his death at the age of fifty-nine the outline of a new Henry Tudor myth had appeared before the reading public. The Welsh or British dimension in the Lord Protector's private and public image was never dominant, never strident. It seemed to match well the complexion of public life in the three - or four - nations: the tune was English, the background harmonies with a Celtic undertone. For the preachers of the Protectorate, Cromwell was the godly Chief Magistrate, and to himself he was the 'poor constable of the parish, set to keep order'. To his enemies, 'A Protector, what's that? 'Tis a stately thing, That confesseth itself but the ape of a king; a tragicall Caesar acted by a Clowne; Or a brass farthing stamp'd with a kind of a crown'. To us, using of course the ambiguous gift of hindsight, it may appear that Oliver Cromwell was the first head of state whose image was crafted to match the British identity.

THE FAILURE OF THE 'GOOD OLD CAUSE'

by Graham E. Seel

The collapse of the Interregnum was by any standards spectacular. At the time of his death on 3 September 1658 it appeared as though Oliver Cromwell had fashioned a republic that was internationally accepted. 'Abroad a King he seems and something more,' wrote Andrew Marvell. On a smaller scale the 'crisis of the Three Kingdoms' appeared solved. Not only this, but there was much to suggest domestic stability. Lambert, Oliver's erstwhile understudy, had been ousted from the political and military machine, the army appeared cowed and quiescent, as did the royalists, and the succession of Oliver's eldest son to the title of Lord Protector seemed to suggest that the new written constitution, the Humble Petition and Advice, was working. The circumstances of 1658 thus appear as an unlikely base for the restoration of the monarchy just over two years later. There was certainly nothing inevitable about the events of the spring of 1660 for that was conditional upon a set of circumstances both unforeseen and unprecedented. Nonetheless, Oliver Cromwell's processes of 'healing and settling', particularly with regard to the appointment of ex-royalist Monck as Governor of Scotland in 1654, fatally weakened the longevity of the Interregnum. 'To this important extent', as Hutton has written, 'the Restoration did not happen because Cromwell had died, but because he had lived.' [1] Above all else, in at least some respects, the period of rule without a monarch had enjoyed perhaps too much success. The efficient repression of enemies, both internal and external, did much to lessen the efficacy of an already unnatural regime; there was now no longer a common threat against which the disparate elements of the Commonwealth and Protectorate could unite. Religious 'fanaticism', most especially in the form of the Quakers, might have served in this role if it were not for the fact that the forms of government of the latter part of the 1650s were tainted by just this. Lucy Hutchinson claims that at the beginning of 1660 the Presbyterian preachers 'began openly to desire the King, not for good will to him, but only for destruction to all fanatics.' [2]

The monarchy was not restored for negative reasons alone. Positive forces were at work also. That they needed to be was clear for the failure of Booth's Rising had shown that the Presbyterian element was far stronger than the cavalier and it was known that the former desired to shackle any restored monarchy with terms similar to those laid out in the Newport Treaty of 1648. Hyde was therefore careful to ensure that Charles Stuart did not make a commitment to

any particular party or course of action. It was important that the exiled Stuart should be able to appear to be all things to most men and that he be invited to return. The 'assiduous and intelligently directed'[3] substantial minority of former royalists, or crypto-royalists, who were able to capture and direct proceedings in the Convention Parliament, worked to ensure that Charles was returned to throne with almost no conditions attached. Hyde's policy reached its apogee on 4 April 1660. The 'Declaration of Breda was a beautiful package: it seemed to contain something for everyone'.[4] Its four main clauses offered a means of bounding up 'those wounds, which have so many years together been kept bleeding.' The House of Stuart offered a general indemnity, a 'liberty to tender consciences', that the 'purchases of land shall be determined in Parliament' and that the army could expect an early payment of its arrears. Payment of the army had proved an insuperable problem to every Interregnum regime. In 1650 the assessment had stood at £120,000 per month, equivalent to eighteen pre-war parliamentary subsidies per annum. Even when at its lowest of £35,000 per month in 1657 this was equivalent to five pre-war subsidies per annum. It was no little surprise that Convention MPs resolved on 1 May 'that the government was and ought to be by Kings, Lords and Commons' and even less wonder that men cheered when Charles stepped ashore in Kent on 25 May 1660. It seemed likely that monarchy would prove a cheaper option.

In financial terms Oliver Cromwell had bequeathed to the son a *damnosa hereditas*. By New Year's day 1659 the Protectorate regime was to have a debt of £2.5 million and the army a legitimate demand for £890,000. This would have been sufficient to destabilise any government but perhaps especially one that had an untried leader at its helm. Nonetheless, whilst Richard Cromwell may have lacked political experience, he was not without ability. His accession did not prove to be the royalists' playtime. Thurloe noted, 'there is not a dog that wags his tongue, so great a calm are we in'.[5] Nor was he destined to become the 'milksoop' and 'Queen Dick' of the textbooks. His very absence from the political scene during the rule of the first Lord Protector may well have served to enhance his appeal for it meant that Richard Cromwell was unsullied with the darker moments of the Commonwealth. Clarendon was aware of this advantage when he wrote that, 'the dead is interred in the sepulchre of the kings...and his son inherits all his greatness and all his glory, without the public hate that visibly attended the other'.[6] He did not carry any political baggage. It quickly became clear that he possessed qualities of decency, sincerity and moderation. Indeed, the new Protector was flooded with loyal addresses. Nonetheless, the notion that the Good

Old Cause was in the process of being betrayed had already been fathered and now many a pamphleteer's pen helped to propagate such a belief. One writer denounced the addresses of loyalty to Richard as emanations of 'the Spirit of the Beast and false Prophet in the former and present Monarchs of this and other Nations'.[7] It was perhaps the submission from the army officers in England, who made their loyalty conditional upon Richard promoting the 'concernments of the godly' and the Good Old Cause, that caused the greatest concern.

In his dealings with the army the new Lord Protector was to display not a little acuity. For instance, when faced with a petition that he abdicate control of the army he met with the officers on 18 October, made a speech in support of the aims of the army and then solved the crisis with compromise: Fleetwood was appointed Lieutenant-General of the army whilst Richard retained supreme power and the granting of commissions. An occasion of deeper crisis occurred on 15 February 1659 when a pro-republican army petition was presented to parliament requesting, in part, that no officers should be dismissed except by court martial and thus served notice that the army wished to be considered as a fourth estate in the constitution. Richard responded decisively. His surprise visit to Wallingford House - the home of Fleetwood where the army grandees met - defused the situation. 'He took so firm a line, indeed, that Fleetwood and Desborough drew back from an open breach, made their peace with him and publicly repudiated the proposed remonstrance'.[8] Yet just over two months later the Protectorate regime was to be overwhelmed by the military men.

One of Oliver's greatest achievements was that he had always prevented any alliance between the army and republican MPs. That the hopes of the army found refuge in the likes of Scot, Vane, Ludlow and Haselrige was less the result of the inadequacies of Richard than the extraordinarily obtuse actions of the parliament that met on 27 January 1659. The elections of December 1658 and January 1659, based upon the pre-Protectoral franchise, had produced a large (549 MPs) and unwieldy House. About half of those elected lacked any previous parliamentary experience and Thurloe noted that there was 'soe great a mixture in the house of commons, that no man knowes which way the major part will enclyne'.[9] In fact, the majority were conservative gentry, motivated in their actions by antipathy to the army. Already affronted by the unseating of their favourites Colonel Robert Lilburn and Major Packer, the army was deeply offended by parliament's actions of 12 April when Major General Boteler was attacked for his harsh treatment of those associated with royalists, actions which he claimed that he had undertaken on the orders of

Oliver Cromwell. Those who had undertaken similar acts, such as Fleetwood and Desborough, now feared for their own well-being. In this way did the parliament make it too easy for the republicans to blow on the junior officers' fears that the good old cause was everywhere being smothered. [10] Not only this but financial difficulties were also promoting instability, particularly amongst members of the army. The republican Haselrige had informed parliament that, 'The army are our children, they are our children, they came from us. We are bound to provide for them.' And, on another occasion he said that 'soldiers must not be in want. Necessity will make them break through stone walls.' Richard's decision to allow the General Council of the Officers to commence meeting on 2 April was thus a realistic attempt to appease the ambitions of the army rank and file, place some legitimate pressure upon parliament and thwart the brilliant filibustering of the republican MPs. It was, however, already clear to both the officers and rank and file of the army that they could recover neither their authority nor their arrears by constitutional method; to the army grandees it was becoming equally clear that unless they rode the wave of their subordinates' grievances they risked being swept away by it. Cashiered republican officers such as Okey and Overton but above all Lambert, still young and with a stature enhanced by his period in the political wilderness, were awaiting the call. Thus parliament was dissolved on 22 April, having succumbed to a 'confederated Triumvirate of republicans, sectaries and soldiers'. [11]

The destroyers of the Protectorate had no workable constitution with which to replace the Humble Petition and Advice. Over the course of the next year or so various devices were discussed. Some in the army proposed a senate but Haselrige and his followers would never accept such a curb on the authority of parliament. After all, they had just got rid of the Single Person. Nonetheless, that other leading republican, Vane, proved to be in favour. The consequent rivalry did much to damage the Rump. James Harrington, in his book *Oceana*, had proposed a bicameral rotating parliament and, although the scheme was much discussed, the fact that it would not exclude any of the competing parties rendered it unworkable. Not only had the Rump proved sterile but the army seemed divided, Fleetwood apparently wanting a Protectorate, Lambert an oligarchy and yet others a nominated assembly or some form of Commonwealth. There was no Putney Debate in 1658 and no realistic programme for settlement. The days of the *Heads the of Proposals*, of the *Remonstrance* and of the *Agreement* were long gone. The uneasy bedfellows of 22 April could produce no scheme that would satisfy each one of them, let

alone the traditional members of the political nation. The last two years of the 1650s thus witnessed a series of reactionary constitutional devices that did much to undermine stability.

It is usual for the efficacy of a regime to be enhanced by the reaction which a common enemy inspires. Booth's Rebellion of 1 August thus served to maintain the uneasy alliance between the army and the restored Rump Parliament. By the autumn of 1659, consequent to the enormously efficient repression of Booth by Lambert, the Rump had been undermined by conflict between the civil and military authorities. It had quickly become clear that the attitude of the Rump MPs had changed hardly at all from their previous period of power. In fact this was apparent even before the disturbances in Cheshire. For instance, although they made Fleetwood Commander-in-Chief as the army had requested, on 6 June they ruled that it would be the Speaker, with parliament's consent, who would sign army commissions. The lamentable failure of Booth at Winnington Bridge signalled the re-emergence not only of Lambert, but of the radical cause in general. This found some focus in the Derby petition of September which, amongst others, demanded that no officer be dismissed without court martial. In its treatment of this petition the Rump showed itself to be the army's enemy and thus, in October 1659, it met the same fate as in April 1653. Its removal by Lambert permitted the emergence of yet greater fissiparous tendencies.

Fracture lines in the republican camp had been becoming more obvious for some time. The effective repression of the royalist cause now served to hasten the fragmentation of the political republicans. In this way did the old allies, Haselrige and Vane, develop a yet deeper enmity, the latter opposing the restrictions which the former and the majority of the Rump had inserted in the commissions of the officers. Not only this but there was now an emerging rivalry between Fleetwood, whom the Venetian ambassador thought a man of 'unexampled frigidity', and Lambert, a man of 'spirit'. The army now suffered from a number of internal splits, most clearly between those who remained loyal to the restored Rump and those such as Lambert, Fleetwood and Desborough, who remained opposed to it. Into the former category stepped George Monck: ex-royalist, colleague of Cromwell at Dunbar, conqueror of the great Dutch admiral Maarten Tromp and lately commander of the Scottish forces. The political events of February 1660 (with which he is associated - notably the re-admission of the Secluded Members on the 21st of the month - were certainly facilitated by the rapid breakdown of the social and economic fabric.

Social and economic dislocation reached new depths in the

winter months of 1659-60. Now came the first taste of sheer anarchy: rising prices and falling trade helped to promote a taxpayers' strike. Troops were brought in to help but this only resulted in an anti-army riot in London on 5 December. Law enforcement was proving increasingly difficult. In the summer many JPs had refused to take an oath to the Commonwealth and had been dismissed with the inevitable result that the assizes had only one judge in commission. By November the courts of Common Law at Westminster had been forced to close mid-term because judges' commissions from parliament had expired. The rule of law was visibly in abeyance. [12] Moreover, the institutions of London were now populated by members of a new generation; men who had never worn a russet coat and wondered a great deal what their fathers had fought for. Little wonder that there erupted in the provinces campaigns for a 'free parliament'. Hutton suggests, however, that 'compared with the havoc of the civil wars, the disruptions of the later Interregnum were slight'. [13] Indeed, the consequences of the coup in October had been continuity rather than chaos. For instance, the Michaelmas quarter sessions went ahead as usual and the magistrates and corporations of towns still met. Nonetheless, and despite elements of normality, any regime associated with chaos on the scale that occurred in the last winter of the Interregnum was unlikely to survive.

An earnest desire to restore social and political normality was not the only motivation of George Monck. The delay between his declaration for the deposed Rump Parliament and his advance towards the English border on 5 December has been argued to be evidence of proto-royalist sympathies. There were, however, a number of reasons for his procrastination. It was necessary to undertake a purge of those elements of his army who disagreed with his declaration. Some loyalty, as is usual, was bought. In the year 1659-60 a total of £72,000 was coming in during the last three months of 1659, and in August Monck had been granted £20,000 by the Council of State. He also had to be certain that his action was evincing support south of the border. In this respect his example was proving inspirational: on 13 December 1659 Vice-Admiral Lawson declared for the Rump and on 16 December he sailed into the Thames. Eight days later Haselrige was on the road for London with the garrison of Portsmouth which had also declared for the Purged Parliament. Even Lord Fairfax was persuaded to come out of retirement and was to muster a force on his old stamping ground, Marston Moor. The immediate effect of Monck's decision was to move the country to the edge of another civil war. Lambert was provoked to march north with a force of about 8,000 men. Badly paid, a long way from home and faced with the onset of

winter, this force soon began to melt away. Perhaps the greatest explanation, however, for Monck's otherwise suspicious delay is that the deposed political republicans sent no evidence of their support: the silence was deafening. Only upon receipt of their endorsement of his actions did Monck begin to move south. Even before his crossing into England, on 26 December, the Rump had reassembled and Fleetwood commented that 'God had spat in their [the army's] faces.' For the first time in twelve years it now appeared that the Commonwealthsmen had real control over the army.

All of this ignores a rather important point. There is little evidence to suggest that Monck disliked the usurpation of government by the military for he had supported the army when it had ejected parliaments in 1653 and April 1659. Monck had been prepared to fight against Lambert not because he approved of rule by the Rump but because he feared the religious radicalism that was associated with rule by the army. It seems likely that the greatest determinant of Monck's action was his urgent desire to save the Church. [14] By his expulsion of the Rump on 13 October 1659 Lambert had irrevocably associated himself with the radicals; the restoration of the Purged Parliament would therefore, at least in the short term, appear to be a bulwark against religious radicalism. After all, it had refused to abolish the tithe. Monck's declaration for the Rump was thus a reaction to the religious chaos that now seemed apparent to all. The 'Quaker terror' was also increasingly prevalent and dynamic in Scotland. As one writer recorded, they 'aboundit and drew themselves in companyis throw the cuntrie without controlment'. [15] A consideration of religious motivation thus helps explain the apparently precipitate urgency of Monck's reaction to the coup of October. The restored Rump, however, had been associated with the most prolific and prominent of all radicals, the Quakers. Possibly owing to the influence of Vane, parts of the militia were controlled by Quakers whilst over in Ireland Henry Cromwell had been replaced with a commission of five radicals who went on to appoint a number of Quaker and Baptist JPs. All of this served to create an atmosphere akin to the Popish Plot fear, manifest most especially in the early years of the Long Parliament. The occasion of a Fifth Monarchist meeting in West Sussex was sufficient to make a royalist agent daily expect a massacre. [16] In Oxford, when the strength of the wind lifted the tiles off St Martin's tower the congregation believed that the sects had risen. The decision to retain the tithe had served to enhance the efficacy of the Quaker movement for they now organised themselves with an efficiency and sense of purpose that could only make the army men jealous. Quaker gatherings in southern England now began to

benefit from shared funds and common records. Reasoned reflection would suggest that the restoration of the Rump would be insufficient to restore religious harmony. In fact, it was increasingly unlikely that it would be able to restore any sense of normality.

The Rump's attempts to do so, or rather their absence, alienated their greatest protector. In the famous letter of 11 February, shortly before the readmission of the Secluded Members, Monck scolded the Rump for encouraging the demands of the sectaries. It would be false, however, to suggest that Monck was working to a blueprint that dictated that he should save the purged House or restore the monarchy. What he did desire was political and economic, but especially religious, stabilisation - if the former could not provide this, then the latter was the other realistic choice. The restored House undertook a substantial purge of the army in January 1660: three eighths of the entire corps were replaced, half of the field officers and two thirds of the captains. A similar process was applied to the parliament. Those who had been removed were replaced by conservatives and as such it now appeared that reform and the cause of the army would indeed be ill-served. Moreover, despite declarations to the contrary, the suspicion grew that the Rump intended to perpetuate itself beyond 7 May. It was increasingly clear that rather than act as a bulwark against radicalism the very intransigence and conservatism of the House was promoting it. In removing the chains and posts which the City had set up in protest at the restoration of the Rump it became clear to Monck and his men that they were contributing to that intransigence and that they were being asked to defend a cause with which they possessed no emotional sympathy. As Hutton has written, 'it seems reasonable to suppose that the whole corps, including its commander, shared neither the past experiences nor the ideals of the Commonwealthmen, and therefore failed to support their policies.' [17] In February 1660 Monck therefore acted to secure the re-admission of those MPs secluded by Colonel Pride in 1648, an act that is often perceived as the moment when the Stuart Restoration became an inevitability.

Eikon Basilike, a volume which purported to contain the prayers and meditations of the dead king, proved to be a runaway best seller throughout the 1650s; Milton's rebuttal of it, *Eikonoklastes*, never made it to a second edition. This perhaps suggests that rather than seeking to explain reasons for the Restoration it would be more appropriate to attempt an explanation of why the Interregnum lasted so long. Much of the vigour of the regimes of the 1650s was sustained to a very significant degree by the requirement of fighting against a greater common enemy, whether this be Ireland, Scotland or Spain or some internal

malignancy such as Papists or cavaliers. By the end of 1658 it was increasingly clear that the former was lessening and the latter was insignificant. The failure of Booth's Rebellion made manifest the extraordinary weakness of the royalist cause and unleashed the self-destructing forces of the Interregnum. In this way, paradoxically, the very weakness of the royalist cause hastened the return of the monarchy. The Interregnum simply imploded. It has been said of Monck that 'he would never have betrayed the Protectorate, but when its destroyers divided their own supporters - officers, radical Independents, sectaries, Commonwealthmen - with such meaningless quarrels that the soldiers threatened to make a ring for their officers to fight in, he decided he must act.' [18] The recrudescence of religious radicals, particularly the spectacular growth of the Quaker movement, might have become the force which held the processes of government together. That it did not do so was because government had come to be associated with such radicals, whether this be the Rump, the Committee of Safety or the rule by Commission in Ireland. 'Quakers...were so aggressive and successful that mere tolerance on the part of the government appeared to be a betrayal to conservatives.' [19] Increasingly reactionary forms of government, which appeared tainted and subverted by the radicals, eventually produced the biggest reaction of all, the return of the Stuart Monarchy.

1. R Hutton, *The Restoration* (Oxford, 1987), p. 120.
2. Quoted in The Open University, *Seventeenth-Century England: A Changing Culture. Block 8. The Restoration* (Milton Keynes, 1981), p. 8.
3. J R Jones, *Court and Country* (London, 1978), p. 131.
4. B Williams, *Elusive Settlement* (London, 1984), p. 115.
5. Quoted in R W Harris, *Clarendon and the English Revolution* (London, 1983), p. 259.
6. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 259.
7. Quoted in A H Woolrych, 'The Good Old Cause and the Fall of the Protectorate', *Cambridge Historical Journal* 13 (1957), p. 140.
8. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 139.
9. Quoted in G B Nourse, 'Richard Cromwell's House of Commons', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 60 (1977-8), p. 98.
10. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 146.

11. Prynne, quoted in A H Woolrych, 'The Collapse of the Great Rebellion', *History Today* 8 (August 1958), pp. 606-7.
12. *ibid.*
13. Hutton, *Restoration*, p. 83.
14. See B Reay, *The Quakers and the English Revolution* (London, 1985).
15. Quoted in Hutton, *Restoration*, p. 71.
16. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 53.
17. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 94.
18. Woolrych, 'Collapse of the Great Rebellion', p. 615.
19. Hutton, *Restoration*, p. 53.

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OBITUARIES

MAURICE ASHLEY

Maurice Ashley, a former editor of the *Listener* who has died aged eighty-seven, was a prolific historian with a special interest in the seventeenth century. He made his reputation as an expert on Cromwell and the Protectorate. As Chairman, then President, of The Cromwell Association after the Second World War, he was always quick to leap to the defense of the Protector. Cromwell's rule, he pointed out, was not only a period during which the foundations of Britain's commercial and maritime empire were laid; it was also a time when the country was respected and feared in Europe - whereas Charles II subsequently reduced it to the status of a hired dependency of Louis XIV. And while Ashley was not sentimental about the regime of the major-generals, he insisted that Cromwell was genuinely committed to religious toleration.

Ashley also produced biographies of Charles II (in 1971) and James II (in 1978) which were models of fairness and balance. If he never quite subscribed to Carlyle's opinion that history is merely a series of biographies of great men, equally - as a writer who generally kept clear of academe - he never allowed himself to become bogged down in the minutiae of economics and statistics. His work was refreshingly free of axe-grinding.

The son of Sir Percy Ashley, who had taught history at the London School of Economics before a distinguished career in the Board of Trade, Maurice Percy Ashley was born on 4 September 1907 and educated at St Paul's School and New College, Oxford, where he took a First in Modern History. His tutor at New College was David Ogg, who helped to concentrate his attention on to the seventeenth century. From Ashley's DPhil thesis there eventually emerged his first book, *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate* (1934).

His first job, which he held from 1929 to 1933, was as research assistant to Sir Winston Churchill, then engaged in writing the biography of his ancestor, the 1st Duke of Marlborough. 'Give me the facts', Churchill would say, 'and I will twist them the way I want to suit my argument.' Ashley was not always in sympathy with his master's views - in 1939 he himself would publish a biography of Marlborough - but he conceived a deep admiration for the man.

In 1989, when Churchill's behaviour as a husband and employer was under attack, Ashley sprang to his defence. 'He

treated me with utmost consideration, almost as an equal', he wrote to *The Sunday Telegraph*. 'Every evening after dinner, Winston played games of backgammon with his wife. He consulted her on public and private matters and frequently took her advice. In my experience he was neither rude nor greedy. He was indeed a wonderful man.'

After leaving Churchill, Ashley worked for four years for the *Manchester Guardian* as a leader writer, and then joined the *Times* as a sub-editor in the foreign department. At the outbreak of the Second World War he was editor of the British Council's overseas publication, *Britain Today*. In 1940, Ashley enlisted in the Grenadier Guards; subsequently he served in the Intelligence Corps, and was demobilised as a major.

Having found a niche as deputy editor of the *Listener*, Ashley produced a stream of historical works: *Louis XIV and the Greatness of France* (1946), *John Wildman: Plotter and Postmaster* (1947), *Mr President* (1947) and *England in the Seventeenth Century* (1952). He had already published a biography of Oliver Cromwell in 1937. Now came *Cromwell's Generals* (1954), *The Greatness of Oliver Cromwell* (1957), *Oliver Cromwell and the Puritan Revolution* (1958) and *Oliver Cromwell and His World* (1972). He saw Cromwell as an essentially conservative dictator - not so much a Huntingdonshire farmer nursing economic grievances as a Christian gentleman who had felt the essence of his religion threatened.

Inevitably Ashley's assumption of the *Listener's* editorship in 1958 slowed down his historical output although he still managed to publish a major general history, *Great Britain to 1688* (1961). This was followed by *The Stuarts in Love* (1963), *Life in Stuart England* (1964) and *The Glorious Revolution of 1688* (1966). Meanwhile the *Listener's* circulation fell sharply as the expansion of the Sunday newspapers took readers from the weeklies.

Ashley left in 1968 and for two years was research fellow at Loughborough University of Technology. Once more the books came thick and fast - *Churchill as Historian* (1968), *A History of Europe 1648-1815* (1973) and *The Age of Absolutism 1648-1775* (1974). He even stepped out of his period to produce *The Life and Times of King John* (1972) and *The Life and Times of William I* (1973). He was back in his element with *A Concise History of the Civil War* (1975), *Rupert of the Rhine* (1976), *General Monk* (1977), *The House of Stuart* (1980), *Charles I and Oliver Cromwell* (1987) and *The Battle of Naseby and the Fall of Charles I* (1992).

Ashley was appointed C.B.E. in 1978. He married first, in 1935, Phyllis Griffith, who died in 1987; they had a son and a

daughter. He married secondly, in 1988, Patricia Entract.

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[Maurice Ashley (1907-1994) was President of The Cromwell Association 1961-77 and a Vice-President from 1977 until his death. Despite his many other commitments, he worked tirelessly for the Association and addressed members on many occasions. His most recent address, delivered at the 1984 Cromwell Day service, is reprinted in this edition of *Cromwelliana*. This obituary first appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* on 5 October 1994 and is reproduced here by kind permission.]

ROY BATTCOCK

The funeral service for Major R.D. Battcock, M.B.E. was held on 5 April 1993 at Golders Green Crematorium. Many friends and colleagues from the guiding profession joined his family to say farewell to one of the Founding Fathers of guiding in London and Great Britain. The secular service celebrated a full life, and was idiosyncratic enough to have pleased Roy, ever the individualist. Amongst those who spoke, Commander Pat Patterson and Gerry Lord acknowledged his contributions to our profession. Roy's contributions should not be forgotten or underestimated; they were fundamental to the reputation enjoyed today by all those who wear the Blue Badge. We can be very proud that he was a founder member of A.P.T.G.

Educated at Harrow, after some years in the book trade and armed services, Roy found his niche in life in 1951, and joined the first generation of guides to qualify with the British Tourist Authority, then in its infancy as the B.T.H.A. He was a founder member of the Guild of Guide Lecturers, and its Chairman for twenty-one years, during which time he worked tirelessly and with distinction on behalf of the profession and its membership. With the creation of the London Tourist Board, he worked alongside Oswald Clarke as course tutor and examiner for many years, and in those years the high standards expected of today's guides were established. His M.B.E. was awarded for services to tourism.

His knowledge was immense, and was generously shared with anyone who approached him. There is scarcely a road or a by-way he had not explored by bicycle before 'tourism' had been

invented. His interests and enthusiasms were wide and varied, but his love of art was paramount. His inspirational lectures for the National Gallery in the 1970s set a standard which few will ever equal. His other enthusiasms - where can I begin? Richard III, Cromwell, Hadrian's Wall which he walked every winter, and Highgate Cemetery (where he was, for me, the definitive Guide) came as part and parcel of his profession; he was a passionate supporter of any cause concerned with the struggle against injustice and prejudice. With quiet but determined pressure he opened his annual Goodenough Trust Lecture tours for future leaders from South Africa to black students; homeless people were made welcome guests (often to the consternation of his family) and it is typical that, at an age when many people turn in on themselves, he became a member of the League Against Cruel Sports.

Even Roy's closest friends could not have described him as a practical man. He was supported, spoiled, scolded, and always staunchly protected by his wife Jackie, one of the Great European Tour Managers, whom he married in 1951. Her devotion to him, particularly during this last difficult year, has been simply heroic.

Roy did not go quietly. He steadfastly raged against the dying of the light. There was, for him, still so much more to see, and know, and do. I marvel at the scope and intellectual challenge of my last conversation with him in December 1992, and I hope that we, the beneficiaries of his generosity and energy, will acknowledge our debt, and create a suitable memorial to him.

[Roy Battcock (1907-1993) was one of the longest serving and most distinguished members of the council of The Cromwell Association; for many years he also served as social secretary of the Association. This obituary, focussing upon his influential role within the Guide Lecturer profession, was written by Elizabeth Shallcross, a close colleague from that profession.]

PETER DIX

Peter Dix should have been one of the first members of the Sealed Knot. Not only was he actively involved in the arrangements for the exhibition at the Castle Inn, Edgehill in October 1967 that gave rise to the foundation of the Society the next year, but he was also one of Peter Young's research assistants and war-gaming circle. Indeed, whenever subsequently in seventeenth century

costume, Peter always wore the original, pre-Knot and slightly *risqué* Order of the Bear. Despite these credentials, his descent from Captain Humphrey Dix, in the Earl of Essex's Army of 1642, and his own undoubted interest in the English civil war, Peter's instinctive parliamentary sympathies kept him away from what was, at first, intended to be a purely royalist society. It was not until 1983 that the Captain General finally persuaded him to join.

Born of a military family, Peter served initially in the Royal Horse Guards (significantly that part of the Household Cavalry claiming descent from Colonel Unton Crook's regiment of the New Model Army), where he claimed the distinction of being the shortest man in the regiment. After passing through Sandhurst, a spell of commissioned service followed before he left the army to commence what proved to be a highly successful partnership in Direct Mail with his wife Elizabeth.

On joining the Sealed Knot, Peter quickly became an enthusiastic and energetic part of the establishment, organising regimental dinners and training musters, serving on the commentary team, elected as a Yeoman, but in particular establishing the Edgehill Battle Museum in the Estate Yard at Farnborough Hall. From small beginnings in 1985, this has become an important feature in the continuing cause of promoting interest in the history of the English civil war. Under Peter's direction, a dedicated band of volunteers have achieved there a remarkable sense of period and an ambience that is possibly far more important than the exhibits themselves. Sadly, Peter's death comes at a critical time for the museum, faced as it is with the desperate necessity of finding new premises.

Peter had only recently been promoted to the rank of major and appointed to command Sir William Waller's Lifeguard of Horse. This last command was something that gave him particular pleasure - he was very proud of his parliamentary heritage and was looking forward to leading the regiment into its New Model persona next year.

Although a long-established member of the Honourable Artillery Company, it was only in recent years that Peter had become involved with the Company's Light Cavalry Troop. As may be expected, he threw himself wholeheartedly into its activities, regularly making the journey to Armoury House or Maidenhead to attend parades and mounted training and encouraging other members of the Knot to take advantage of the facilities of the Troop's Saddle Club. Several of our present riders owe their prowess on the battlefield to their experience on the Skill at Arms course. It is therefore particularly appropriate that the cavalry of both armies have decided to celebrate his memory by the institute of

a challenge cup in that very field.

Peter Young always advised us never to go soldiering with miserable, gloomy b*****ds; Peter Dix was, I am sure, the sort of companion that he preferred, always cheerful, generous, full of boyish enthusiasm, but better than that, capable of making others cheerful also. Peter was a man of many parts, of which the Sealed Knot was, in truth, but one. It is in that context, however, that we shall remember a lively, entertaining friend; for me, there is a favourite motto which seems to encapsulate Peter's whole attitude to life - 'Dum Vivimus, Vivamus!' - which, the times being what they are, had better be translated - 'While we live, let us live.'

[Peter Dix (1936-94) was a long-serving and active member of The Cromwell Association; many members will recall that on the occasion of our 1990 AGM, Mr Dix lectured on the battle of Edgehill as we visited the battlefield and then welcomed us to his Edgehill Battle Museum at nearby Farnborough Hall. This obituary, focussing on his role within the Sealed Knot, first appeared last autumn in the Sealed Knot's own journal, *Orders of the Day*, and is reproduced here by kind permission.]

CROMWELL DAY 1984

by Maurice Ashley

When, in 1653, Oliver Cromwell became Lord Protector of England, Scotland and Ireland, he was a comparatively young man, in contrast to Churchill, Adenauer, de Gaulle, Franco or Reagan, all of whom were heads of state in their seventies or eighties. Oliver had two serious illnesses before he became Protector and the strain upon him of the office was obvious. He not only had to supervise the day-to-day government of three countries, but to negotiate with foreign ambassadors and maintain contact with foreign sovereigns. He made long speeches to three parliaments; and he was also commander-in-chief directing large armies and navies. Naturally much of this work could be delegated, but his was the ultimate responsibility for everything. He had only one Secretary of State - fortunately the hard-working John Thurloe.

It is constructive to reflect on the requirements of the two written constitutions by which Cromwell governed. The first - the Instrument of Government of 1653 - provided that the Protector should with the advice and consent of his Council of State hold correspondence with foreign kings, princes and states and 'also with the consent of the major part of his Council have the power of war and peace'. In the second constitution - the Humble Petition and Advice of 1657 - it was laid down that the standing forces of the Commonwealth were to be disposed of by the Protector with the consent of the two Houses of parliament (the Commons and 'the Other House') and in the intervals of parliaments by the advice of the Privy Council (as the Council of State had become). And in each constitution the size of his revenue was prescribed.

In the United States of America, which, like the Cromwellian Protectorate, is governed under a written constitution, the second article provides that the executive power shall be exercised by the President, that he shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy and that he can make treaties with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. So there is certainly a marked similarity between the duties undertaken by Oliver Cromwell under a written constitution and those assigned to the President of the United States by the enduring constitution drawn up in Philadelphia in 1787. No-one denies that the United States was and is a republic. One can therefore argue that under Cromwell England, Scotland and Ireland formed a single republic.

The members of the Protectorate parliaments when they met could be extremely obstreperous. Many were not greatly interested in the welfare of the country at large. Essentially they were constitution-mongers. The republicans among them claimed that Oliver had abandoned the 'Good Old Cause'. But they were not themselves democrats. Their ideal rather was an aristocratic or Platonic republic - a government of wise men (like themselves): the sort of government, indeed, of which Alexander Hamilton would have approved. Before the Protectorate was established, in the Rump Parliament - what you might call a select assembly - these dedicated republicans were not very successful in carrying out necessary reforms, or in providing a settlement or maintaining order: and after Cromwell's death they promoted an anarchy which ironically led to the restoration of the Stuarts in 1660.

Looking back, then, to the situation of some 330 years ago it is sad to think that in Oliver Cromwell's last years he was unable to come to terms with his two parliaments chiefly because a small number of theoretical republicans condemned him as being a dictator. In modern terms he was certainly no dictator. So far as I know, he only overruled his Council of State once: that was when

he wanted it to agree to the readmission of the Jews who had been expelled from England in the Middle Ages.

Another comparison that can be made between Cromwell's Protectorate and the Presidency of the United States is that very few Presidents, except Franklin D. Roosevelt, have been able to carry out striking reforms during their first terms of office. It has often been claimed that Cromwell did nothing constructive or enduring during his five years as Lord Protector. However, four things at least spring to mind. One was the ordinances for ensuring that ministers in the loose national church were competent and fit for their offices. Cromwell was more concerned about the moral and pastoral quality of the clergy than about the precise nature of the theology they preached. This meant in effect that there was more religious toleration in Cromwellian England than had ever existed before. Consequently nonconformity was so strongly entrenched that it could not be destroyed at or after the Restoration. Another ordinance provided for a political union of England and Scotland, which James VI and I had so much desired. This lapsed at the Restoration and the union would not be completed for another fifty years but a start had been made. Then Cromwell accepted the first act of parliament that established a national postal service, which if not quicker, was somewhat more reliable than it is today. There was also the ordinance that modified the absurdly severe penalties imposed on poor men who could not pay their debts. This sort of reform lay close to Cromwell's heart. He once said, 'the law as it is now constituted serves only to maintain the lawyers and to encourage the rich to oppress the poor'. But he had neither the time nor the opportunity to reform the law as he would have liked. In any case his republican opponents in parliament were more enthusiastic about hamstringing the Protectorate than about achieving reforms of any kind.

Whatever reforms Cromwell failed to bring about - and we must remember that at that time reform was not thought to be the essence of government - and whatever political difficulties he may have failed to overcome, in his brief spell of office he succeeded in maintaining law and order, in upholding liberty of conscience and of thought and laid the foundations of the first British Empire. In this and in so much else, Oliver Cromwell proved himself indeed a great man.

[This address was delivered on 3 September 1984 at the Cromwell Day service by Dr Maurice Ashley, a past President of The Cromwell Association and latterly one of our Vice Presidents, who died last year.]

CROMWELLIAN BRITAIN VIII

UXBRIDGE, MIDDLESEX

by Jane A. Mills

The town of Uxbridge is located in the London Borough of Hillingdon close to the River Colne, on the border with Buckinghamshire in the north-west part of Middlesex. It is easily reachable by road via the A40 or by the underground Metropolitan and Piccadilly lines, which both terminate at Uxbridge station in the centre of the town.

The county of Middlesex has natural borders on three sides made up of the rivers Lea, Colne and Thames, and is surrounded by the large counties of Essex, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Surrey. It is the second smallest county and in 1965 due to the London Borough Act it ceased to exist as a county administrative area. The county has always been important due to its proximity to London and in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries royalty (especially Henry VIII and Elizabeth I) and nobility had residences here which meant that they were within easy reach of both court and parliament without having to cross the River Thames.

The Domesday Book of 1086 gives us a clear record of the area with a list of landowners and a concise inventory of terrain, buildings and livestock. Prior to this period, records are sketchy; the only real traces of Roman occupation are the three important roads which dissect the county - Ermine Street, Watling Street (Edgware Road) and Thames Street (Bath Road). We know the area was populated by Middle Saxons, the origin of the name 'Middlesex'. The placenames are Saxon and through archaeology there are traces of a dyke in Harrow and moats and camps elsewhere. Some members of the Lincolnshire tribe called 'Wixan' set up home in the area controlling the vital crossing point at the River Colne, the origin of Uxbridge; this was politically important to the Saxons who shared a border with the Mercians.

In the years which followed the Norman Conquest, Uxbridge continued to grow in size and importance. In 1179 it was granted its first market charter, in 1281 an annual fair on St Margaret's Day (20 July) and thirteen years later a second fair (Michaelmas) and market charter (Mondays). Uxbridge began to prosper with increases in population; the surrounding areas sent their produce to Uxbridge. It soon became the service centre for the milling of corn - two and a half mills were documented in the Domesday Book and by the nineteenth century thirteen mills were

in operation at its height.

In the sixteenth century Uxbridge was recognised as the first stopping point on a traveller's route to and from London. Many inns were built at about this time to cater for the increase in the transitory population. During the seventeenth century Uxbridge's fortunes fluctuated largely due to its dependence on the corn market and inns, both of which suffered when there were poor harvests or when plague struck, as it did in 1625, 1636 and 1665, travellers avoiding the town.

The Lordship of the Manor was held by the Countess of Derby who was the patron of both Spenser, author of *The Faerie Queene*, and John Milton, who became Secretary for Foreign Tongues under the republican government. She had the legal right to collect tolls from the town of Uxbridge, which she did up until the start of the civil war. During 1630 there were signs that the population were not happy with this situation, believing they should be beneficiaries of the market tolls. It was after attacks on her toll collectors by armed mobs that the Countess sought legal action and the ultimate threat of the Star Chamber, which frightened the inhabitants into submission. In October 1633 they joined the Countess at a banquet. In the foyer of the Civic Centre the events are illustrated in a mural.

During the civil war and Commonwealth the population took the opportunity to collect the tolls as the then Lord of the Manor, Lord Chandos, the Countess's grandson, was a royalist and had fled abroad. After the Restoration his successor resumed collecting tolls until 1695, when the right was purchased by a group of residents led by a grandson of the Countess's protagonist.

At the end of the High Street on the Oxford Road stands the inn called The Crown and Treaty House. It faces the entrance to the Highbridge Industrial Estate and is opposite two very modern buildings of the 1990s. Above the entrance a legend is written, 'Ancient Treaty House where the illfated Charles I held the memorable, but unsuccessful treaty with his Parliament in January 1645'.

The building was then two thirds larger and was originally known as Place House when it was built in the early sixteenth century. During the eighteenth century with the expansion of the coaching trade through Uxbridge part of the house was demolished and the Oxford Road was built through the gardens. The house then became a coaching inn with stabling for forty horses. The interior panelling which can be seen in the inn today is original. In 1924 it was removed and sold to an American businessman who used it to furnish his office in the Empire State Building (in the 1920s and 1930s there was a renewed interest in wood panelling and several

designers were using it in their buildings). In 1953 the wood panelling was returned as a coronation gift to Elizabeth II who had it reinstalled in the inn.

Uxbridge was a parliamentary stronghold and an obvious venue for the peace negotiations as it was on the Oxford Road and suitable for the royalist representatives from Oxford and the parliamentary commissioners from London. Each side was represented by thirty-two men, accommodated on both sides of the High Street. The George Inn was the headquarters for the parliamentary commissioners and they also took over all the buildings on the north side. The south side, except for one house, was reserved for the royalist commissioners with their headquarters at The Crown Inn.

The negotiations were doomed to failure from the outset due to the attitude of Charles I and his view that he was above and beyond earthly laws. He believed he was put there by God and therefore subjects must obey their king without question. Sir Edward Nicholas, who was Secretary of State and one of the royalist commissioners, was urged by the king at every opportunity to remind the parliamentary commissioners that they were 'arrant rebelles and that their end must be damnation, ruine, and infamy, except they repented...'. On 4 March a delegation was sent to the City of London to report on the failure of the negotiations and to secure an advance of £80,000 for the New Model ordinance. Speaker Lenthall said that 'this army, under God, is the principal means to preserve us in safety', and the diarist D'Ewes wrote 'no way to safety now but the sword'.

In June and July 1647 the New Model Army made their way to Uxbridge and set up their headquarters (a garrison was maintained here until 1651). Fairfax appointed Cromwell and nine others to discuss with parliamentary commissioners at the Katherine Wheele Inn *The Humble Remonstrance (The Humble Representation of the General Council of the New Model Army)*, a document proclaiming the army as the fourth estate of the realm with proposals for its own maintenance. Cromwell stayed at The Crown Inn, which had been the royalist headquarters during the peace negotiations of 1645. The House of Commons chose to ignore the army's demands and therefore failed to prevent the army's subsequent occupation of London.

During the reign of Edward VI Uxbridge had become Protestant and managed to remain so despite pressure from Roman Catholic Mary, who had three Protestants burnt at the stake as an example to the residents. Several puritan ministers fled here after the Restoration, among them Oliver Cromwell's chaplain Hezekiah Woodward, who had been Vicar of Bray. Until his death in 1675

he was the leader of the Independents who secretly worshipped in private houses. They later became known as Congregationalists and their meeting house was built in 1716. The Friends Meeting House on the corner of Belmont Road and York Road dates from 1817 and replaced the original 1692 Meeting House on this site. The town has been the home of Quakers since 1658. During the eighteenth century Uxbridge was again in the forefront of a non-conformist revival when wealthy Quaker families arrived, among them the Hulls, who were related to Elizabeth Fry. John Wesley came and preached in Uxbridge and it was during this period that some of the religious buildings were replaced.

The sixteenth century Queen's Head and The King's Arms coaching inns can still be seen, and a number of other old buildings survive in the town. In the main, however, Uxbridge had changed a great deal since Cromwellian times.

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In 1994 nothing concentrating on Oliver Cromwell came my way, but in the nature of things and the ubiquity of the man himself, he turned up in a number of items, monographs or surveys attempting to recreate the world whose impact, co-operating with his genes, moulded his character and outlook.

The six decades during which Oliver lived and worked are well-considered by Keith Wrightson in "'Sorts of People" in Tudor and Stuart England', in *The Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society and Politics in England 1550-1800*, edited by Jonathan Barry and Chris Brooks (Longman, 1994, £40 cloth, £12.99 pbk). Wrightson takes as his starting point Cromwell's claim, 'a nobleman, a gentleman, a yeoman; the distinction of these, that is a good interest of the nation and a great one', setting it within a discussion of 'a social structure undergoing profound change...one reality fading slowly, the other stirring and quickening to life', each with its own vocabulary of social differentiation. This article illuminates the complexities, local and national, that lay behind such glib phrases as 'the better sort' or 'the meaner sort'. 'Middling sort' seems to have come into its own during the pamphlet wars of the 1640s and 1650s and was not unassociated with questions of political allegiance in a formative - and destructive - age. Other essays in this volume take up *inter alia* apprenticeship, the professions and case studies of urban society in London and Colchester. The Introduction by Jonathan Barry contemplates the historiography of the diverse approaches to social and cultural processes so far made. Historians have been as healthily argumentative as were contemporaries.

Religion runs through every feature of the early modern era. Kenneth Fincham has edited for Macmillan's long-running 'Problems in Focus' series a diverse collection of studies of *The Early Stuart Church 1603-42* (Macmillan, 1993, £40 cloth, £12.50 pbk), that church in which Cromwell grew up and which had somewhat - much or little - to do with the civil wars. The editor rather regrets that the search for causes of the conflict has dominated to the point of distorting the proper study of pre-war religion. If religion did have 'an integral role in 1642', Fincham opines that 'we must acknowledge it embodies a host of secular concerns and values'. That seems unexceptionable. Among his contributors, Nicholas Tyacke would rank William Laud as one of the greatest archbishops since the Reformation. Many historians might share this assessment and, like Tyacke, not imply by that approval of his impact upon religion or anything else. Peter Lake affirms 'the rich texture' of 'the Laudian style', which was at once innovative and conservative with intellectual roots in the reign of Elizabeth. Judith Maltby's thoughtful juxtaposition of 'parishioners and the prayer book' points out that innovations generally could drive people out of the church as well as inducing respect for the Book of Common Prayer. The Elizabethan *via media* - if such it was

- did not, according to Peter White, disappear during 'the personal government of Charles I'. Rather, what the 1630s saw was not 'novelty' of policy but sheer vigour of enforcement of what was already there. Unfortunately Laud's involvement in secular policy, which it is suggested did not amount to much, meant that his religious activity became inextricably ravelled up into the politics of the Caroline court, with disastrous results. Every article in this stimulating volume underlines the fact that whether or not the coming troubles are best characterised as 'England's wars of religion', faith and worship had - and would have further - diverse pressures upon the generations that would endure war in the 1640s and a protracted search for settlement during the Interregnum and Restoration.

Peering ahead, we should also glance back to what happened in the sixteenth century. Two enterprising volumes by single authors offer some help: *The Early Tudor Church and Society 1485-1529* by J.A.F. Thomson (Longman, 1993, £40 cloth, £17.99 pbk), and *English Reformations* - note the plural - bearing as subtitle 'Religion, Politics and Society under the Tudors' by Christopher Haigh (Oxford UP, 1994, £35 cloth, £12.99 pbk). Exploring a dozen topics - worship and preaching, the church and lay power and more - Thomson displays a church in England on the eve of the Henrician disturbance, stolid, at ease - perhaps too much at ease - with itself, a vital social and political as well as devout spiritual institution. 1529 assumes significance as inaugurating rapid changes unthinkable when Henry VIII had succeeded to the throne and married his elder brother's 'relict'. Haigh devotes nearly a third of a substantial tome to Thomson's period but goes on to the death of Henry's younger daughter. He is, of course, well-known, indeed notorious, for forthright 'revisionist' views and wastes no time in getting down to expunging accepted views of what happened to and in the church under the Tudors. Basically this new version sets out to 'integrate the dynamics of high politics with the variety of local responses', something surely worth doing for all movements at all periods. Looking at 'resisters' as well as reformers, losers as well as victors, he finds more of the former than the latter. Wrestling with contrary arguments, more directly in an incisive bibliographical survey than in the body of his text, he cheerfully pushes forward the debate over the nature and extent of religious transformation. He sees the early Tudor church as 'unchallenged' - though surely not unchallengeable - and argues that at the death of Elizabeth I 'the Tudor Reformation' - note the singular - had yet 'to replace a Catholic England by a Protestant England'. Rather, there was a divided country in which 'the goldy', evidently an unappealing lot, felt they were still being smothered not by the rags but by the untorn tissues of popery, symbolised perhaps in a clean linen surplice. This is powerful stuff, but it leaves us wondering when was - if there was - a Reformation. If Fincham and company start their investigations too late, Haigh breaks his off too soon.

Moving away from movements to individuals, we encounter a

diverse trio - Edward Mountagu, 1st Earl of Sandwich, John Taylor the plebeian scribbler and the last Protector, Richard Cromwell. *Cromwell's Earl* (Harper Collins, 1994, £20) is Richard Ollard's rather inept title for his life of Sandwich, who got his earldom from Charles II as one reward for clinching the Restoration by bringing the fleet over to 'the true sovereign' and bringing him back home in the soon renamed *Naseby*. The admiral has twelve years and 180 pages (out of 260) to go in this elegant and kindly biography. Certainly he had served parliament and the Cromwells well - Oliver he knew from his own boyhood - because the Protectorate offered what was to him 'the essential element of monarchy'. Its collapse left him no alternative to offset 'blood and confusion' but Charles Stuart. Happily for him George Monck, another general-at-sea-and-land, came to the same conclusion. Ollard delineates a man of parts - diplomat, Fellow of the Royal Society, courtier as well as naval person. He quotes John Evelyn - 'incomparable...prudent as well as valiant...learned in the mathematics, in musique...infinitely ingenious' - clearly the tribute of one virtuoso to another. Mountagu's humanity extended to some instrumentality in saving John Milton from the revengers in 1660 and it may well be that favourable remarks by Clarendon about Cromwell and Blake owed something to Mountagu, whose naval career they had fostered.

Ollard's sympathetic portrayal is reinforced in Bernard Capp's *Cromwell's Navy* (Oxford UP, 1989, still in print at £16.95 pbk), which demonstrates Mountagu's concern after 1660 that the experienced seamen of the Interregnum fleet should not be cast aside, but kept on for their own sake and for the true interests of the navy and the country. Capp has now sailed into inland waters with a survey of *The World of John Taylor the Water-Poet* (Oxford UP, 1994, £25). Taylor was a London boatman with a pen as vigorous as his oars. During nearly half a century he poured out tracts, pamphlets, poems - Capp lists over a hundred items as 'extant', under titles such as *Taylor's Pastoral* and *Taylor's Travels and Circular Perambulation*. He was not a modest man, though his talents were, but he made up the deficiency by determination, cheek and the unabashed manipulation of causes, not least of which was himself. He could be tedious, but much of his output was enlivened by keen observation, wit and humour and by the unremitting certainties of his opinions. Emphatically royalist, he was a loyal 'orthodox' Anglican - that anachronistic appellation for which there seems no generally acceptable alternative. Lacking formal education, and very conscious of it, Taylor had a hard road to tread as a writer, but drive and showmanship pushed him along it. He was 'a character', known and in some measure admired for it. Yet few of his works have ever been reprinted, apart from in three volumes put out by the Spenser Society in the late nineteenth century. Capp presents us with a just appreciation of the writer and the man, set firmly in context, giving a proper weight to his confrontation of the social, political and religious issues of his times, and persuasively exposing the

complexities of personality and values that informed his forthrightness, pointing to 'the conflicts that might rage' within plain men like Taylor as well as within cultivated gentlemen. In fact, Taylor opens a way into the cultural conditions of the first half of the century, enabling us to glimpse that not only was there a polarity between 'the elites' and the people - Capp uses the unfortunate term 'the masses' - but also a continuing interplay up and down the social stairway. 'To educated readers [Taylor] was the acceptable face of popular culture', while to the more lowly of his audience he held out a prospect of 'a social and cultural world beyond their reach'. As 'a cultural mediator' he was hardly a striking success, but the persistence of his efforts commands respect, and Capp has done well to resuscitate him.

Taylor escaped the anticipated end of the world in 1654 and the inauguration of the Protectorate by dying early in December 1653. What, one imagines, would he have made of the short regime of Protector Richard? John Butler, a member of The Cromwell Association, is intrigued by 'the fact' that Richard 'is always there, in the history books, stuck in between Oliver Cromwell and Charles II, and no-one seems particularly interested in him'. This is, of course, an exaggeration. There have been biographies, Voltaire admired him, and the Association has lately put up a plaque at his burial place, but there is always room for a reappraisal of a remarkable man, not an Oliver certainly, but with his own Cromwellian qualities. *A Biography of Richard Cromwell, 1626-1712, The Second Protector* (E Mellen Press, 1994, £35) is a well-documented study, which includes a selection of his letters. It discerns in him capacities, exaggerated perhaps in Andrew Marvell's claim that 'a Cromwell in an hour a Prince may grow' but certainly absolving him, as Butler does, of the charge of being Tumbledown Dick, 'an ape on horseback'. Richard was an attractive personality, with 'neither fraud nor guile in him', intelligent, conciliatory, some might think, but given the intractability of his position in 1659, perhaps not. Butler gives a clear, thoughtful account of the crisis, in which Richard responded sensibly to the prompting of Providence, though in a different way, no doubt, from the one his father might have done. He did not let down the Good Old Cause, but the advocates of various other causes saw him off. He survived, after twenty years of exile, to die at home in the closing years of Queen Anne's reign, smoking, hunting, 'hale and hearty' almost to the last, a quiet end to a life of vicissitudes.

Richard's wife, who long predeceased him, and his daughters, were formidable women, not rarities in any age. Ann Laurence, of the Open University, anatomiser of the parliamentary army chaplains, has turned to 'a social history' of *Women in England 1500-1760* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994, £25 cloth, but a pbk edition at £12.99 is due later this year), tackling them under such headings as 'marriage', 'sex', 'motherhood' and 'health' as well as 'work', 'education' and 'religion'. There is much to say, and much said here, about all of these. To some extent this episodic approach inhibits consideration of whether the

long(ish) period saw or encouraged large changes in attitudes to, by, with or from women and in their actual as distinct from their 'legal' status, though a brief introductory chapter 'Women and the Historians' - increasingly more of the former among the latter - offers intelligent suggestions, and throughout there are indications of processes, such as the way 'many subjects which had been moral matters' affecting women and dealt with in church courts became 'matters of public order or of medical concern'. The chapter on waged labour shows women - single, married, widowed - experiencing, if not enjoying, independence and success in a variety of activities, even as *feme sole merchant* in 'men's' trades. Relaxed regulations during the 1640s and 1650s ensured that after the Restoration 'it proved impossible for gilds and livery companies to regain their hold', offering thereby opportunities for women to run businesses, taken probably by more of them than can be identified in currently available evidence. It may be that you can't keep a good - or tough, or clever, or manipulative - woman down. Women no more than men were immune to the impact of the civil wars and as with men it could work to their advantage or disadvantage. Of particular interest is Laurance's critical approach to the notion of Lawrence Stone, too readily accepted, that family relations in this period lacked love and affection. 'The evidence of women who lost their children suggests that far from caring for them less, the loss of a child could be as devastating a blow as it is today.' Just so. What they did have was their own age's 'set of responses to grief. Laurence notes a growing concern with individualism then and among commentators since and finds it difficult to escape the conclusion that 'individualism is a concept devised by men to describe a process which freed men from the restraints of community'. It has since been extended to women by an iron lady, dedicated to a different set of limitations, those of the market.

'Women in 17th century Devon' are the theme of Janet A. Thompson's *Wives, Widows, Witches and Bitches* (Peter Lang, 1994, £30), case-studies based on thorough research in local and national archives, and taken against the background of an initial chapter on 'English Women in the Seventeenth Century', stressing the misogyny inherent in a patriarchal society and suggesting, though this is not a novelty, that 'perhaps the purest form' of that 'is evidenced in the witch hysteria of the early modern period', which took in 'women hating and fearing other women, and ultimately...women hating themselves'. Thompson's survey of witchcraft in Devon, interestingly enough, suggests that 'the county diverges from the classic chronology of Alan Macfarlane and Keith Thomas which puts the bulk of trials in the reign of Elizabeth'. Here they peaked in the 1650s and continued until nearly the end of the century. This seems to be the case, too, in Somerset and Wiltshire. Few men were charged unless they had some kinship or other close connection to an accused female. Other than that the sense of 'a need to hunt witches came much later [in Devon] than elsewhere', the circumstances there which produced accusations were much the same - 'a breakdown of communal values in a changing

world'. If that is so, that breakdown lagged in Devon 'until after the English Civil War'. Thompson wonders 'if this was not also the case in other more rural and provincial parts', which raises some nagging questions not only about 'wives, widows, witches and bitches'. Thompson is a feminist but she is a historian first and last in casting a cold eye on a world made and developed largely by men, in which presentation for witchcraft was only one, but the most serious one, of many defamations, formal or otherwise, of the female character. Her chapters on female alehouse keepers and of slander cases in the church courts reinforce this point.

Devon comes into its peculiar own, too, in *Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in Devon during the English Civil War* (Exeter UP, 1994, £25) by Mark Stoye, which digs deep into the level of the groups conventionally taken to constitute the mid-seventeenth century political nation to examine actions and reactions of Devonians in town and country to the challenges of military conflict. It is as important in the national context as in the local, but as it is reviewed elsewhere in *Cromwelliana*, enough said.

Ivan Roots

Gordon Wakefield, *John Bunyan the Christian* (Fount Paperback Classics, 1994, £5.99).

The Pilgrim's Progress is still an influential best seller translated into many languages; it was probably the first novel. Many doubtless remember studying *The Pilgrim's Progress* at school. I did so for A-Level English Literature and my knowledge of religion and understanding of the religious changes that were taking place at that time and of their importance were sadly lacking. I wish this book had been around then. Many people might feel that a book on religion could be difficult to read, but this is an excellently constructed book. It was originally published in 1992 by Harper Collins; Fount Paperbacks is part of the same publishing group.

Though this book is classified as a biography, it does not cover all aspects of Bunyan's life but mainly concentrates on the periods which included preaching, imprisonment and his writing. Gordon Wakefield draws together previously published works on Bunyan, answers their criticisms and sets out to explore the events - political, social and religious - which influenced this prolific (sixty works) uneducated writer. This is a well researched and useful publication. There is a section explaining the various sects which collectively come under the 'puritan' heading, and Wakefield explains in great detail the imagery of *The Pilgrim's Progress Parts I and II*. It is well worth reading.

Jane A. Mills

The history of the civil war in Devon, as in most English and Welsh counties, was complex. To oversimplify, the county as a whole appears initially to have been parliamentary, tinged with a hint of apathy and neutralism, fell to the king's men during 1643 and remained royalist until the parliamentary reconquest of the autumn and winter of 1645-6. Beneath this familiar story of military campaigns, occupation and control, however, Dr Mark Stoye detects a much deeper pattern, more complex, far more difficult to reconstruct but ultimately far more rewarding. As the subtitle of this book makes clear, this is a study of 'popular allegiance' at grass roots level, a full-length examination of how and why the broad mass of people within the parishes of Devon responded when faced with the option of supporting king or parliament. Although other historians, particularly David Underdown, have published work in this field recently, far more needs to be done to replace current rather nebulous guess-work with clearly supported and proven interpretations. Accordingly, this book is to be welcomed and is potentially the most important study of the civil war to have appeared during the past year. As such, it merits detailed discussion.

The book is divided into four parts, very different in length and, at times, in quality. Part One, 'The Context', paints a brief 'Portrait of Early Stuart Devon', the main thrust of which is to suggest that, because of a number of factors - sheer physical size, topography, and occupational, social and religious diversity - Stuart Devon was not and could not be a single coherent unit, the 'county community' which some historians of the seventeenth century claimed to have detected a generation or so ago. Instead, Stoye sees the county divided into four principal regions - North Devon, Central Devon (encompassing much of Dartmoor), South Devon (principally the South Hams, including Plymouth) and East Devon (east of the Exe, including Exeter).

In Part Two, much deeper and more rewarding, Stoye argues that in many parishes, urban as well as rural, it is possible to detect a clear, dominant popular allegiance, either to king or to parliament, and that that allegiance was deep-rooted and durable. Further, he suggests that the allegiances of individual parishes reveal broader regional patterns of popular allegiance, which correspond to the four regions already sketched out. North and South Devon were largely parliamentary in allegiance, Central Devon largely royalist; East Devon Stoye finds to be internally divided, the north-east parliamentary, the south-west royalist. Exeter receives more detailed examination which reveals that, although the city as a whole was divided, within many of its urban parishes either royalist or parliamentary allegiances clearly predominated. In constructing these patterns of popular allegiance, a great deal is sometimes squeezed out of rather thin and questionable source material. Although Stoye is aware of this and often seeks to explain and justify his use of sources, doubts must remain about the strength of some of the material used - stray reports from ministers or constables, largely uncorroborated stories of gatherings

or 'risings', the surviving petitions of maimed soldiers, and so forth. Moreover, even if these sources are accepted, they generally relate to a small minority of Devon parishes and give a very incomplete picture of allegiances. Map 2 (p. 53), illustrating 'Parliamentarian parishes, 1642-1646', and Map 3 (p. 73), illustrating 'Royalist parishes, 1642-1646', starkly reveal that surviving evidence reveals the allegiance of only a tiny proportion of the 465 parishes of civil war Devon. In the light of its quality, quantity and distribution, the degree to which broad regional and county-wide interpretations can safely be constructed from such evidence is debatable.

In Part Three, Stoye seeks to explain the patterns of popular allegiance which he has detected. He is highly sceptical of explanations which rest upon the leadership of the gentry, portraying the masses as unthinking fodder whose participation was determined by deference to, or pressure from, the social elite. He is equally unconvinced by suggestions that differing popular allegiance sprang from differences in race (Cornish Celts against Devonian Anglo-Saxons), land use and agricultural regions (the thesis of Underdown and others that wood-pasture areas tended to be parliamentary while arable areas tended to be royalist), or occupation (parliamentary townsmen, cloth-workers and fishermen against royalist rural labourers and tanners), in each case finding insufficient evidence firmly to prove these suggestions and too many exceptions to accept them. Similarly, he argues that civil war allegiance cannot have been determined by the political opinions of the pre-war years, for the surviving evidence of opinion at gentry level and below invariably points to criticism of the king's government; thus it cannot explain the divided allegiances of the war years. Instead, Stoye is far more taken with the theory that popular allegiance was determined by religion, suggesting that those areas in which radical Protestantism had taken deepest root in the century before 1640 tended to be parliamentary, whilst those areas least affected by the new ideas and where religious conservatism predominated tended to be royalist. All this is argued in some detail and by drawing upon a variety of local sources. Once again, a great deal is made of some far from unimpeachable sources - on religious conservatism alone, the use made of inevitably patchy and incomplete records concerning the holding of church ales and 'revels', the erection of may poles and the incidence of civil war iconoclasm is open to question.

The fourth and final part of the book looks briefly at the 'National Picture', exploring whether the sort of divided popular allegiance uncovered in Devon can also be detected in other English and Welsh counties, and if so, whether a case can be made for religious factors predominating there also. Stoye generally answers the first question clearly in the affirmative and the second more cautiously so. However, this assessment is based upon a trawl through earlier published county and regional histories, most of which were not seeking to explore or explain popular allegiances and few of which attempted a comparable analysis of the same type of sources which Stoye employs for Devon.

No matter, this book stands or falls on its analysis of the Devon situation and the Devon evidence in Parts Two and Three. Here Stoye is

undoubtedly impressive, employing a wide array of source material and squeezing a great deal from those sources. The arguments are clear and the finished book is a testament to meticulous research and to complex but lucid argument - in every way a *tour de force*. Given the surviving materials with which he had to work, he has probably gone as far as it is possible to go in reconstructing and then explaining popular allegiances in Devon. His work will undoubtedly be copied for other English and Welsh counties but, unless unusually rich sources are lurking elsewhere, is unlikely to be bettered. Nagging doubts remain, however. Has the source material been pushed too far? Can such broad county-wide conclusions about popular allegiance be drawn from the surviving sources, often patchy, incomplete, open to differing interpretation and relating only to a small minority of Devon parishes?

Glenn Foard, *Colonel John Pickering's Regiment of Foot 1644-1645* (Pryor Publications, 1994, £7.99).

This is a well researched and well presented history of one of the parliamentary infantry regiments created in spring 1644 as part of the expansion of the Eastern Association and absorbed into the New Model Army roughly a year later. From its inception, it was commanded by Colonel John Pickering, a member of the illustrious Northamptonshire family of that name. One of his brothers, Sir Gilbert Pickering, became even more famous as a leading light in the court of Protector Cromwell and a member of his Protectoral Council of State; Sir Gilbert married a sister of another sometime Protectoral Councillor, Edward Mountagu, later 1st Earl of Sandwich, a new biography of whom is reviewed above. This study begins by exploring the Pickering family and by looking at the creation of John's regiment, in the process giving brief histories of Pickering's subordinate regimental officers. It closes with John's death at Ottery St Mary in November 1645, victim of the diseases rampant in army camps, and with a brief review of the subsequent history of the regiment under its new commander, the regicide John Hewson. The bulk of the study, however, is given over to reconstructing and exploring the campaigns undertaken by Pickering's regiment during 1644 and 1645, taking in Marston Moor and second Newbury, Naseby, Langport, Bristol and Basing House. It is possible to discern the precise role played by this particular regiment in some, though not all, of these actions. The author draws upon a broad selection of printed and unprinted sources, including the 'Commonwealth Exchequer Papers' (SP 28) in the Public Record Office. These papers, used to good effect here, can show where a regiment quartered, identify its junior officers, indicate levels of pay and total costs and reveal how and with what it was supplied. As a regimental history, this study inevitably has a fairly narrow focus; it does not seek to give an overall account of the civil war or to compare this regiment with others. Within these confines, this is an impressive and lucid account, rich in quotations from contemporary documents, and is a useful addition to the growing corpus of regimental histories.

Oliver Cromwell, God's Englishman (W.H. Smith Exclusive Video & Book, 1994, £15).

This 55-minute colour video explores the life and career of Cromwell through a mixture of dramatic reconstruction - including battle re-enactments and 'living history' scenes - and film of seventeenth century buildings, portraits and so forth, supported by off-camera narration. The credits indicate that it was written and directed by Bob Carruthers, though with the assistance as historical adviser of Dr Les Prince, a member of The Cromwell Association; Dr Prince appears on the video briefly explaining key points. Cromwell is played by Mick Greenway, suitably made up to carry off a passable physical likeness of Oliver. The approach, broadly chronological, includes a very good, illuminating and full discussion of the religious milieu in which Cromwell grew up, exploring predestination, providentialism and puritanism, and a briefer though adequate account of the causes of the civil war. Like Cromwell's career itself, the coverage becomes much fuller after the outbreak of war and explores in some detail Cromwell's role in the civil wars of the years 1642-51.

The point is rightly made that Cromwell was better and more assured as a soldier than as a politician. Much the same could be said of the video. The assessment of Cromwell's military career, from Edgehill to Worcester taking in Wales, Ireland and Scotland en route, is clear and admirable. Particularly good use is made of Cromwell's own letters and speeches, key extracts from which are delivered on-camera by the actor playing Cromwell. However, the coverage of Cromwell the politician is less thorough and satisfactory. Some episodes are skated over - there is, for example, almost nothing on Cromwell at the Reading and Putney debates of 1647, and the explanation of his ejection of the Rump in spring 1653 is very thin. Some blunders are made - Charles I's third parliament and Cromwell's first did not first meet in February 1629, the members of the Nominated Assembly did not resign because Cromwell had rejected their offer of the crown, there is no evidence to suggest that in its wake Cromwell reluctantly accepted a written constitution prepared by the Assembly before its dissolution, he did not rule 'with his Major Generals' in 1654, and after his death the Protectorate did not survive for twenty months until the Restoration. A couple of slips of the pen or of the narrator's tongue have also escaped detection - Cromwell dissolved his second Protectorate Parliament in 1658, not 1648, and the military historian quoted on Cromwell in Ireland is C.H. Firth, not Frith. Indeed, the video pack usefully includes a booklet reprinting extracts from Firth's *Cromwell's Army*. As an account of Cromwell the politician, this video has limitations, and pales beside John Morrill's BBC lecture in the *Late Great Britons* series. As an account of Cromwell the soldier, this is an excellent production which is to be warmly welcomed and recommended.

Peter Gaunt

BRITANNIA'S AGONY

Oh, sleeping Britannia -
Where is your greatest son?
The greatness he gave us,
The liberties he left us?
Like Oliver, they lie with our flag
In the dust.
Oliver was Britannia, our flag, the soul of
Our nation.
Without Oliver, no Britannia, no flag, no freedom, no soul.
No Parliament can function without him,
No man inspired,
No shore defended.
As Britannia groans beneath the weight of
An unjust Roman Treaty
She also cries out in agony:
'Oh, Cromwell! Where art thou?
Thy People and I, Britannia, need thee!'

John West & Alison Knowles

SUMMER SEASON 1995

The Cromwell Museum,
Grammar School Walk,
Huntingdon.
Tel (01480) 425830.

open Tuesday-Friday 11am-1pm 2-5pm
Saturday & Sunday 11am-1pm 2-4pm
Monday closed

admission free

Oliver Cromwell's House,
29 St Mary's Street,
Ely.
Tel (01353) 662062.

open every day 10am-6pm

(minor interior building work currently in progress,
leading to opening of upper storey later this year)

admission charge

The Commandery,
Sidbury,
Worcester.
Tel (01905) 355071.

open Monday-Saturday 10am-5pm
Sunday 1.30-5.30pm

admission charge

CROMWELLIANA

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